


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11 JULY 1988



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KOMMUNIST

No 6, April 1988

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KOMMUNIST

No 6, April 1988

New Document by Vladimir Ilich Lenin

*18020012a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian
No 6, Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 3-6*

[Text] For nearly 80 years V.I. Lenin's letter to I.P. Goldenberg, member of the RSDWP Central Committee, dated 28 October (10 November) 1909, which we publish below, remained in the files of the police department in manuscript form and a typewritten copy (opening and inspection of correspondence), currently preserved at the USSR TsGAOR. It was discovered by I.Ye. Gorelov, doctor of historical sciences and professor at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, and by V.S. Emeksuzyan, candidate of historical sciences and docent at the Krasnoyarsk State Medical Institute. With their help, members of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism proved through their research that V.I. Lenin was the letter's author.

The letter was written in the atmosphere of reaction which occurred after the defeat of the first Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905-1907. This was one of the most difficult periods in the history of the Bolshevik Party. The party went into clandestinity under the circumstances of the harsh persecution to which the tsarist government subjected the revolutionaries, the bolsheviks in particular. In December 1907 Lenin was forced to emigrate abroad. He lived initially in Geneva and subsequently, as of December 1908, in Paris.

At that time Lenin considered the party's task as one of preparing for the inevitable new revolutionary upsurge and as protecting and strengthening the clandestine party organizations, combining clandestine work with work within a variety of legal organizations and strengthening the party's organizational and ideological unity.

The letter was written by Lenin in Paris and mailed to Petersburg. In it Lenin discusses the composition of the editorial collegium of NOVYY DEN, the legal newspaper of the social democratic faction of the Third State Duma, one of the editors of which was I.P. Goldenberg, the addressee, and the funds needed for continuing the publication of the newspaper. This part of the letter broadens our views on the role which Lenin and the bolsheviks played in the use of legal possibilities of strengthening the ties between the clandestine party and the masses and, in particular, with the leadership of the Duma's social democratic faction.

During the reaction period Lenin waged a decisive struggle against mensheviks and other opportunists. The letter criticizes, sharply and on a principle-minded basis, liquidationists, conciliationists and Trotskyites. Lenin indicates the need for a cautious attitude toward statements by individual liquidationists on abandoning their

erroneous views, and testing this in action. He reports to Goldenberg that he personally, in Paris, is engaged in a sharp struggle against the conciliationists on the subject of menshevik-liquidationists and Trotskyites.

In his letter Lenin exposes Trotsky's centrism. He proves that Trotsky, hiding behind the mask of the struggle against factionalism, in fact through his own actions restores the "worst possible means of the worst possible menshevik factionalists," creating his own faction and publishing the factional newspaper PRAVDA in Vienna. Lenin calls Trotsky an intrigue-maker and firmly refuses to help and establish contact with him and calls for an uncompromising struggle against him.

The letter includes Lenin's advice to bolsheviks in Russia on how best to achieve a rapprochement between bolsheviks and menshevik-party members in the struggle against liquidationists and for the preservation and strengthening of the RSDWP.

This document is of great importance in the study of party history during the reaction period of 1907-1910 and the life and activities of the leader of the Bolshevik Party.

The letter will be included in the next Leninist collection. The publication was prepared by R.M. Savitskaya, institute consultant and doctor of historical sciences.

CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism

Letter to I.P. Goldenberg

28 October (10 November) 1909 (1)

Dear colleague! I returned to lay from a trip (2) and read your letters, the first on the shortened and other articles, with explanations with which I was already familiar, and the second on the fact that it is probably true that the demons are tossing us around. Unquestionably, a series of misunderstandings has developed (as a result of the lateness in obtaining from you accurate news on the nature of the Ebdo (3)) and, one would think, there will be more of the same. However, most of the points you cover have already been settled by the development of the situation.

As far as "my project" is concerned, I insisted on a journal and not an Ebdo. I do not deny that this Ebdo is needed with the mandatory and absolute majority of support within the collegium (three out of five), with which you too agree. Therefore, this item as well has been settled.

Unless we achieve a three vs. two, the swing vote must be held by a reliable person such as Steklov. I hope that you can smooth difficulties concerning the opposition to him.

Why not recruit Stepanov? As to Bazarov (4) I would be very happy to learn that he is with us on matters of philosophy. It would be good to start by testing him in action, with a number of articles, before letting him become the editor. In any case, however, I have absolutely nothing against him in terms of the Ebdo, should the success of this project depend on such a combination.

Finances have improved and that which was suggested you will receive quite soon (5). In my view, you are absolutely right in the matter of "proving to the Kurd-yukovists (6) that the conversion from Kurdyukovism in this case is not all that simple, and that it is not sufficient simply to state that we are not liquidationists but must prove in fact the content of this latest statement." Now this seems to be, unquestionably, the latest "fashion:" to proclaim in words that I am allegedly not a liquidationist whereas I am one in fact (as written—editor). In this case we must display triple caution, restraint and actual testing. We must not be pondering and test "under our own" control before trustingly opening our arms.

Here I am waging a rather sharp and ever aggravating struggle precisely for this reason, with all of my friends, who have become trusting to the point of the ridiculous, and would like to throw their arms around Martov's and Trotsky's necks. As to the latter, let me say that he has extracted from the German Party (sic!!?) money for his own firm, for his own faction! This intrigue-maker is fighting factionalism while personally **duplicating** the worst methods of the worst factionalists mensheviks in Stuttgart (when Plekhanov and company took money from the Germans not for the party but for the faction, for which reason they were criticized in front of Bebel and forced to surrender the money to the party). In my view it is mandatory to force Trotsky to do that which Plekhanov was forced to do, to question Trotsky on this subject officially, and officially to suggest to him to put an end, once and for all, to such a risky game. I firmly and absolutely oppose any help to him after such a behavior and I am against sending "to him" "someone." I will fight against my closest friends fiercely, including the writing of articles that I will send to the press here. In our circles an awareness is beginning to be lost of the distinction between a **rapprochement among factions** which are strong, influential and real and which lead the labor movement in Russia and which promote the party through their rapprochement, and the slackness, looseness and weakening of factions, Trotskyism, and making up (which are of advantage only to the liquidationists or intrigue-makers). Trotsky may find it suitable to play with the "school at NN" (7) and print hypocritical and false things about it. Trotsky is raising Trotskyites who disseminate among the workers the worst baseness and idiocy (we recently received from Russia a model of hectographed incredible baseness (8), disseminated by the Trotskyites on behalf of the Moscow District Committee). Trotsky finds it suitable to promote intrigues together with "his own" literary group. Trotsky finds it suitable to promote intrigues among the fledglings

against the party (allegedly I represent the party while the Central Committee is a faction).... No, enough of that. If such is the case what we need here is not help but struggle. If he wants to march separately as a faction, let him. To help in such matters would be on our part a shameful tactic, a suicidal tactic. We must gain the majority, as we have done here and you have done with Ebdo. We must set as a minority all party members, mensheviks as well as noncommitted members, we must lead that minority down a strictly loyal party way. Only thus can and must we unite the party rather than throw ourselves in the arms of various circles, groups, factions, etc.

Yours.

1. The incident on Frey's leaving the editorial board has been settled (9). 2. In a few days the 620 rubles needed to reach a total of 1,000, will be sent (10).

Sent from Paris to Petersburg.

First publication based on manuscript copy (opened and inspected mail)

Footnotes

1. I.P. Goldenberg (Vishnevskiy) (1873-1922) was a social democrat who became a bolshevik after the Second RSDWP Congress. During the 1905-1907 revolution he was a member of the editorial board of a number of bolshevik publications. In 1907 he participated in the work of the Fifth (London) RSDWP Congress, where he was elected Central Committee member. In January 1910 he became member of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, and displayed conciliationist leanings toward the liquidationists. In World War I he joined the defenders—G.V. Plekhanov's supporters. In 1917-1919 he supported the views of the new-lifers. He was readmitted to the Bolshevik Party in 1920.

The typewritten opened and inspected copy of the letter begins with the following data: "Paris, 28 October 1909. To Poletayev, member of the State Duma, St Petersburg, the Tauride Palace (for Vishnevsk.)" This indicates that the letter was sent to I.P. Goldenberg (his pseudonym was Vishnevskiy) via N.G. Poletayev, who was member of the Third State Duma. As to the date of the letter, the inspected copy does not stipulate the calendar used. However, the manuscript copy of the letter has the note "1 November 1909. Incoming number 3012x—2/XI/9," which leads us to believe that the inspected copy of the letter was dated according to the old calendar. The content of the letter should be taken into consideration. The appendix states that the incident on the withdrawal of Frey (Lenin's pseudonym) from the editorial board of the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT has been settled and that this occurred only on 6 November (Gregorian

calendar) 1909. Consequently, Lenin could have described this fact only after 23 October (Julian calendar) and not before 6 November (Gregorian calendar) 1909.

As an exile abroad, Lenin dated his letters in the Gregorian calendar but in this case, obviously, the official who copied the letter converted the date from the new style, 10 November, to the old style, 28 October 1909. The same occurred with other inspected Leninist mail.

2. On 23 October (5 November) 1909 Lenin traveled from Paris to Brussels to attend the session of the International Socialist Bureau, from which he returned on 28 October (10 November) 1909.

We have been unable to find Goldenberg's letter to which Lenin's is an answer.

3. The word Ebdo was used by Lenin conspiratorially, to describe the newspaper NOVYY DEN, which was a weekly. This word is an abbreviation (in its Russian transliteration) of the French word "hebdomadaire," which means "weekly."

NOVYY DEN was a legal newspaper published in Petersburg from 20 July (2 August) to 13 (26) December 1909. A total of 15 issues came out. Initially the newspaper belonged to an unaffiliated group. In August 1909, permission for the publication of this newspaper was purchased by the bolsheviks Goldenberg and A.Yu. Finn-Yenotayevskiy. In addition to them, the editors included N.I. Iordanskiy, who was a menshevik-Plekhanovite, and one K.L. Veydemyuller. Actually, the newspaper was edited by Goldenberg and Iordanskiy. After Iordanskiy's departure (October 1909) Goldenberg decided to continue publication with other editors. It was precisely on this matter, as well as on the matter of the necessary money to continue with the publication of the newspaper that he wrote to Lenin. In the letter we published, Lenin suggested an editorial board consisting of three bolsheviks and two mensheviks or, should this fail, to recruit Yu.M. Steklov and I.I. Skvortsov-Stepanov as editors. The new editorial board was joined, in addition to Goldenberg, by the bolsheviks M.S. Olminskiy and Steklov.

NOVYY DEN came out as a social democratic newspaper. Actually, it was an organ of the social democratic faction of the Third State Duma. The bolsheviks used the newspaper during the Petersburg electoral campaign for supplementary elections for the Third State Duma. Issues Nos 9 and 15 of 14 (27) September and 13 December 1909 included Lenin's articles "Once Again on Party-Mindedness and Nonparty-Mindedness" and "On VEKHI" (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Completed Collected Works], vol 19, pp 109-111 and 167-175). The newspaper carried articles by I.P. Pokrovskiy and N.G. Poletayev, who were members of the social democratic

faction of the Third State Duma, and by V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich and M.S. Olminskiy. Issue No 16 of the newspaper was also ready for publication but did not come out, for the newspaper was closed down by the police.

4. V.A. Bazarov (Rudnev) (1874-1939) was a philosopher and an economist. He had been a social democrat since 1896; in 1905-1907 he was a contributor to a number of bolshevik publications. During the reaction period he promoted the ideas of "God-building" and empiriocriticism. In the final years of his life he was a translator of fiction and philosophical publications.

Lenin waged a struggle against the Machist views displayed by Bazarov in his book "*Materialism and Empiriocriticism*" (see op cit., vol 18, pp 7-384) and continued to accuse him of idealism and concessions to Machism in its essential aspects, of supporting the VEKHI trend, switching to the camp of the liquidationists, and so on, in works which were written after said book (see Ibid., vol 20, pp 90-94, 109-110, 114, 122, 129-130, 132 and 133; vol 47, p 202; vol 48, pp 140-141).

Apparently, Goldenberg had reported to Lenin his own or someone else's view to the effect that Bazarov seemed to support the bolsheviks on philosophical problems. Lenin did not trust this communication all that much and suggested that Bazarov be tested in action, with a number of articles, before making him member of the editorial board of the newspaper NOVYY DEN.

5. This refers to the funds needed for the publication of NOVYY DEN. Based on the resolution "On Legal Publications," which was adopted at a conference of the expanded editorial board of PROLETARIY (see "*KPSS v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh Sezdov, Konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK*" [CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses and Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], vol 1, p 349), on Lenin's motion 1,000 rubles were appropriated for the Duma newspaper from the 1,500 rubles which had been allocated for legal publications (see V.I. Lenin, op cit., vol 19, p 31). In his letter, Lenin tells Goldenberg that the 1,000 rubles appropriated for the newspaper would be sent soon.

6. "Kurdyukovists" was an adjective borrowed from a humorous poem by I.P. Myatlev "*Sensations and Remarks by Mrs Kurdyukova Abroad—Dans l'Etranger*," which was published in three parts in Petersburg between 1840 and 1844, in which the author mocked the ignorance of the Russian nobility which revered anything foreign. The term "Kurdyukovists" applied to the liquidationists who were trying to "Europeanize" the Russian Social Democratic Party, and to reorganize it in the manner of a European social democratic party and to create a legal rather than clandestine party, i.e., to adapt it to tsarist conditions.

7. This refers to the party school which was organized in 1909 on the island of Capri (Italy) by the Otzovists, Ultimatists and "God-Builders." The conference of the expanded editorial board of PROLETARIY, which was held in June 1909, resolved that under the guise of this school Otzovists and Ultimatists were organizing in Capri their own factional center. The school opened in August 1909. It had 13 students. Lenin answered the official invitation of the school's organizers to come to Capri as a lecturer in the negative. In November 1909 there was a split in the school: several students separated themselves from the Bogdanovists, for which reason they were expelled from the school. Invited by Lenin, they came to Paris to hear a cycle of lectures, including Lenin's "Our Time and Our Tasks," and "Stolypin's Agrarian Policy." In December 1909 the school lecturers with the students who had remained in Capri organized the "Vpered" antibolshevik group.

8. Lenin referred to the hectographed "Report" issued by the factional party school in Capri. He published a critique of this report in a note "From the Editors" to the "Open Letter of the Executive Commission of the Moscow Okrug Committee" which came out in PROLETARIY Nos 47-48 of 5 (18) September 1909 (see op cit., vol 19, p 67).

9. This incident arose as a result of the differences between Lenin and the conciliationists in the editorial board of TsO, the newspaper SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT. Lenin suggested the publication of an editorial he had written "On Methods of Strengthening Our Party and Its Unity" (not located) in which he demanded that a decisive struggle be waged against liquidationism and defended the need to preserve and strengthen the independent bolshevik organization. However, at their 21-22 October (3-4 November) 1909, the majority of editors (G. Zinovev, L. Kamenev, L. Martov and A. Varskiy) rejected the article as an editorial and suggested that it be signed by its author as a basis for discussion. At that point Lenin raised for discussion a "Draft Resolution on Strengthening the Party and Its Unity" (which he had written on 21 October (3 November) 1909 (see op cit., vol 19, p 125). This motion as well was rejected by two votes against, two for and one abstaining. On 22 October (4 November) 1909 Lenin announced his resignation from the editorial board of the TsO (see op cit., vol 47, p 218). After the Executive Commission of the Bolshevik Center intervened, a text was drafted of a collective statement to the editors of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT by the bolshevik members of the editorial board and the representative of the Polish Social Democrats, to the effect that this incident, based on a misunderstanding, should be considered as never having happened (see *Ibid.*, p 287). Lenin signed this declaration on 24 October (6 November) 1909, while attending the session of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels. The incident was considered closed.

10. From the 1,000 rubles appropriated for the newspaper NOVYY DEN, 380 rubles were sent on 24 October

(6 November), while the remaining 620 rubles were sent on 5 (18) November 1909 (TsPA IML, f. 377, op. 1, d. 215, ll. 17, 18).

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Bedrock Foundation of Party Life

18020012b Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 7-17

[Article by Aleksandr Yakimovich Degtyarev, secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Now, when we already have acquired an initial experience and have seen the first results of perestroyka, we need a fuller, a considered understanding of the scale of the needed change in the depth of the developing process of democratization of social life. Initially, in the first post-April days and months, it seemed to many that all that it took was to come out of the swamp of stagnation and go beyond the next hill and the objective would be attained.

However, after taking the first hundred steps, after climbing on the first rung, the horizon of the tremendous changes which, as we progress, becomes increasingly broader, became rapidly apparent. The place of solved problems is now taken by new, more difficult ones. What is pleasing, however, is that in the course of our advance the energy of the party and the people, steadily expended on major or minor projects, is not declining but, conversely, increasing. Such are the dialectics of perestroika.

Democratization is an all-embracing process which imbues social structures, combining them through qualitatively new ties and relations. It cannot be carried out as a campaign and completed initially in one sector, followed by another and a third. It must be considered as an integral process the scale of which could be equated to a scientific and technical or cultural revolution. Actually, it is a revolution of our political culture. "Democratization is consistent with the very essence of the Leninist concept of socialism," M.S. Gorbachev, party Central Committee general secretary, noted at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum. "It enables our society to attain the ideals for the sake of which the October Revolution was made."

It is precisely in accordance with this understanding that, in our view, we must structure our work today. We must also be prepared for the fact that not everything will be obtained immediately: some things will have to be redone and "brought up," and a great deal not only of the old and ordinary but also of what was born in the course

of restructuring, will have to be abandoned. Such is one of the characteristic features of any revolutionary process and today's is no exception.

The first thing we try to leave behind as soon as possible is the customary old campaign ability to adapt with exceptional speed to any innovation and, at any time, lightheartedly, to drop it. That is why we must not allow for the clarification of the tasks of restructuring and its main components to assume the nature of a short propaganda campaign. It is one of the long-term components of ideological work, the implementation of which demands not only to bring to light the objectives formulated by the party but also to oppose any thoughtless and superficial definitions of the tasks which face society and which may appear. Of late, for example, the idea that there are no alternatives to restructuring is frequently interpreted (particularly in oral propaganda) as the absolute necessity to upgrade the standard of material consumptions, whereas matters are in fact much more complex and serious, as they affect the basic interests of society. Perestroyka is the reasoned choice of our people and the failure to implement it would make us clearly question our own historical destiny.

In turn, democratization, which is one of the two most important components of restructuring, is a complex structural process which develops under the influence of several social forces and a variety of economic, social, ideological, legal and other factors.

The party's ideological activities and the readiness and ability of the broad party aktiv to engage in daily educational work under the new circumstances are particularly important in terms of the systematic expansion and intensification of democracy. I recall a recent case: at a meeting of the buro of a raykom, criticized for poorly involving managers in propaganda work, the secretary of a large party organization let out the following cry from the heart: "One cannot involve everyone by the numbers. This is no simple matter! One-half of you would be unable to cope with the problem, yet you are demanding the literal involvement of the entire command!"

We can see behind this short but ardent discussion the current struggle for developing a new understanding of propaganda and, in general, all ideological work. The time is past when the activities of a considerable section of ideological personnel were reduced to filling the spiritual-moral atmosphere of society with "propaganda balloons." We are also abandoning the narrow understanding of political education: if the indicators are good it means that the ideologues are doing good work; if labor productivity has dropped and drunkenness has become widespread (as though it was not used in solving budget problems!), and if the people are dissatisfied with the lack of variety in the stores, it means that the propagandists had not done all they should, that educational influence is not on the necessary level, for the comrades have not fully understood the situation....

In the very first stage of the post-April changes the broad party aktiv carried out an important ideological assignment: within the shortest possible time the ideas of restructuring conquered the masses, in general and as a whole, and became a real motive force. In Leningrad, for example, over the past 2 years public opinion surveys have steadily indicated that the overwhelming majority of the working people are in favor of restructuring. The main task of today is to preserve and qualitatively to intensify this nationwide support and convert it more rapidly to the level of substantial practical accomplishments.

Intensifying democratization also sheds a light on the ignored or, more accurately, difficult to detect faults which have accumulated in party work. For example, for many years we were proud of the organized system of economic education of the working people although this system failed to withstand even the initial trials of perestroyka! In the spring of 1986, when on the initiative of the Leningrad party organization work was mounted in our area to convert industry to two- or three-shift operations, this fact became fully apparent. We came across lack of understanding, silent opposition or even poorly concealed sabotage of the adopted line (for example, at night the lights were left burning in the shops so that members of the raykom or any passer-by would think that the plant was working on three shifts). Yet at that time it was a question of finally beginning to take into consideration basic specific economic laws which had been drilled into the students by the propagandists at each class. It was particularly annoying that such an attitude became widespread among economic managers on different levels, starting with line management. The elimination of this unexpected difficulty, generally speaking, (since confidence prevailed in the efficiency of the economic training system) required a quick change of many components of political and economic training, adapting what was left to the new realities (so far our study of the efficiency of available propaganda means has been clumsy and sporadic. A recent survey indicated, for example, that the "Television Course for Propagandists," on which a great deal of efforts is being spent, is considered valuable by no more than 4 percent (!) of surveyed propagandists. One-third of them did not watch this program at all; 47 percent watched it occasionally, in the hope that some interesting materials would be presented. Nor does it "work" in influencing the public at large, for 84 percent of the people of Leningrad do not watch this program at all).

Now, when multiple-shift work has become an intrinsic part of economic life in the area, this event remains a covered but remembered lesson, for it clearly reflects a problem which is becoming aggravated with every passing day. In a certain sense, it is a key feature of the entire restructuring. It is the problem of the activeness of the party organizations on all levels in implementing the earmarked line. It faces today with particular urgency the primary party units, which are its foundations. Every one of us has frequently read in resolutions issued on

different levels that the combativeness of party organizations is growing steadily. However, in a number of party organizations the qualities which this concept brings together turned out to be quite lost during the period of stagnation. This was natural, for no particular need for them had existed over a long period of time. Furthermore, tolerance and an amorphous attitude appeared in the internal life of many party organizations, imperceptibly affecting the observance of fundamental statutory principles. A recent case in point forced us to think about it: a party organization (of more than 100 members) determined at its meeting who to support in the elections. When the votes were counted, however, it became clear that those in favor of the selected candidate were far fewer than the number of party members of the organization. Many party members deemed admissible and possible for themselves and not prejudicial in the least anonymously to oppose the line which had been collectively adopted, instead of engaging in personal agitation and organizational work among members of the Komsomol and nonparty people in favor of it, or else, had they disagreed with the suggested candidacies, publicly to object to them during the debates.

As we consider the nature of such internal erosion, we reach the conclusion that this is one of the sad consequences of the period which we now describe as one of stagnation, a consequence of the bureaucratization and, in the final account, the distortion of the Leninist principles of cadre policy. During that period work with the reserve became a virtually secret field of activities conducted by a very small circle of officials. Such "secrecy" facilitated the implementation of arbitrary decisions. The selection of cadres was actually removed from the area of activities of party members, and bolshevik traditions in this area were largely abandoned. The current apathy, lack of commitment and even scorn, most frequently subconscious, of statutory principles are the result of those long years of lethargy. They are being eliminated in the course of the developing democratization of intraparty life. This is one of the vital tasks of the democratization.

By the end of 1987, when accountability reports were being submitted by party committees and party bureos of the Leningrad party organization on managing perestroika, one of the items on the agenda of such meetings was the discussion of the immediate and the long-term reserve of party organization managers. Such discussions took a variety of aspects. In some areas no progress was made and matters were reduced to a despondent approval of the state. In the majority of organizations, however, a different situation prevailed. In frequent cases the preliminary work done by the party buro in developing a reserve was rejected by the party members. Discussions assumed a sharp and principle-minded nature. In a number of organizations this sharpness reached a critical level of a different sort: the planned reserve had to be used immediately, for the party members deemed unsatisfactory the work of secretaries and even party bureos in guiding restructuring.

This was a beneficial gravity. In comparing our present attitude toward such events in party life with that which prevailed several years ago, one can understand and see the real result of a restructuring of the mind, for until recently secretaries re-elected "on an unplanned basis" and a consideration that the work of a buro was unsatisfactory were considered an exceptional event and the "culprits" were being mollified in all reports. They had "failed to master," they had "allowed," or they had "failed to ensure." Those whose job was truly to control the circumstances within the party organization—the party members—were either ignored or accused of "immaturity." Today we look at such processes as a grave yet necessary reality, a standard in restructuring.

Cadre selection for party bodies is based on a new style. Today the cadres are assigned on the recommendation of the primary organizations, which greatly reduces the likelihood of errors in this matter, which is of utmost importance to party life.

In the past 2 years nearly one-half of the personnel of party raykoms and gorkoms have been replaced in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast; among them the number of people with economic training and of specialists in industrial sectors of the greatest importance to Leningrad has increased. There is also an increased number of people who, in addition to their specialized training also have higher party-political training. Such people can master more rapidly the ways and means of party influence on the economic, social and ideological processes involved in restructuring.

It is necessary to point out that in each case replacing one official with another is dictated exclusively by the interests of the project. In this case we deem inadmissible any stupid campaign promotion, bureaucratic administration and subjectivism. The basic criterion in cadre selection is the attitude of the individual toward perestroika and his active participation in it.

Restructuring makes us reconsider requirements which sometimes appear extremely simple. Any new party member must memorize the first paragraph of the statutes. But does everyone observe it, not formally, but to its fullest extent? For the solution of our problems directly depends on how active a party member participates in the work of his organization. If we believe our statistics, party assignments are being implemented by the absolute majority of party members. However, no more than 20 or 30 percent of the party members have been given truly responsible and serious assignments. The others have assignments which may be considered either as a formality or as insignificant or, in other words, assignments for the sake of assignments, for the sake of accountability.

We are trying to change this practice radically. Every party member must be assigned a social project which will help to solve one problem of restructuring or another. This is particularly important now, in the

course of a mass conversion to contemporary economic management methods. Everyone must do what has been assigned to him, without taking the jobs of others or asking to be replaced in his own. This too is a facet of democratization, which organically combines with responsibility for the assigned work sector. In this case it may not be mandatory in the least to adopt as the inviolable rule the formal recording of "assignments," which is being persistently urged by our system of various accountabilities, oriented toward "encompassing" and mandatorily expanding on the basis of the level already attained. Actually, we have become accustomed to replace the end result—the efficiency of the efforts of party organizations—with the system of "assignments for their own sake."

The democratization of intraparty life is the most important part of the general process, comparable in significance only to the pressing and already occurring changes in the role which the soviets play in our society. A great deal has already changed in their work and positive processes are occurring, whether faster or more slowly. In recent times alone, subsequent to the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers 1986 decree on measures for the further enhancement of the role and increased responsibility of the soviets for the acceleration of socio-economic development, an essentially new style has developed in the work of the Leningrad Soviet. It involves the formulation of unified plans for the development of the city and the oblast, including a regional general plan for the period until the year 2005. The Leningrad Soviet was granted and is making active use of the right to include in enterprise plans, regardless of departmental affiliation, orders which are necessary in solving local problems. Now enterprises under union and republic jurisdiction must coordinate with it their own planning documents, particularly as far as the development of the social area is concerned. Currently the local budget receives as much as 10 percent of the profit of enterprises located on the territory subordinated to a specific soviet. These are merely a few of the major features which confirm the fact that the previously reduced full power of the soviets is now being restored.

Paralleling practical work, an extensive debate and discussion of ways of further progress are taking place. One of the main lines has become quite clearly crystallized. The pressing need for restoring the full rights of the soviets on all levels, understood in its Leninist meaning, as agencies of the people's rule, is deemed essential. This was actually demonstrated in the period of and the functioning of the command-administrative system, in which the self-expanding executive apparatus had begun to legislate, triggering an ocean of still operative instructions, which prevailed over the laws themselves.

Obviously, it was precisely in an effort to counter the growing bureaucratic pressure that the local party committees were frequently forced to assume the functions of soviet bodies. Efforts were made to correct one

distortion with another: instead of strengthening the weakened soviets, the party committees began to solve their problems, taking over a tremendous amount of daily and sometimes strictly communal work, such as the allocation of released premises, approving construction projects, drafting various stipulations for communal services, etc.

We had become so greatly accustomed to such a gradually established understanding of the role of the party authorities in society that today we can poorly imagine any other forms of interaction. Where does an economic manager who needs an industrial area go: to the soviet or to the sectorial department of the obkom? The experienced one goes immediately to the obkom, knowing that, as it were, the executive committee would have to obtain the obkom's agreement. The functions of party and soviet authorities have become so intertwined, involved in an odd but universally accepted symbiosis, that to this day, in the period of renovation, we are still viewing them through the old lenses. That is why no one wonders at cases of releasing a raykom secretary for the poor organization of trade in vegetables or for poor preparations for heating supplies in winter, as we have been frequently told by the press.

This is understandable, for the old type of established relations between party and soviet authorities continues to prevail unchallenged. That is why the party journalists are discussing so energetically the problem of "Soviets and Departments," virtually ignoring the delicate area of their relations with the local party authorities. However, the logic of democratization will inevitably demand a solution of this problem, for which reason, I believe, this item must be fully included, on a principle-minded basis, in the agenda of problems to be discussed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The start of the comprehensive study of this problem was laid in M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum. He described the question of demarcating between the functions of party and state authorities as a "basic problem in the reform of the political system." The extensive party discussion of this problem becomes, in this connection, one of the tasks in the preparations for the party conference.

The question of what changes are necessary in order to make the mechanism for the consideration of public opinion in daily social practice as efficient as possible becomes relevant and pressing in connection with the increased role of the soviets. The general system seems to be clear. Obviously, under the conditions of glasnost the phenomenon of public opinion, which has appeared and taken shape, must through a variety of mass information media (discussions, the press, radio and television) gain to a certain extent the support of the public and, respectively, be taken into consideration in various aspects of the work of the state authorities, economic and public organizations, deputies, party workers, etc. Ideally, the open democratic forms of socialist community life must

bring about the type of situation in which any fact of existing and socially significant opinion must not be ignored by virtue of the legal and moral standards prevailing in the society.

For the time being, a different situation prevails. To begin with, the possibility of ignoring public opinion has not been eliminated; second, our consciousness is full of the stereotypes and unwritten standards of the past. "The greatest difficulty on the path of perestroyka," M.S. Gorbachev noted, "is found in our way of thinking which was shaped in previous years." The elimination of this greatest difficulty would require the greatest efforts and will be (and already is) a painfully complex matter. To this day, quite frequently we react to something which may be unusual or unpleasant with the imperative "forbid!" or "what do they think they are doing!" Such emotional outbursts are, if we judge by the mail reaching newspapers, the radio and television, by no means isolated, for which reason they assume essential social significance. This increased emotionality and sharp reaction are also the offspring of stagnation, when public opinion was frequently ignored, hence its spontaneous outbursts today.

Mastering the standards of debates is the most topical task of the present. Unfortunately, the still blossoming subculture of debates in many areas (even such educated ones as science and literature) is characterized by features such as intolerance, clickishness and even aggressiveness. Scientific differences and literary prejudices and artistic inclinations are frequently reshaped into personal enmity or even hostility and willingness to resort to prejudicial tools.

The standards of democracy proved to be just about the most scarce material in restructuring. Let us consider: Why is it that a great variety of public meetings so frequently end in our country with the adoption of resolutions calling for "immediately closing down," "disbanding," "creating," "terminating" or "severely punishing." Essentially, in terms of its manifestation, our public opinion frequently slides into bureaucratic prohibition-permission methods, for such stereotypes have dominated for such a long and unchallenged time as to become an organic part of ourselves.

Man lives with the idea of the future. However, in terms of social experience, he also lives with the past and this dialectics triggers its own contradictions. For that reason, for example, today we frequently read that some apparently entirely democratic forms of community life (creative associations, public organizations) greatly resemble, in terms of their bureaucratic subterfuges, regular bureaucratic offices and frequently catch the "bureaucratic plague" disease. This is the effect of the inverse relationship with the past. The channels of customary stereotypes obligingly accommodate the new currents and these old channels distort the new currents.

All of this is the application of vestiges in all possible areas of social life. However, the time makes its own demands and new developments are grafted to the tree of life. Sometimes this takes place imperceptibly even to the close observer, so tiny each individual step may be, and it is only by tracing the chain of such steps that all of the sudden one realizes that we have left the recent past behind us and have advanced far ahead! Was it long ago that the elections for the RAF created a Union-wide sensation? In Leningrad today thousands of managers have been elected. This is an ordinary working process of perestroyka, which does not astound anyone.

The transformation from existing structures to newly created initiative-minded groups, such as hobby clubs, foundations and societies and various associations, is one of the characteristics through which social activeness is manifested today. Terms which reflect these new realities have been created and accepted. They may not be always precise but are universally understood.

However, changes in the forms of social activeness have not as yet led everywhere to corresponding changes in the ways that the party influences them. Today the participation of a party member in the work of some autonomous associations should be considered as an important party assignment, for the question of the influence under which a given group of young people finds itself is a most important problem in the practical work of a party organization. Practical experience proves that this type of approach yields the most fruitful results, for it enables us to exert a steady and specific influence on the activities of various social groups. Independent associations have become today a form of mass organization (there are tens of thousands of such organizations in the country, and the work of the party members in mass organizations has always been the most important aspect of party activities).

Today the party committees must operate on a qualitatively new level in the study of such phenomena. Their analysis should be a kind of monitoring, i.e., a permanent analytical process and one of the components of daily work. The mosaic of various social initiatives, movements, groups, and so on, should not be considered as something uniform. At the present stage the types of various social, group and even individual initiatives may substantially differ. Some of them are born and blossom as the direct result of neglect in the solution of topical problems which appear in some areas of social life. This includes, above all, problems related to ecology and the preservation of the cultural heritage.

The drastic increase in the attention paid by society to such problems has real grounds (something which should be realized clearly and fully), fertilized by omissions and blunders committed in the past. Work in such areas must be restructured in accordance with the new phenomena, their importance and the sharpness with which social

awareness reacts to them. Such reinterpretation must be quite quick and complete, for otherwise these areas may be "taken over" by other forces, perhaps to the detriment of society.

Another group of new social phenomena is related to ideological influences exerted by our class enemy. It includes various manifestations of reactionary trends of bourgeois ideology (such as nationalism and chauvinism) and petit-bourgeois interpretations of some problems (human rights, pacifism). Close to them are a variety of clerical movements, tightly interwoven with politics in the contemporary world. Practical experience indicates that such trends are "omnivorous" in terms of all possible social problems. Today they are speculating on the claims of "refuseniks;" tomorrow they will be active in the democratization of trade unions and the day after they will attack the difficulties of the conversion to new economic management methods. Wherever they may operate the one thing they seek is to create social tension.

The main weapon in the struggle against these, albeit extremely few but really existing trends, is comprehensive educational work and open opposition to and convincing exposure of the nature of such ideological views.

Also related to external influences is the existence of amorphous youth (adolescent above all) groups which appear, in their pure aspect, as informal (in recent times this term is frequently misused in terms of autonomous associations). Without discussing the traditional forms of work with young people in this category, let me merely point out one relatively new type of educational activity. Generally, it is related to the system of youth values. We know that one of the main organizing aspects in such associations is the commonality of interests, the range of which is, as a rule, quite narrow and twisted. Narrow interests concentrate on "rock," "metal," motorcycles, style of clothing and behavior, etc. Therefore, wherever we are successful in broadening the system of value orientations of adolescents, there is a natural weakening of such influences. The entire question is how to introduce new dominant features in the realm of youth interests, for a limitation, as a behavioral standard, has a powerful self-defensive ideological and moral function.

Of late the city's cultural and educational institutions have been able to find some approaches in this area. Thus, the Oktyabrskiy Concert Hall sponsored a big cycle of concerts in which popular youth ensembles performed together with classical groups, such as chamber orchestras. Their organizers and musicians deliberately took the risk, hoping that the youngsters have a certain general cultural background, although quite chocked by the weeds of a variety of subcultures. These hopes were justified, for many youngsters developed an interest in musical forms which were quite different compared to modern rock. Today such concerts have become a regular feature and gather quite a broad public. Interesting work experience has been acquired by other

cultural institutions and other social organizations as well. The department of the environmental protection society has involved in its activities the so-called "rockers," and has recruited this "motorized troop" in solving protection problems, studying, inspecting and surveying natural projects throughout the oblast. The departments of the society for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments and the Soviet Cultural Foundation are learning how to interest and attract youngsters in the restoration and repair of museums and protected state sites. Today hundreds of people volunteer to work on Sundays, paid for the selfless toil with lectures, hikes and stories about our history. The Museum of the Great October Socialist Revolution is engaged in most useful work with young people in the area of such complex categories. It has turned out that the interest shown by the young in the honest and complete history of our revolution has not vanished in the least. It lives in the young hearts and sometimes even a small step toward it would suffice to trigger a response.

The Hermitage and the Russian Museum have substantially changed their work style. Until recently most of those interested in their educational activities were university students, the scientific and technical intelligentsia, professionally oriented secondary school students, etc. Most of the work consisted of annual or even multiple-year cycles of lectures and trips. Today the emphasis has been shifted to the working youth, to PTU students, and to a wide range of secondary school students. The length of many cycles does not exceed two or three lectures and their purpose is to expose the young to beauty.

Characteristic of these means is the aspiration to understand the inner world of the young person, to open to him previously unfamiliar life values, to expose him to history and culture and to make him feel an inseparable part of society and to sense his social usefulness and social significance.

The growth of civic activeness is, naturally, related not only to new forms of its manifestation. The labor collectives, the old associations, societies and federations are also changing their attitude toward life. The creative associations and their various voluntary societies are recovering their public nature. For example, today the Leningrad Writers' Club is no longer a premise where writers meet or an arena where group prejudices clash. It is quickly becoming a social club which is attracting a wide circle of citizens. Debates here have become more significant and their influence on public opinion and on the life of the huge city has become tangible.

There have been noticeable changes in the activities of the Leningrad organization of the Union of Architects which, until recently, was a closed, a corporate group. Its halls today are crowded. Debates take place here and the

subject of arguments has been carried even on the city streets, for the last exhibit of new designs presented on the Nevskiy windows have been seen by (literally!) millions of people.

We believe that the party aktiv and the party committees should in no case make it seem as though the new phenomena which have appeared in the course of the democratization of society have left their work virtually unaffected and are of no social value. Such moods, however, do exist, for which reason we should discuss them.

Looking soberly at things, we should acknowledge that the influence of public opinion on various aspects of life has noticeable increased and is most frequently beneficial. It contributes to drawing social, party and state attention to the topical problems of life. It corrects efforts and sometimes forces us even to re-evaluate an old decision and reject a stereotype.

Such was the case which took place (and is taking place) in the area of the preservation and reconstruction of historical and cultural monuments which, in Leningrad, is a separate part of the general plan. Emotional debates on the construction of protective installations have made it necessary to intensify explanatory work and engage in additional expert evaluations; the construction workers have been forced to acknowledge erroneous violations of installation technologies which had been agreed upon with the scientists. This admission is valuable unto itself, for it is a guarantee that no similar errors will be made in the future.

As a whole, the influence on the work of party, soviet, and economic authorities has increased in terms of variety of topics and forms of consideration of public opinion. This has given the soviets new strength, enabling them to solve social problems with increasing persistence and aggressiveness. Here is an example: starting with last January, the Leningrad City Soviet has made enterprises pay for releasing untreated water: 20 kopeks per cubic meter. This is a quite substantial step which has displeased the enterprises and departments which neglected ecological problems or treatment, or else lacked treatment facilities altogether. The question is whether the soviet's steps in this and other similar areas would have been so firm and strict had not society created an atmosphere of high civic exigency in the course of discussing ecological problems. This would have hardly been the case for, as in the past, there would have been stipulations and half steps. That is the way the new component of the democratic mechanism is manifesting itself.

In all such changes and printed and oral debates and in difficult arguments one can see a multiplicity of views through which, in each specific case, answers to complex problems are reached: how to make one aspect or

another of our socialist life better. This multiplicity of voices is a spectral emanation of the initial phase of socialist pluralism which is developing under our very eyes.

In the past we used the term "pluralism" only in its negative sense (as any sociopolitical dictionary would indicate), although it comes from the totally neutral Latin root (pluralis means multiple). When the term was heard in the discussion between the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and members of the French public in a positive coloring, some people were even shocked. The entire point, however, was that according to an old dogma (still extant) multiplicity of views within the framework of a communist world outlook cannot exist. If there is a high road leading to a new society what is the point of any argument or debate? What was quite artfully hidden was the fact that there is no truth given once and for all but there is a theoretical doctrine, a so to say geodetic survey from the past to the future, a road which is to be built as we go along, and the question of how to do so better must necessarily presume the inclusion in the search for an answer of all intellectual forces of society and, therefore, a variety of choices, suggestions and judgments.

Socialist pluralism must cover the entire range of socialist social interests. We have already taken this path as confirmed by the release of a huge amount of social energy, coming in a variety of aspects, and its inclusion within the overall movement toward a new qualitative status of our society.

Glasnost, variety and the sharpness of public opinion are the clearest proof of this. They have made the permanent question of the interaction between party organizations and party authorities, on the one hand, and mass information media, on the other, inordinately relevant. Without covering all aspects of this party project, which is most important under contemporary conditions, let me mention merely one.

Glasnost and its grass-roots aspect are major elements which go deep within the nature of democratization, the importance of which, judging by all available information, is growing. Until recently there was a time when grave problems existing in some areas were found out to exist by the local residents only if discussed in the central press. Occasionally the local press would degenerate into leaflets which would be of interest only in a television show. That is why in frequent cases rumors, gossip and listening to foreign radio broadcasts became a stable form of information or, more accurately, disinformation. Their strong background was a permanent component of social life. The harm which this phenomenon was causing to our society was substantial. Today, although with some difficulty, we are systematically eliminating it from social life. For example, the people of Leningrad are well-familiar with the fact that anything of interest to them—political event, concert, exhibit, a grave accident, a noisy act on the part of a youth group and even a

malicious speech by a renegade or a crime, will be detected, covered and commented by journalists. Sociological soundings have indicated that the amount of rumors has substantially declined; under the conditions of glasnost rumors, like anonymous denunciations, have sharply declined.

The increase of glasnost in the future will obviously result in structural and size changes in the mass information media. This is one of the objective processes of perestroika: we will not forget that the structure of the press which we inherited was a reflection of the command-administrative system prevailing in the mass information media. One of its characteristic features, among others, was the role assigned to the local press as that of "reproducing" orders issued by superiors. Now, when the press has undertaken to cover the entire range of local problems, the readers' interest in the press has begun to increase.

For example, how has restructuring changed the dynamics of subscriptions to newspapers in our area? The eight basic central newspapers have increased the number of their subscribers by no more than 4.5 percent compared with 1985. This is a very modest figure, taking into consideration the tremendous interest shown by readers in civic affairs! Yet the situation relative to the local press is different. The total edition of the 18 regional newspapers in the oblast increased during the same period of time by 16 percent and that of the three Leningrad dailies, by 40 percent.

The logic of democratization is such that changes in one area of life inevitably create a chain of consequences in a great variety of areas. Thus, the developing glasnost demands the fastest possible reinterpretation of the attitude of party workers and party committees toward newspapers. The party-mindedness of the press is largely ensured by the fact that the journalists must always be aware of the major and minor problems solved on the grass-roots level. This knowledge, which must be specific and profound, should be the lens through which the journalists study life. For the time being, it is true, we are far from having reached such an ideal situation.

A sociological survey of television and radio journalists in Leningrad revealed that the system of factors which influence the interpretation of topical problems facing the mass information media is still far from what we would like to have. The leading factors turned out to be personal experience, fiction, exchange of views with colleagues, meetings and talks with the city's population and with specialists. The least interesting were attending the party instruction system, all kinds of meetings, and interviews and talks with various officials.

The situation which we found here essentially was that a gap existed between words and actions. This is a paradoxical situation according to which the petty supervision of the press and constant snubbing were combined with a real alienation of the majority of senior workers

from the mass information media. In filling personal questionnaires, V.I. Lenin frequently answered the question "what is your profession?" as follows: "literary worker," or "journalist," thus showing us what should be the true party attitude toward journalism. Today these semiforgotten traditions of a bolshevik attitude toward the mass information media are beginning to be revived. However, the necessary level of participation of the broad party aktiv in this work has not been reached yet.

Nonetheless, the need for this is tremendous. That same survey indicated the great urgency of developing a great variety of interaction between journalists and party authorities: 92 percent of the surveyed journalists demand a drastic increase in the number of press conferences and information talks given by party committees on all levels. The same number favor a broad development of personal contacts between party workers and editors; 85 percent deem necessary regular working contacts between obkom departments and editorial boards and call for steadily holding roundtable meetings, open-day letters, debates on topical problems, and so on. These virtually unanimous views alone prove that we have fallen seriously behind in realizing the organizing role of the press and we fail to use even that which could be achieved through minimal efforts.

Naturally, changes in this area have taken place as well: regular press conferences in Smolnyy have become the standard; journalists are receiving steady information by the various departments of the party obkom, gorkoms and raykoms; all kinds of written and unwritten limitations of initiatives by journalists have been eliminated. However, these are merely the first steps and a great deal more remains to be done.

The problems to be solved remain numerous. Not everything turns out as planned and not everything is proceeding at the desired pace. New developments come little by little, and more slowly than we would like. The old ways, which have permeated the pores of social life do not vanish simply and painlessly. Democratization, however, this pivot and guarantee of restructuring, is expanding and demanding of the party organizations and all party members a freshness of views, a thoughtful and attentive approach to the variety of life and purposeful ideological efforts. Every single day must mark a step on the path of its development.

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Who Is Master at the Factory

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[Article by Valerian Nikolayevich Nakoryakov, journalist, honored worker of culture of the RSFSR]

[Text] In May 1988 the Chelyabinsk Road Machinery Plant imeni D.V. Kolyushchenko will be 90-years old. For the Urals this figure is not all that impressive, for

there are plants here the age of which is double or even triple that. Furthermore, in recent decades the numerous anniversary celebrations, accompanied by excessive publicity on the occasion of new and even greater obligations but rather modest accomplishments, have legitimately dulled the importance with which such ceremonies are perceived. Nonetheless, few people here have remained indifferent to the forthcoming event.

A while back the ministry set up, using the facilities of the plant imeni Kolyushchenko the Zemstroydormash Production Association. The collective objected to this name and letters of indignation were sent to Moscow: "We do not wish to have an impersonal name." ... Initially, the ministry stood its grounds saying that a new name was "entirely consistent with the nature of the enterprise." Perhaps it is consistent, the plant people objected, but it is not consistent with our traditions. A delegation was sent to Moscow. Minister Ye. Varnachev heard out the representatives of the plant and admitted that an error had been made.

Later, in conversation with me, Yevgeniy Andreyevich expressed himself more forcefully:

"That was a stupid error we made. We did not take into consideration that in relations with plant collectives we must take into account not only production-technical but also psychological aspects."

This was an important admission. The collective had developed as a single entity under the influence of a great variety of circumstances, and not one of them could be ignored without harming this unity. The name Dmitriy Kolyushchenko, a worker and leader of the plant party members, a man who had dedicated his life to the revolution, had loyally served several generations of plant workers, rallying them, and helping them to surmount difficulties. Let us note, incidentally, that the tradition which had been established during the first years after the October Revolution of giving to enterprises the names of the best members of the working class, the rank-and-file fighters for the party's cause, was unquestionably fruitful and one can only regret that subsequently it was virtually abandoned.

Although the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko is not one of the giants of the Urals, it is not all that unknown either. The heavy-duty graders, bulldozers and scrapers it produces are well-known throughout the country. I heard many favorable references to the plant at the Chelyabinsk Party Obkom and the Minstroydormash. The enterprise bears on its banner the Order of Lenin and is responsible for the legendary "Katyusha," and for the best models of contemporary machinery. All of these are justifiably items of pride for the plant workers. However, it was easy to note that today they are concerned essentially not with what one could but with what one could not be proud of.

'We' and 'They'

Last winter an open party meeting was held at the plant on the tasks of restructuring party and economic work within the collective. In the course of preparations for the meeting the plant newspaper turned to the readers with several questions, one of which was the following: "Do you feel the existence of perestroyka at your work place?" The most typical was the answer by V. Agafonov, a turner at shop No 4: "Perestroyka has not reached the work place. Clearly, it has stopped at the office of the plant's administration and the party and trade union committees." In addressing the meeting, R. Shipilova, a turner at shop No 2 said: "Our machine fleet is old and new equipment has been idling for years. We have moved several machine tools from one place to another, and that is what restructuring has amounted to. Discipline in the shop and at the plant is not brilliant. To this day people show up for work late and leave early." Here is an excerpt from an article in the plant press by V. Burmistrov, foreman at the heavy machinery section: "One could say that democracy here has come in its raw aspect. Not everyone has understood its meaning... Those who spend their entire lives shouting and demanding are still shouting; those who were silent are still silent."

It has been justifiably noted that the people work in the same way that they breathe. However, the opposite is equally true: the people breathe in the same way that they work.... Last year, making extensive use of overtime and with a great deal of difficulty the plant fulfilled its plan but only in terms of overall output. Many obligations in the contract were not met. There were substantial losses, above all related to lack of organization and rushing. For the year as a whole, the first 10 days of the month would account for about 14 percent of the monthly volume of output, and more than 60 percent would be completed during the last third. The plant seems to be advancing not sliding on the tracks but painfully bouncing on the railroad ties.

Talking to Yu. Novinkov, one of the most experienced machine tool workers in shop No 3, a milling-tool operator, I subconsciously noted his oil-soaked overalls. Intercepting my look, Yuriy Vladimirovich angrily said:

"Do you think that I like to work dressed like this? But look at the dirt and dust around me. There were five cleaning workers in the section, today there is only one old man. This is called economizing. Meanwhile, the number of bosses has increased and everyone is telling us to 'produce, produce.'"

I already knew that Novinkov lives at the other end of the city, in a cooperative apartment building and that "he owes nothing to the plant." I could not help but ask: Why not move to another enterprise where conditions are better? He looked at me puzzled and answered:

"Why should I leave my plant?"

I felt ashamed at my question. This was a cadre worker to whom the words "my plant" meant not only a place of work but a life stance....

Are there many such people at the Chelyabinsk road-machinery plant? Judging by what I was able to see and hear at this place, they are numerous but I would not claim that they account for the majority. The plant management, naturally, realizes that it is precisely these most experienced and knowledgeable workers that keep the work going. They understand this, however, it seems to me, more in general terms and as a whole. This does not prevent them from displaying in terms of specific individuals lack of attention and unfairness. This is felt most frequently by the people who are the most active, those who sharply react to any omissions, who daringly oppose hasty administrative decisions and actions.

There is nothing mysterious about this. Such people are not usually distinguished by their obliging nature. Well-familiar with the production process, clearly realizing what depends on whom, they demand of every manager knowledge of the work, efficiency and attention to their problems, remarks and suggestions. They call things by their right names, triggering unease and wounding the self-esteem of management.

However, even these workers who, as a rule, are aware of their value do not exaggerate the extent to which they can influence the situation in the collective. They assign most of the responsibility to the "command" which, one must say, does not reject this. The formula "much is demanded of he to whom much is given" suits both managers and subordinates. As a result, we hear on the one hand that "you have been told what to do, so go and do it and keep your opinions to yourselves." On the other, we hear that "we are fed up with climbing up the wall; even a horse has more sense than that."...

"We" and "they," "workers" and "chiefs" was a division which became particularly aggravated during the period of stagnation, when the administrative apparatus was growing not by the day but by the hour, and when most valuable initiatives were shot down and perished without a trace in the bureaucratic maze.

Speaking with a group of workers in a shop, I asked why they referred so unflatteringly to their managers. The answer was roughly the following: "Not about everyone. We would not insult our director had his assistants been better. Furthermore, there should be fewer of them."

The concepts of "we" and "they" is not only on the grass-roots level. As it expands, the administrative apparatus becomes increasingly alienated from the production process and, to a great extent, locks itself "within itself," acquiring, albeit imaginary, a certain independence from those it manages. On one occasion sociologists asked a group of participants in a seminar for young managers the qualities they valued most in their subordinates and their colleagues. What were the answers? It

turned out that it was sufficient for a worker to be obedient, disciplined and industrious. As to their colleagues engineers, the managers would like to see them as people who think creatively and are comprehensively developed. Therefore, "we" is one thing and "they" another, some are "generators of ideas" while others are "performers," whose opinion should by no means be taken mandatorily into consideration....

In my presence I. Nekrasov, an elderly worker, asked the section chief to tell him when his machine tool would be repaired. What happened? Instead of answering, the chief simply turned his back and calmly walked away.

Last summer a large group of workers in shop No 3 of the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko sent a letter to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee. The workers wrote that they warmly support the restructuring initiated by the party but that it had still not reached them. This was confirmed by facts of inattention to the people and their working and living conditions and the fact that the plant and shop managements, as in the past, ignored worker remarks and suggestions. An investigation confirmed the facts cited in the letter. Following a presentation by the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, the collegium of Minstroydormash closely looked at the fact and earmarked steps which, let us assume, will improve the situation at the plant.

We shall not dispute the fact that some of these steps did indeed depend on the ministry. But here is what we read also: "The system of worker bonuses has been set taking the views of the collective into consideration." Was it impossible to "take this view into consideration" without the intervention of high-level authorities? I found out about this during my first talk with the plant workers. This is not an isolated puzzling case. What is the result? It is that the machine builders must discuss matters with their own administration via Moscow.

What is more likely is that V. Bogdanov, the plant's director, V. Sofin, party committee secretary, and other members of the enterprise's management have been unable fully to understand the importance of this fact. They failed to see the main thing which the letter proved. Unquestionably, the leaking roof, broken down ventilation and unsuitable planning system, which were mentioned in the letter, demanded not words but immediate action. However, in this case one could not ignore the moral atmosphere which had triggered such a letter. It was precisely this atmosphere that had forced the people to take up the pen and not in the least any kind of malice. The letter was signed by more than 100 people, young and elderly, nonparty members and communists, skilled and not all that skilled. It was signed not by people who had "poured a bucket of dirt on the collective," or "instigating workers against the administration," as some people thought, by old habit.

To the plant director this letter came as an unpleasant surprise. The shortcomings which were discussed had not appeared only yesterday but had taken years to accumulate. Having taken over the plant some 2 years ago, Vitaliy Nikolayevich Bogdanov had done a great deal to change the situation, which was worsened also by the fact that under his predecessor, who had invested his energy essentially in settling personal matters, the authority of the director had reached its lowest point.

One of the first projects which appeared on the plant's territory under the new director was the greenhouse. As he showed it to me, Bogdanov explained:

"We had to make it from virtually nothing. Neither money nor materials.... But then soon fresh vegetables will appear in worker cafeterias."

Yes, I thought, if a manager truly wants to do something for the people possibilities will be found. The next day, however, I suddenly heard in one of the shops:

"So they built a greenhouse, they will be probably growing flowers. As to the fact that there are holes in shop roofs, amenities are totally unsuitable, they (!) say the hell with it...."

At this point here is something to consider: a good project was completed but the people were dissatisfied, for no one had asked them whether one should begin with building a greenhouse. And so, a gap developed between a seemingly proper decision and its moral results. A person who considers a decision "alien," cannot support its accuracy but willingly criticizes mistakes. Yet the precise opposite could have prevailed.

Where Is the Seat of Indifference?

The chief of one of the plant's administration departments said:

"I met with my people and I told them: Let everyone express his opinion on how better to organize our work. We waited for 10, 15 minutes.... Everyone kept silent. Finally, someone suggested that we consider the matter for a day and meet again. We met the next day, once again everyone remained silent, and we dispersed.... Yes, people here have not become accustomed to speak frankly," my interlocutor summed up the event.

Although this story itself allows us to judge of relations in the department, let me cite some statements by his associates:

"Our chief has seen to it that we keep our ideas to ourselves...."

"The moment someone would dare to disagree with his viewpoint, he will find himself the target of such a storm that no one would dare to try this again...."

"There have been changes. A year ago, if something printed in the departmental newspaper would displease him, he would simply remove the paper. Today, in such cases he simply does not say hello to the editor...."

Not one of the personnel with whom I spoke questioned the competence of his manager in the matter of special problems. However, as a leader of a creative collective, the people had noted his serious fault: he could not see even in his gifted associates people who could make independent engineering decisions. And what about them? Some had already accepted their status as "cogs," while others were still trying to assert their rights but, fearing the consequences, were doing this insufficiently persistently. Therefore, I believe, the plant's director had some grounds, in answering the critical article written by a young and capable engineer, for accusing him of the fact that he could not see his own involvement in the shortcomings under discussion. Obviously, however, this makes it even more necessary for the plant's management to consider the establishment in all enterprise subunits of the type of atmosphere in which no single person would fail to feel his involvement with the state of affairs in the collective.

The new economic management system, which was adopted by the plant starting with last January, is aimed at solving this problem. However, the system would work only if the individual assumes a suitable place within it. Of late we frequently mention the human factor. But then do we always have the time and effort to look at the specific individual behind this already customary combination of words? Not a "labor resource," not "manpower," and not "engineering and technical workers and employees," but the live person, with his qualities and faults, knowledge, capabilities, views on life and obligations to the collective and society and, finally, with his unique features? We could hardly answer this in the affirmative today. A great deal remains to be restructured in the area of existing relations. If we speak of a labor collective, it is exceptionally important to have the skill to proceed, above all, in any management decision or social measure, by determining how individuals will answer to it. Will such a decision trigger an influx of energy, and the aspiration to do as much as he can or, conversely, will it trigger indifference and lack of confidence in the person's strength?

Did I see progress toward it at the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko? Yes, such progress does exist although, as everywhere else, it is not advancing all that confidently. It is cautious. New people have assumed the leadership of some shops and services, people who have not as yet caught the disease of administrative enthusiasms, for which reason they are more receptive to the demands of the time. Some of them were not appointed but elected. It is indicative that, in instructing their nominees, in addition to other wishes, the workers have advised them "to be exigent, to organize strict discipline." One should not be astounded by the fact that not everything is developing smoothly and quickly.

"In order to be ready for electiveness," Hero of Socialist Labor Ivan Afanasevich Korobtsov, head of a turners brigade in shop No 2, believes, "we must change ourselves a great deal. We must not simply agree with the suggested nominations but learn how to take everything into consideration."

The management as well must understand the irreversible nature of the democratization of the life of the labor collective and try to see in every worker, engineer and employee a person who is as responsible for the affairs of the enterprise as the director. This does not demand a starry-eyed approach. All it takes is to put everyone in the type of moral and economic conditions in which he would truly become the master of the plant. However much remains to be done in order to solve this "simple" matter....

The very days when the workers of shop No 3 were drafting their critical letter to Moscow, the enterprise's management was involved in setting up a labor collective council. This work was being done on a parallel basis and at no point did the two concepts cross. Those who drafted the letter did not make their actions public, fearing that someone would "talk them out of it" and prevent them from turning to the high officials. The managers did not draw the attention of the broad plant public to the choice of candidates for the collective's council not because of some kind of considerations of principle but more by old habit. For many years that was precisely the way any elected authorities were set up, not for the sake of secrecy but, as a party worker I knew pointed out, "without any unnecessary promotional activity." It was thus that the membership of the party and trade union committees were appointed, candidates for deputies nominated and lists for state awards and the right to purchase a car were drawn up....

The various public authorities, the purpose of which was to enable the working people to exercise their rights to participate in production management were set up on the basis of an even simpler system. The management of the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko saw to it that they had as many forms of such participation as other enterprises. There were PDPS, NTO, VOIR, foremen's councils, brigade councils, councils of young specialists, people's control groups, various party and trade union organization commissions, public cadre departments, and norm-setting bureaus.... There were so many that it was difficult to find for them something to do. It was as though the public was ready to take over virtually all enterprise management functions. Practical experience proved, however, that the creation of innumerable social units did not help in the least to reduce the full-time administrative apparatus. Despite sharp criticism from below and strictest possible instructions on reducing the staff, annually issued by superiors, the personnel increased further and further. The moment the need to pay attention to one area or another appeared, immediately a new opening would appear in the table of organization or even an entire subdivision would be created.... Such a

unit had absolutely no intention to share any of its rights and functions with anyone else. No production management public authority was ever included in the operating administrative system and most frequently public recommendations were ignored. Having quickly realized this through personal experience, the enterprise party and economic management no longer took such commissions, departments, councils and bureaus seriously and generally ignored them. As to the workers and employees, most frequently they ignored their existence altogether: if a public agency, acting on my behalf, does not in fact express my interest and is unable to do anything to meet them, why do I need it? As a result, all such "forms of participation of the working people in production management" existed, in their majority, somehow nominally. This was like the millions of rubles of so-called nominal economy which would benefit the national economy from the development of ideas by some scientific research institutes, although no one had been able to feel the tangible effect of such millions of savings....

Therefore, one should not wonder that when the question of setting up a labor collective council at the enterprise was raised, many people were quite indifferent to it, considering the new social group the latest modification of those same PDPS, the mere mention of which would make knowledgeable people smile ironically. The leadership, the party committee above all, should have obviously gone to shops and sectors and tried to convince the people that it was a question of setting up an essentially new public authority which would have real rights and would engage not in debates but in solving the vital problems of the collective. That is why such a council should include the most knowledgeable and intelligent people, the most honest and principle-minded people who can reliably defend the interests of their shop or department and knowledgeably solve plant problems. Incidentally, had all of this been said to the workers of shop No 3 and had everyone of them seriously considered who best to appoint to the labor collective council at the enterprise and what instructions to give him, hardly anyone would have thought of turning to Moscow with his troubles. Yet, what happened?

A trade union conference on the way the collective contract had been implemented was being prepared at the conference, and the decision to use this opportunity was made. The trade union committee issued assignments to all subdivisions as to how many candidates should be nominated for the plant council and from which areas. The procedure was followed differently in the individual shops and services: the number of participating people may have varied but, everything seems to indicate that there was no true discussion of the candidates and of what such candidates should deal with and the responsibility they should assume. The plant newspaper remained totally silent on the subject. Even the editorial note which appeared in the newspaper after the trade union conference failed to mention anything on the

procedure used to choose the council, although its title was "We Are Choosing A Labor Collective Council." It repeated some stipulations of the Law on the Enterprise. Specifically, in terms of the plant's council, it read as follows: "By resolution of the conference of the working people, dated 13 August, 1987, the decision was made to establish a labor collective council for the plant...for a 1-year term and consisting of no more than 70 people." Why for a single year, when the law speaks of 2 or 3 years? That same note states that "labor disputes between individuals and collectives and the council will be considered by the plant's trade union committee." Does this mean that a council is considered equal to an ordinary trade union commission? It is entirely puzzling why it was necessary to mention the fact that it should have "no more than 70 members." Did this mean the simple approval of a council rather than its structure which the newspaper published in its subsequent issues, the count of which revealed no more than 57 members?

I mention such "trifles," for any one of them could cause the suspicion that the members of the council were not elected but selected and, therefore, it would be difficult to hope that they would express the will of the collective....

The CPSU Central Committee 14 January 1988 Politburo session noted that holding elections for labor collective councils and enterprise managers should ensure that workers who are professionally competent and show high moral-political qualities and can ensure a combination of the interests of the society, the collective and of the individual workers should become involved in production management.

Are the actions of the party committee at the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko consistent with these requirements? A positive answer would be possible only by stretching the point. The council includes 21 workers. The rest are employees, specialists, and representatives of the public organizations; among them only three are rank-and-file workers: a design engineer, an economist, and rate fixer. Naturally, in themselves these figures are not all that meaningful. However, it is difficult to ignore the question of whether or not the plant undertook the setting up of this council after giving it proper thought. Here is why: a worker was elected chairman of the council; one of his deputies was also a worker and another was chairman of the plant veterans' council. Clearly, here as well haste was displayed. Unquestionably, all of these people are worthy of the trust of the collective. However, one can hardly justify the absence of experienced specialists and production organizers in the council's leadership, for the purpose of the new public authority is to manage and not to "participate in management." Is the plant's party committee and the management forgetting this? Following is a rather recent occurrence:

The decision was made to combine two shops. This was given extensive thought by the party committee and the administration as to how to do it better and who to put

at the head of the consolidated subdivision. Finally, a director's order was drafted and all that remained was to sign it. Suddenly, however, someone recalled that the plant had its labor collective council! The council was urgently summoned and shown a draft of the order. Naturally, there was no substantive discussion. Despite the appeal by Chairman O. Demyanenko, not even the members of the council working in the merged shops voiced their opinions.

But let us avoid hasty conclusions: the council is taking merely its first steps. We hope that in time the people will gain confidence and act more boldly, the more so since conversion to full cost accounting and the enactment of the Law on the State Enterprise will establish an essentially different situation within the collective. The managed will also become managers and, perhaps, will assume responsibility for the state of affairs of the enterprise; those who manage will become managed and will have the duty regularly to report to the collective.

Who Should Bear What Responsibility?

"When the regulation on the council was under discussion," says Oleg Vasilevich Demyanenko, "it was resolved that it should include the fact that a member of the administrative council has no right to impose a punishment without our agreement. This angered one of the enterprise managers: 'Does this mean that the director cannot issue a reprimand to anyone?'"

This item, however, had not been invented at the plant. It had been taken from the Law on the State Enterprise. Obviously, it will not be easy for the council to justify the accuracy of its decisions if it cannot refer in this case to direct superior instructions. However, time works for democracy and the supporters of bureaucratic administration will have to surrender their positions.

A very great deal in the development of self-management at the enterprise depends on the party organization, on the decisions it makes and on the way the party members themselves organize relations among themselves. Yet methods of bureaucratic administration and command, which had imbued the practice of party work in the past, are still being felt. Without firmly surmounting them and without a comprehensive assertion of the Leninist norms of party democracy it would be difficult to hope for democracy to be established in production: relations which develop in the vanguard of the labor collective will inevitably spread throughout the entire collective. In this case the personal qualities of the secretary are not the least important.

Galina Nikolayeva, author of the familiar novel *Battle on the Way* noted at one point that a party worker must be as captivating as an actor. In my view, Viktor Viktorovich Sofin, party committee secretary at the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko, is by no means lacking such charm. Let us add to this that he has a clear and quick mind and ability clearly to formulate his position and let

us multiply these qualities by good engineering training and the experience of a production organizer. This explains why he is respected in the collective. However, he is not particularly respected when occasionally he decides to impose his opinion upon others, considering it to be the only right one, requiring neither discussions nor approval. Could this also be the reason for which, to the best of our understanding, the party committee membership does not include so many people who can act as worthy opponents of the secretary?

The party committee consists of 13 people. In addition to two workers released from their jobs—the secretary and his deputy—the committee includes the director, the deputy director, the chairman of the plant's trade union committee, shop chiefs, bureau chiefs, section chiefs, the editor of the plant's newspaper, two brigade leaders and two rank-and-file workers. As we can see, management predominates. The vigilance shown by gorkoms and raykoms seeing to it that the absolute majority of new party members are workers determines the degree of indifference shown toward the very modest representation of workers in the memberships of party committees and buros. It is being said that in terms of social status the brigade leader is also a worker. This is true. However, psychologically the head of a brigade, a large brigade in particular, is obviously closer to the administrator than the rank-and-file worker or engineer. But even if we ignore this feature, less than one-third of the party committee consists of workers. Is this not too little in the case of a production collective? Above all, judging by the records, by no means are all of them active or express their opinion. And is it correct for the party committee to have not a single rank-and-file engineer? Obviously, a partial explanation for this is that same way of regulating the type of people joining the party. Usually, engineers are accepted only after they have reached a certain job level for it would be embarrassing to have a chief specialist who is not a party member....

At a recent meeting the party committee considered several requests for party membership and all of them from workers. Not one of them was refused, although not one of them had shown himself as a person who may be somewhat politically knowledgeable and socially active. Subsequently, the party committee secretary explained the fact as follows:

"What are we to do? As it were, I was already reprimanded at the raykom for having lowered the enrollment indicator compared with last year."

Apparently, here as well the ever living "gross" approach had been at work.... Could it also be, nonetheless, that better few but better? Has the time not come to look more closely at rank-and-file engineers who wish to join the party, providing that they have shown their qualities adequately? Furthermore, under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution how different is their social status from that of the worker?

The fact that most of the members of the plant's party committee are production managers influences the nature and methods of its work. The tonality, obviously, is set by the party committee secretary. As an engineer who has had training in economic management, he finds it difficult to abandon the usual approaches when the objective turns out to be an indicator and although the people may be the most important feature, they are nonetheless the means to reach it. Furthermore, such habits and methods seem more efficient for, unlike the methods of party influence, they could yield immediate results. Is this not the reason for which the party committee secretary, as Foreman V. Burmistrov wrote in the plant newspaper, regularly visits his section, particularly when the section is experiencing a hold up. "For example, by the end of November we were unable to provide the full supply of facing plates for the DZ-118 and the DZ-94. V.V. Sofin helped us to solve the problem by applying some pressure on the shop managers. We were able to fulfill our plan."

Here is another example. Last September, when a difficult situation developed with the implementation of the program not by a single sector but the entire plant, the party committee decided "to create a staff in charge of controlling the course of implementation of the state plan for September and for the first 9 months of 1987." The staff included two deputy directors, and chiefs of a number of shops, sections and departments. It was headed by chief designer V. Shakhov, a person who is well-known at the enterprise. An engineer, and perfectly familiar with the production process, he has, as I personally had the possibility to note, the rare ability to persuade and to lead even those who question his accuracy or who may even totally disagree with him. His trenchant and frequently paradoxical views and sharp descriptions of people and situations are received with interest by any audience, making the people listen to him. In all likelihood, all of this was taken into consideration by the party committee when it assigned him to head such a staff and gave him as his assistants two plant deputy directors. The party committee was right. As its documents indicate, "the situation was corrected and the plant honorably dealt with the state assignment."

I will not argue the point that under exceptional situations such methods may be justified. However, could we fail in this case to ask why an authority which had essentially purely administrative functions was set up under the aegis of the party committee? Furthermore, the staff consisted entirely of people in managerial positions. Was it easy to distinguish when A. Chapaykin and V. Fedorov functioned as deputy plant directors and when as deputy chairmen of the "control staff"? Perhaps, with its decision, the party committee intended to enhance the responsibility of the plant management. In such a case, however, why did it bypass the director?

Here is another matter worth considering in connection with its event. V. Shakhov headed one of the commissions of the labor collective council which had been set

up precisely before setting up the staff. Could it be that as such he should have been assigned the duty of rescuing the plan? No, I do not suggest in the least that the collective council play the role of firefighters. I believe, however, that it would not have lost any of its authority and, under the existing circumstances, joined in the solution of this difficult problem.

For the sake of fairness let us point out that the plant party committee frequently receives from the superior party authorities lessons in bureaucratic administration and in applying a command-pressure management style. A certain number of people and trucks must be assigned to agricultural work! In thus and such a sovkhoz a cow barn must be built! A potato storage bin must be urgently built in the city!.... Such orders come out as though out of a cornucopia. They are usually issued by the Sovetskiy party raykom but it is easy to guess that their true origin can be traced to higher levels. Otherwise why, for example, would the raykom be concerned with completing residential premises at the other end of the city? Neither the rayon nor the plant would be allowed to use them. Naturally, it was not the raykom itself that decided that the plant should build a station facility for railroad workers, located 30 kilometers outside the city. Each order is accompanied by the threat that failure to implement it would lead to the strict punishment of the director and the party committee secretary. As a result, 20 or more of the 30 construction workers at the plant work on the outside. Meanwhile, the construction of animal husbandry premises in the enterprise's auxiliary farm cannot be completed....

"Difficult situations may arise," thinks Vitaliy Nikolayevich Bogdanov. "For example, I may be summoned to the obkom and assigned to do something for the oblast. Meanwhile, the labor collective council may meet and resolve that this will not be done. What to do?"

The director said this in the continuing discussion on who should head the plant council. He did not openly say that the plant party committee had made an error by recommending this position to be held not by the director but by a worker. Personally, however, it seems to me, V. Bogdanov is convinced of this fact.

Eventually, coming back from a conference at the obkom, he told Sofin, as though incidentally:

"You know, I met there directors I know and all of them had been elected chairmen of their councils ..."

Yes, mastering the science of democracy is no simple matter. The question of "what to do?" could be the result of an obsolete concept according to which the director is responsible only to the superior authorities. Actually, the labor collective, represented by its council, should be to any member of the collective also a superior authority and its decisions should be mandatory to all. Let us assume the following about the obkom instruction issued

to the director: if it is sensible and sufficiently substantiated it is unlikely that the council would reject it. That is because the council should be more far-sighted than any individual member of the collective, considering the number of minds at work!.... But what if the assignment is dictated merely by administrative zeal? At that point, forgive us, but we have our cost accounting.... Incidentally that type of firm position should have been taken by the collective also in terms of the assignments issued by the ministry, which were supported by nothing other than shouts.

Naturally, all kinds of situations arise in life. It is no accident that more than enough discussions and arguments are taking place today on the subject of the labor collective councils. There is virtually no practical experience and scientists are not in a hurry to issue their conclusions, which is as it should be. The question of who should head the labor collective council should be considered with a feeling of respect and a lot of thought should be given to this topic. For example, today, when we are only learning democracy, when many people are still doubting and have no faith in its triumph, should we not, as a rule, make the economic manager of the collective also the chairman of its council? It is no accident that people have already asked "is this a council of the collective? It is the council of the director." That is why, obviously, the party committees are right when, familiar with the deployment of forces, they recommend that a rank-and-file specialist or the most knowledgeable worker be elected council chairman. Here is a bit of practical experience: "The factory director was made member of the council but not chairman, so that neither side would be tempted to exert pressure or develop the habit of obeying the instructions of the management...." One Moscow enterprise decided that no chairman was needed to begin with: the chairmanship would rotate among the members of the council. A search is under way and one should not hasten with the final decision. The essential line was clearly stipulated in the resolution of the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "The plenum ascribes prime significance to the development of democracy in production, the systematic application of self-management in the life of labor collectives and the creation of conditions which would enable every working person to feel himself the master of his enterprise."

When a person feels himself the master of the enterprise he begins to act from the heart and his mood becomes consistent with this feeling. At that point, I think, milling worker G. Fedorov, at the Plant imeni Kolyushchenko, would be able to implement his intention in full. Answering the question in a survey as to what he would do if he were the director, he wrote: "I would do everything possible to have the people go to work as though to a holiday."

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**Democratization of the Party Means
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Roundtable Meeting by Correspondence
18020012d Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6,
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[Text] Following is the publication of letters on problems of party building and the further democratization of the party and society (see KOMMUNIST No 18, 1987; Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5, 1988)

O. Smolin, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, Omsk State Pedagogical Institute imeni A.M. Gorkiy: "The Protective Mechanisms" of Socialist Democracy

The speech which M.S. Gorbachev delivered at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum clearly expressed the need to protect our political system from accidents. Not the least reason for many of them is the influence which the human factor has on the fate of society or, in simpler terms, the personality of the manager.

Let us consider the essential characteristics of the communist system, repeatedly studied by Marxist sociologists, characteristics which determine the special role which the subjective factor plays in its functioning and development. The very possibility of an individual to influence the fate of society and the size of such influence "are determined by the nature of the organization of the society and the correlation of its forces. The nature of the individual is a "factor" of social development only if and to the extent to which he is allowed to do so by the social relations" (G.V. Plekhanov, "Izbrannyye Filosofskiy Proizvedeniya. V Pyati Tomakh" [Selected Philosophical Works. In Five Volumes]. Vol II. Moscow, 1956, p 322). Such precisely has always been the Marxist approach to the problem and it is precisely this approach that allows the researcher to avoid a kind of optical trick in which the individual power of a political leader is confused with the social force which promoted and supported him (see *ibid.*, pp 326-327).

We know that socialism is the only society in history which cannot appear spontaneously, for which reason it must be built (and, if necessary, restructured) in the full meaning of the term. The objective nature of the laws of socialism is by no means the equivalent of the automatic nature of their acts. It means that the system of management and leadership and, above all, the ruling party, cannot ensure any progress if they are not guided by these laws and that neglect or underestimating of said laws lead to deformations and even to critical situations, triggering the obstruction mechanism. In other words, under socialism the human factor is built-in, so to say, in the mechanism of action of the objective laws of social development themselves. The exceptional difficulty of the study and, even more so, the practical utilization of

the laws of social life, combined with many other reasons, makes errors in the management of socialist society quite likely. Since the area of conscious management and its possibilities here are greater than at any time in the past, the cost of such errors increases proportionally and, as historical experience confirms, could be high.

Naturally, there are situations in which the fear of errors, paralyzing the activeness of managers, in itself becomes the worst error. So far, however, socialism has suffered more not from such fear, not from excess doubts in the accuracy of decisions made but from the absolutizing of the latter, and their presentation as the only true ones and, occasionally, from raising them to a level of absurdity in the course of their practical implementation. The utilization of the advantages of socialism, consequently, largely depends on the subjective factor; they become advantages only if properly used, for in the opposite case they are simply lost.

In addition to the weakening of uncontrolled regulation of social life, another essential feature of socialism which determines the increased role of the subjective-personality aspect in management, is societal sociopolitical unity. It is hardly necessary to prove that such a unity of the social system, which is unaware in the course of its normal development of the existence of social antagonisms and class struggle, is a major historical advantage. However, this "coin" as well has its other side. Since all classes and social groups are on one side of the barricade, so to say (at least in terms of their position in the public production system), as a rule the extent of the trust of the masses in the political leadership in particular is quite high. The broad population strata in the socialist countries usually consider this leadership as "their own," and the attitude toward it is most frequently considered a criterion of loyalty to the fatherland and socialism. All of this develops favorable conditions for mobilizing the working people for the solution of social problems which previously appeared only on rare historical occasions of "nationwide" revolutions, wars of liberation, etc. The high extent to which the masses trust the actions of the leadership imposes upon it a tremendous political and moral responsibility. This was frequently mentioned by Lenin, who emphasized that "the party is responsible."

Finally, nor should we underestimate the negative influence of factors, such as bureaucratism which, generally speaking, is inherent in any country but which richly blossoms under the conditions of an overinflated centralized management of society; the level of overall and political standards of the masses, which was low in the first decades of our history (a level which has outstripped administrative practices only in recent decades); the condition of the social sciences, etc.

Therefore, society must be protected from accidents. It cannot rely only on the personal qualities of an official, whatever his rank and however superior they may be.

Furthermore, as practical experience indicates, the percentage of "bad" people within this category is sometimes significant and their influence is occasionally tremendous. However, the possibility of and objective foundations for such a manifestation were frequently pointed out by V.I. Lenin who noted that inevitably people who would like to extract from this situation personal benefits will try to make use of the status of the ruling party in the course of a transition to socialism (see "Poln. Sbr. Soch.", [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 27).

Consequently, the development of "protective mechanisms" becomes a problem of exceptional importance. Such mechanisms would enable us to prevent or to reduce to a minimum such a negative influence. Naturally, one way or another such mechanisms have always existed under socialism. History has proved, however, that so far their efficiency has been low.

Without losing its essence, socialist society cannot eliminate the conditions which determine, to a far greater degree than under capitalism, the influence of the human factor on the development of the social system. However, it can eliminate or limit the effect of the reasons which are triggering or could trigger a negative trend for such an influence. To this effect, in accordance with the stipulations of the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee Plenums, currently a transition is being made from administrative-command forms of managing the country to a system under which political leadership by the party and the use of primarily economic management methods by the state would be combined on a democratic basis with the active and independent role played by public organizations and collectives of working people.

Unquestionably, the conversion to such a system would be a difficult and contradictory process. In order to make it irreversible and in order to prevent the old system from winning yet one more victory over the shoots of renovation, political guarantees are needed. Their essence, as stipulated by the party, would be to put everything occurring in society under the control of the people. We are well-familiar with the first important steps which have been taken in this direction, such as electing managers on different levels by secret vote and nominating several candidates for each position. Obviously, this would enable us not only to make fuller use of the best qualities of the best people in the interests of society but also to protect it more reliably from undesirable personality influences; glasnost and constructive criticism, the area of which has expanded significantly, have not as yet become comprehensive; it would also involve the use of scientific expertise in evaluating technical, economic and social plans, etc. We must advance further, for practical experience has frequently proved how easily the best democratic stipulations, not backed by reliable guarantees, yield to bureaucratic deadening and formalistic emasculation.

The problem of creating such guarantees was of particular concern to the founder of the Soviet state in the final years of his life. Lenin's suggestions on this account are well-known. The most important of them is to fill the positions in the Central Committee and Central Control Commission with workers and peasants in a number which would be sufficient to ensure their decisive influence on decisionmaking (see op cit., vol 45, pp 343, 384). It was a question of people who are workers and peasants not in terms of origin but of their social status at the time of elections.

Lenin saw the merits of such a restructuring of the central authorities in the strengthened ties with the masses, in upgrading their authority and, finally, the fact that the workers within them would undertake better than others to improve and "re-create" the administrative apparatus (see ibid., pp 343, 347, 386). To begin with, thanks to a worker-peasant nucleus, the influence of purely personal and random circumstances on the Central Committee would be reduced and so would the danger of a split (see ibid., p 387); second, this would drastically limit the possibility of a recurrence of subjectivism and malfeasance. We should remember today and make creative use of the experience of the Central Control Commission, a certain number of whose membership, in Lenin's view, "must attend each meeting of the Politburo and constitute a united group which 'regardless of personalities,' must see to it that no one's authority, neither that of the general secretary nor any other Central Committee member, could prevent asking a question, checking documents and, in general, achieving an unquestionable degree of information and ensuring the strictest accuracy of proceedings" (ibid., p 387).

Therefore, even the high political leadership—the Central Committee and the Politburo and their own leaders—should, according to Lenin, be subject to control by the party and the people through their elected representatives. This must be a control which would operate on a permanent basis and not from one congress to another. It must be a direct control over the daily activities and tactical decisions in which area the likelihood of errors and violations is higher than in the formulation of a strategic line. Since history, as we know, cannot be conjugated in the subjunctive, it would be worthless to make assumptions as to how many tragic pages would have been deleted from the chronicles of the land of the soviets had this Leninist idea been implemented in full. However, having charted a course toward further democratization, it would be obviously useful to discuss the problem of its current implementation, with the following amendments:

First, since several generations of Soviet intelligentsia have been trained, we have all the necessary grounds to include its representatives among the worker-peasant nucleus of leading authorities. The main thing is to preserve the Leninist principle of the establishment of such a nucleus consisting of people who do not hold administrative positions and are not part of the administrative system.

Second, rank-and-file workers, peasants and intellectuals should constitute a firm nucleus not only in the central but also in all other authorities of the party and the public organizations, the soviets and the labor collectives. They must, as Lenin suggested, attend, with controlling rights, all meetings of bureos, committees, and so on, on different levels. We must abandon the current tactic according to which the majority of executive authorities which account for the bulk of the actual administrative functions would include a few (sometimes one or two) members "without portfolio," who have no real possibility of substantially influencing the course of affairs.

Third, at least part of the members of the central party and other authorities, who are not professional managers and politicians, should be elected not at congresses and conferences, in which the bulk of the voters are unfamiliar with the practical and personal qualities of the candidates and are forced thoughtlessly to raise their hand in favor of those who have been selected "on the top," but at meetings of large party or public organizations, with secret voting for one of several candidates for each position, granting to those same organizations, and to them alone, the right to recall personnel who have not justified their trust. This would limit the possibility of the full-time apparatus to apply pressure on those who disagree.

Under circumstances dominated by the sociopolitical unity of society and the party leadership of it, socialist pluralism could and should perform important protective functions. This type of pluralism, unlike bourgeois pluralism, has been left virtually unstudied by Soviet social scientists. As a first approximation, we can only say that it is distinguished from its predecessor by an essentially different ideological and political platform, which is socialist, and on the basis of which the variety of ideas and views and the autonomous activities of political and other public organizations develop.

Socialist pluralism is a comprehensive phenomenon and its establishment in various areas is taking place at an uneven rate. It is developing the fastest in the spiritual and cultural area: in the materials of the mass information media gradually "unanimous approval" is yielding to a clash among various viewpoints, although here as well a great deal of routine treatment remains unchanged from the past. This process is developing much more slowly in the sociopolitical area.

We know that despite the direct instructions issued by the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee Plenums, party authorities continue to interfere in the daily activities of soviet, economic and other organizations. In some oblasts and republics, where the real power of the party leadership was essentially uncontrolled, each one of its instructions was identified with the party line, and obeyed unconditionally. All of these organizations literally worked under orders from above. The independence of the judiciary was undermined by

the "telephone law," etc. To repeat the fact that all of this created tremendous favorable grounds for subjectivism and malfeasance would be unnecessary.

Naturally, it is a question of the ways and means of party leadership and not of reducing its role or the party's independence from other units within the political system. We believe that such forms and methods must be defined by the law which would establish not only the rights and privileges but also the limits of such rights and not only what a given authority or manager can do but also what they cannot do and, mandatorily, the responsibility for violating any respective legal standard. To a certain extent such steps to streamline the functions of the central economic departments were already earmarked at the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. To apply this to relations between the party leadership and society means to strengthen the foundations for the autonomy of the masses under socialism.

From the viewpoint of the development of socialist pluralism serious attention should also be paid to the suggestion of converting the USSR Supreme Court into a constitutional court for, having critically interpreted the experience of socialist Yugoslavia, for example, we could create a system of constitutional courts in which citizens and their organizations would have the right to appeal management decisions made at any level and determine their consistency with the laws and socialist principles. On the other hand, if necessary, such courts could consider the problem of the compatibility or incompatibility of new social movements which are already appearing and, one could assume, would continue to appear, with the constitution, as well as solve disputes between state and public agencies, etc. Obviously, particular concern should be shown for guaranteeing the independence of such a court.

Yet another aspect of the system of "protective mechanisms" in socialist society is formed by the "ecology" so to say of the party and the administrative apparatus and the prevention of their becoming corrupted with careerists, bureaucrats and immoral or even criminal-type people. Here as well, in the spirit of the lesson of the truth taught to us by the 27th CPSU Congress, we must bluntly say that the political formula which has been repeated a thousand times to the effect that belonging to the party provides no privileges but entrusts the party member merely with greater obligations is still not being consistently implemented. Although the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum recommended that nonparty people be promoted to leading positions in accordance with their constitutional rights, priority in the right to hold such positions is granted in practice, as in the past, to party members. Party members enjoy the same privileges in being accepted as postgraduate students in the social sciences, in competitive elections for positions in corresponding departments, in the right to travel abroad, etc.

We may assume that, having legalized (or applying in violation of the law) such a practice, the motivation was one the best. However, the virtually total party affiliation of managers and social scientists nonetheless did not prevent stagnation phenomena in the political system or the social sciences. The absolutizing of such principles in cadre selection, as we have frequently noted in practical life, turns into a worsening of the cadre structure. Yes, the party is the frontranking part of the people and the bulk of its members are, so to say, on an averaged statistical basis, more conscientious and active than the rest of the citizenry. However, it does not follow in the least from this that every party member separately is more conscientious and more active than any nonparty member. In choosing cadres for leading positions, staffing social science departments, etc., we are dealing not with the mass but with a specific individual. It is particularly here that we must adopt an individual approach, the question of which was so sharply raised at the 27th Party Congress. Equally unquestionable is the fact that the party-mindedness of social science and a party card in the pocket of a scientist are by no means one and the same.

Cadres must be chosen exclusively on the basis of their practical, moral and political qualities. CPSU membership must be dictated only by ideological-political motivations. It must be cleansed from pragmatic considerations. Otherwise, no decisive victories should be expected in the struggle for having a pure and honest image of the party member. Naturally, access to the party should be made possible for nonparty managers and social scientists who have proven their qualities. For that reason the suggested measures, while contributing to improvements in the cadre structure, not only would not weaken but, conversely, would strengthen the party's leading role.

It is considerably more difficult to implement such steps in terms of the administrative apparatus compared to the party, for under socialism administrative activities, like any other, need material incentive. Under the conditions of distribution according to labor the desire of a person to improve his material position by working better and more, and thus holding a higher position is an entirely normal phenomenon. Obviously, for that reason the time has come to acknowledge that the suggestion based on the experience of the Paris Commune, formulated by the Marxist-Leninist classics of paying administrative personnel wages which would not exceed the earnings of a worker is an extraordinary measure, one of the manifestations of a return, inevitable in a transitional period, toward "naive" democracy (see V.I. Lenin, *op cit.*, vol 33, pp 43-44). Under our conditions this could lead only to a shortage or a worsening of the cadre corps.

Finally, in the case of committing a criminal act, obviously party membership or holding a leading position should be considered aggravating circumstances and by

no means being of a redeeming value as has frequently been the case so far. This too is a Leninist formulation of the matter.

However, can we guarantee the reliability of the "protective mechanisms" exclusively through legal and organizational means? Clearly, we cannot. If everything is under the control of the people, in the final account the decisive factor in the realistic nature of such a control would be the level of the people's political standard, shaped through democratic practices. Today Lenin's thought to the effect that shortcomings in our management system "are rooted in the past which, although overthrown, has not been rejected, has not gone into the stage of a distant culture," and that "in such matters we could consider as accomplished only that which has become part of the culture, the way of life, the custom" (*op cit.*, vol 45, p 390) becomes surprisingly topical, although in an entirely different context.

As we know, culture develops in the course of activities and one cannot learn democracy with all of its attributes other than on the basis of personal experience, working under democratic conditions. I believe that it is particularly important today to concentrate ideological means on "squeezing the slave out" of the subordinate and the "master" out of the manager and to encourage true rather than ostentatious democracy in the style of management and way of communicating on all levels, and to nip at the roots and ridicule lordliness.

Finally, it is time to learn how to draw lessons from our own past. The exceptional importance of the "protective" function of socialist democracy, the need to protect perestroika and, in broader terms, to protect socialism from subjectivism and abuse of power should be acknowledged as a social science and should assume a proper place in ideology and in the mentality of the public. Society cannot complacently exist through the natural uplift created by the fact that the present Soviet leadership is systematically implementing a course of innovation. No management is guaranteed from errors. That is why the concern of the public for the future of our development is fully justified.

Without fearing any double or triple insurance and reinsurance, while this is still possible, we must create an exceptionally reliable system of "protective mechanisms" within the framework of socialist democracy, so that the human factor can never again play in our history a conservative or destructive role. It is only then that the path to the future will become straighter and less dramatic and the cost of great accomplishments will no longer be excessively high.

V. Ponomarenko, instructor, organizational-party work department, Kharkov Obkom, Ukrainian Communist Party: Professional Charts Are Needed

Currently the practice of the competitive choice of managers, including those in the party, is becoming increasingly accepted in the process of democratization of social life. Nonetheless, a price may have to be paid for adopting a subjective approach in evaluating the merits of applicants for filling a given party position. How to lower it? A variety of ways exists. One of the most promising, in my view, is the search for and development of scientifically substantiated professional requirements which must be met by party workers on different levels and in different categories, that which in the science of management is described as professional charts.

Today professional charts are being increasingly used in training cadres in various economic sectors. It is strange, to say the least, that this efficient method for a scientific approach to the mastery of professional skills (which would include party work) is considered almost as a fashionable eccentricity by the party committees, who must act as storage areas for anything that is new.

I am convinced that taking into consideration the party's task of ensuring the continuous party-political training of leading cadres, the use of such professional charts would enable us greatly to improve the training and education process in party schools and to gain a clearer idea about the type of qualities which the party workers must have (political, moral, practical, etc.), which must be obtained through this system, and the type of knowledge, skills and abilities which the party worker must acquire in the course of his training.

The thus trained graduates of party schools will be equipped with scientifically based recommendations concerning their efficient utilization in practical work. It would be useful also to ensure legal guarantees of jobs to graduates of higher party schools in accordance with the actually attained level of their skills, as described in their professional charts. I believe that we should develop the type of procedure according to which the party committees would appoint graduates of higher party schools to a position for a specific term (such as 2 or 3 years), after which, if necessary, the collective or the party organization could re-elect on a democratic basis such people, who have passed this test.

Ya. Parkhomovskiy, doctor of technical sciences, laureate of the USSR State Prize, Moscow Oblast: What Kind of Assessment?

Let us assume that we would like to study the work of party organizations on the primary and middle levels, based on the minutes of previous party meetings. Unquestionably, we would find a striking similarity: in the overwhelming majority of cases the party members unanimously considered the work of their committees and bureos exclusively as satisfactory. In extremely rare cases and, furthermore, essentially only most recently, the minutes would show an "unsatisfactory" rating. This exception merely confirms the rule.

In the course of my several decades of membership in a Komsomol and party organization I do not recall a case in which suggested satisfactory rating of the work of an elected party authority has been changed at a meeting. This could happen only under extraordinary circumstances.

Secretaries of party organizations, party committees and raykoms have come and gone. They have included people of varying characters, capabilities and human qualities and attitudes toward the members of their organization. The work of such secretaries (and bureos) essentially differed, ranging from very good to poor. Some of them worked with enthusiasm and secretaries and bureos acted as the initiators of important, interesting and useful projects; other secretaries worked for the sake of showing off, concerned more with external, superficial results. People and times changed but what remained unchanged was the procedure applied in rating their activities.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that a "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory" rating cannot reflect the actual state of affairs in the party organization in its dynamics. How, using such assessments, can we determine whether today a given party organization works better compared to yesterday? How to compare the work of two or several organizations, if an identical rating is given to their work?

A raykom secretary who works no more than "satisfactorily" is given awards. However, everyone knows that such a rating of his activities is quite estranged from the real situation. There have also been cases in which a manager who quite recently had been given a satisfactory rating had been relieved of his position for failing to do his job.

We must point out that initially, many decades ago, the "satisfactory" rating was a deliberately modest statement of the achievements of an organization, a statement that it had done less than it should have accomplished. This rating was like a challenge to become more active. Gradually, however, the existence of this rating, from my viewpoint, began to function in the opposite direction: it was a convenient way of concealing the many faults in organizational party work.

Many years ago, the management of a people's commissariat, where I was employed, guided by the best possible motivations, naturally, issued an order according to which the handling of equipment was allowed only to individuals who had passed a test in handling it, rated "excellent." After a while everyone began to pass such a test with "excellent" ratings. Does this same mechanism operate in rating organizational party work?

Let me mention what I consider to be another important aspect of the matter. The tremendous majority of secretaries of primary organizations (numbering in the hundreds of thousands) are workers who have not been relieved or who have been "semirelieved," so to say,

from their regular jobs. These people combine production with public activities. Let us frankly say that this is hard and not always rewarding work. For that reason it would be only just for each secretary (and buro member) to know that his activities will be assessed fairly, according to their merits. Good work must be encouraged. If despite efforts and energy the results of such efforts by the secretary are assessed only as "satisfactory," this willy-nilly lowers his activeness. After I had praised his organization, one such secretary said: "Whatever the case, all that I would rate would be a passing grade."

I fail to understand what is preventing us in each individual case to assess the work of an elected party authority or a party group organizer as very satisfactory, good, or very good, naturally if it deserves it. The party organization can today issue from a very mild to a harshest possible reprimand to one of its members. Meanwhile, a public praise to a party member is not practiced, it is not accepted. However, an acknowledgement of thanks to the secretary of a primary organization, party committee or raykom which has been, furthermore, entered in his record, could substantially strengthen the arsenal of educational means. Not everyone responds exclusively to reprimands.

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Arithmetics and Content of Economic Development

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[Article by Viktor Nikolayevich Bogachev, doctor of economic sciences, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics]

[Text] The study of the results of economic development obtained at the beginning of this year and information received from enterprises indicate that the fears expressed by many specialists on the eve of the enactment of the Law on the State Enterprise are being confirmed.

The radical economic reform, which is oriented toward the real needs of the national economy and the population, orders and demands, immediately found itself heavily entangled in volume-value assignments and began to run idle. The energy of cost accounting incentives is being wasted on surmounting the friction which is heating up the atmosphere of economic management based on outlays and inflations. Excessive resistance is overburdening the internal mechanisms of cost accounting, threatening to strip its assemblies and parts which have not been run in as yet.

As in the past, ministries and the local authorities are professing primitive mercantilism. They have adopted the fashion of issuing state orders for anonymous commodities worth millions. A new term has been invented and even adopted by the press: "additional state order." Efficient economic management is made to fit abstract predetermined figures. The criticism of gross output indicators by the press has long become commonplace. However, we must not ignore the fact that the ineradicable attachment by all levels of economic management to the concept of "gross output" has sunk profound roots and is based on powerful social forces. In short, this indicates the prevalence of the ordering and obeying positions held by the participants in public production compared with the proprietary system (see V. Dementev and Yu. Sukhotin, "Ownership within the System of Socialist Production Relations," KOMMUNIST No 18, 1987). As the earner of wages and bonuses, honorary certificates and awards, everyone, from worker to minister, is interested in a clearly formulated and, if possible, simple indicator which would fairly establish the degree of success. The more abstract this indicator is the more varied become the means of implementing assignments and, from the standpoint of the performer, no better system than payment in rubles can be invented. The elimination of this mathematical view is possible only as a result of true cost accounting, the purpose of which is to replace motivations based on orders with economic motivations.

For the time being, the dead are ruling the living; departmental favoritism granted to value has long penetrated the agencies entrusted with the protection of nationwide economic interests. Growth percentages are by no means an auxiliary consequence of a balanced plan founded on social needs; the "overall volume of output" figure itself claims the role of cornerstone which determines the shape and proportions of the national economic plan. Distorted practices in planning based on the final macroeconomic figure, having already appeared and sunk roots, have secured themselves ideologically, developing the imperative of the "steady growth" of national economic output.

Promoted to the rank of state objective, the percentage of growth of macroeconomic aggregates (overall social product, national income, wages and other monetary payments to the population and capital investments) has laid the claim of being of basic political significance. For that reason, as seen by the economic manager, the preference for a cumbersome structure, put together from expensive materials and complementing assemblies, means not only concern for his collective or ministry but also a patriotic exploit and, furthermore, a contribution to the world-wide success of socialism.

The propaganda purpose of such figures vanished a long time ago. The people judge of the condition and dynamics of the national economy by what is on store shelves, the labor-consuming procedure of "procuring," the rubbish strewn around construction areas and plant shops,

and the quality of goods. During periods of stagnation the black magic of the macroeconomic pace obviously played a political role: the figures which were displayed supported the authoritative nature of ostentatious management rituals. Today, when the meaning of words is beginning to be evaluated by sincerity, and the significance of a project by tangible results, we believe that we could painlessly wash off the ideological make-up covering the gross output.

The strategic course formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress was one of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development. This means the all-round intensification of production on the basis of scientific and technical progress, a structural reorganization of the economy, and mastering efficient economic management methods. Actually, sectorial technocrats consider that acceleration means their beloved increasing of anything which could be increased. Seemly arguments have been fabricated to this effect: cost accounting principles are being applied as the 12th 5-Year Plan is being fulfilled, based on the previous economic management mechanism, for which reason, it is alleged, for the time being we cannot do without applying coercion on cost accounting-contractual relations. What strange considerations! If the volume-variety assignments of the 5-year plan are sensible, they are consistent with the real needs which should be expressed in some kind of an order; if the plan figures are "immortal," and cannot be filled with a useful variety, why not ignore them for the sake of conserving national resources and gradually restructuring them to meet socially useful purposes?

The continuation of the tradition of extensive economic management, concealed behind concern for the pace, is holding back the structural changes and hindering the conservation of energy and resources. Acceleration, conceived primitively, in its formal-arithmetic sense, is the core of the obstruction system which blocks the mastery of antioutlay economic management methods. We shall be unable to eliminate the "gross output" in the basic unit and in sectorial management hierarchies unless we establish the information value and meaning of macroeconomic aggregates, the purpose of which is to reflect the dynamics of the "overall production process." Obviously, this is a necessary aspect of the ideological backing of perestroika, raised as a priority task at the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

I

One hundred years go, in 1888, Richard Dedekind published a work which bore the unlikely title for a work on mathematics "*Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen*," the translation of which could be "What Are Numbers and What Meaning Could We Ascribe to Them?" Amazing and fundamental results came out of this childishly naive question. A similar question asked about numbers which we have become accustomed to consider as expressing the results of socioproduction activities

would be obviously fruitful as well. Actually, the question was asked, and analyzed and its answers have long become included in textbooks but, alas, not in Soviet ones. We are too proud of the record-setting pace (standing, we must say, for truly impressive successes) to question the good quality of macroeconomic computations as such. To this day, textbooks on statistics and planning shily circumvent the methodological problem of computing indicators and aggregate expressions of overall output.

In an extensively expanding economy the areas of processing raw materials remain as unchanged as is the purpose of intermediary and finished products. Under these circumstances, the overall national economic output in various places and at different times could be compared in terms of "physical volumes" and quantities of consumer values. The basic foundation of the ideology of "physical volumes" is precisely the invariability in time and identical nature in space of consumer properties and means of manufacturing identical products.

If the public production process is a structure consisting of permanent parts and if its development is reduced to gradual expansion, albeit uneven, of all these parts, what should the macroanalyst do in order to be able quantitatively to define the "general growth?" Naturally, the best would be to find some kind of representative element of the production structure the dynamics of which, expressed in honest and unquestionable natural measurements, could solve the problem. Such representatives have included grain, carded wool, iron, coal, petroleum and electric power. However, in order to protect the computations from accidental errors in the choice of the representative product it would be more reliable to take several representative items. The dynamics of the production of each one of them does not contain anything questionable or mysterious: if last year 200,000 metal rims for glasses of a certain shape were produced and 230,000 were produced this year, production of this item increased by 15 percent or 1.15 in terms of the base level. Such figures—individual indicators or relative quantities—could be derived for each element of a comparable output, and changes in the dynamics of the overall output are reduced to the technique of averaging numbers.

The mean figures could be arithmetical or geometric; furthermore, individual indicators should include the weight which represents the significance of each product in the world of commodities. If the production of metal rims has increased by 15 percent of the base level and the production of electric motors by 5 percent, it becomes unconsidered to determine the average growth, for electric motors are somewhat more "important" to the economy and this must be taken into consideration in our computations. The monetary amount of the commodity output of a given product during the base or accountability period may be used as weight coefficients. The problems of structuring a price index are entirely symmetrical with computations of "physical volumes."

In both cases the end result depends on the methods and forms of averaging adopted. The natural question which arises is the following: What form of index is "true" or what are the criteria of veracity in measuring macroeconomic dynamics?

The answer (I. Fisher, "The Making of Index Numbers," Boston, 1922) is as follows: there are no index forms which can meet sensible requirement and be consistent with any reliable measurement of overall output.

Let us consider very briefly some such requirements. The product of the "physical volume" index multiplied by the price index, structured on the same methodological basis, should be the index of the value exchange of the production process. Said correlation is derived for each separate product. However, in terms of considered averages, this can be observed when all individual indexes are the same. It is clear that under these circumstances the aggregate index is totally unnecessary: the rate of output of any individual product fully represents the overall dynamics. If the production of different items develops at different speeds, the average weighed rate would contain a systematic error which will become the greater the farther the economic system departs from the hypothetical model of a purely extensive equal expansion.

A "good" index should also have the property of "convertibility in time." For example, if the 1984 industrial output, expressed in 1970 prices, was 200 percent of the value of the industrial output of 1970, the 1970 product, measured in terms of 1984 prices, should total 50 percent of the value amount of the 1984 output. The criterion of the reversibility in time is applied in mathematically weighed forms only if all prices have changed from the base to the accountability aspects within the same ratio (or else have remained unchanged). This condition of the proportional dynamics of all prices is far removed from the realities of scientific and technical progress and intensification.

Finally, such indexes should be concomitant: let us assume that the 1980 output, expressed in 1975 prices, accounts for 1.25 of the initial value and the 1985 output, expressed in terms of 1980 prices, yields a 1.2 index. We have the right to expect that the 1985 output expressed in terms of 1975 prices would be $1.25 \times 1.2 = 1.5$ of the value amount of 1975. Alas, this circulatory property is found only in geometrically unweighted items.

This circumstance is very important in terms of the philosophy of macroeconomic measurements. The propagandist or political journalist who makes extensive use of output comparisons covering long time intervals would hardly dare to claim that he can invest with a "real" meaning figures which depict the growth of the gross social product, compared with 1913, as being 88 times higher, the generated national income as being higher by a factor of 97 and of industrial output, by a factor of 213. Any meaningful interpretation of these

figures would be unable to avoid sterile considerations of topics such as how many times is a color television set "more important" than a nickel plated two-cup samovar, or by how many times does the annual production of submarines exceed the production of ammunition for a mounted cossack. The production structure has radically changed, and a comparison among physical volumes of national economic output is simply meaningless. It may seem, however, that since for each short-term period indicators nonetheless remain meaningful, multiplying them would yield economically significant results for as long a period of time as we wish. The trouble is that the operation of multiplication (of structuring a chain index) would be accurate only in terms of unweighted averages (geometric at that).

In this case it is not a question of the degree of accuracy of statistical observations but of a basic measure used in determining the results of statistical reports and comparisons.

II

These defects in figures the purpose of which is to depict macroeconomic dynamics, indicate that the concept of "overall output" is basically inadequate in a developing economy, even if the development is reduced only to changes in correlation within an unchanging list of products. What makes the situation much more complex is when items are updated. The higher the pace of innovation, the narrower becomes the range of goods to which one could ascribe individual indexes and the lesser are the chances of establishing representative sets of goods which could express the "overall results" and the lower becomes the reliability of assessments through prices.

Furthermore, the abandonment of the gold monetary standard is already compromising the idea of the commensurate nature of the value amounts of output as aggregates which can be compared in terms of time. As long as a stability could be ascribed to a monetary unit, albeit only in terms of gold, the statistician and the macroanalyst still had a relatively reliable shelter: let output structures of different years remain physically noncomparable and let price correlations in terms of quantity be spoiled by weighed averages and, finally, let there be an unstable "overall price level," whatever that may mean; in any case the price aggregates of output at different moments in time would express commensurable quantities of the same type of monetary material. This final bulwark, which supported the faith in the significance of numerical macroeconomic measurements, crumbled along with the gold standard.

Let us incidentally note that the scientific and technical revolution has formulated stricter requirements concerning the elasticity of the monetary market; fluctuations in the purchase power of a monetary unit could not be considered random and unrelated to technological and

structural reorganizations. Marx himself noted that economic operations such as, for example, laying a railroad track, exert pressure on the monetary market "for the reason that this constantly demands an advance in capital on a large scale and over a long period of time." Goods are withdrawn from the market, such as means of production and for the upkeep of the workers engaged in the implementation of major long-term projects. However, the funds expended here "are not a monetary form of newly created value." As a result "the solvent demand increases which, however, does not contain any elements of supply" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 24, pp 354-355). In the 19th century railroad construction was financed not only through voluntary savings but also coercively, by reducing the purchasing power of the monetary unit. The limited possibilities of credit expansion within the monetary systems based on metal sometimes forced the halting of relatively short-term programs such as the building of a railroad track or a navigation canal.

Despite the illusions of the students of science, who console themselves by computing the time separating a scientific idea from its materialization in an experimental model, the innovations made today demand both more time and greater appropriations. The full innovation cycle (including the application stage) takes several decades (for example, the telephone may be considered an "ancient" invention; in our country, however, only one-third of the necessary telephone facilities have been installed, so that the benefits of fast and convenient connections are obtained so far against a background of initial capital investments to which no end is in sight). Superimposed, new developments lead to a rather high and uneven demand for money which, obviously, classical credit systems were unable to meet.

The seeds of skepticism, which Fisher planted, grew up as an open rebellion to quantitative concepts of macroeconomic dynamics precisely after the elimination of the gold standard. We shall cite two statements, respectively made by a professional statistician and by one of the most noted theoreticians of the 20th century. The first is the following: "Index figures are a widespread disease in contemporary life.... It is very problematical, although this formulation may smack of heresy, whether or not we would benefit from using the full set of index tricks. A great many things in the index computations are so archaic, and so greatly distant from reality and deprived of any practical value that the regular compilation of indices should be considered as a universal neurosis maintained by force" (M.J. Moroney, "Facts from Figures," London, 1951, p 31). The second is the following: "To say that net output is today greater and the price level lower than they were 10 years ago or, let us say, 1 year ago, would mean claiming that Queen Victoria was a better queen but not a happier woman than Queen Elizabeth, which is a judgment which makes a certain sense and is of some interest but is unsuitable as a material to be used in differential calculus. Our claims to accuracy become ridiculous if we try to use such unclear

and nonquantitative concepts for purposes of quantitative analysis (John M. Keynes, "General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," Inostrannaya Literatura, Moscow, 1948, p 37).

The quantitative looseness of the idea of economic growth was not felt in practical work during the period of the first industrial revolution. Extensive development and the mechanization of ever new technologies and types of activities were naturally accepted and depicted as growth: growth of machines and power capacities, growth of employment in industrialized economic sectors, growth of output procured by replacing preindustrial forms of production with the machine manufacturing of identical items. But then not only timber logging but pencil sharpening and not only the crushing of ores but the grinding of coffee beans became mechanized. Naturally, one could go on further refining the power influences on matter, consolidating unit capacities, specializing the working parts of machinery and increasing their size. However, the growth of productivity thus achieved reduced outlays invested in the extensive growth of a specific instrument, in accordance with the law of diminishing returns.

The current reconstruction of technological processes eliminates many trends inherent in industrial growth. The properties of substances extracted from nature or accumulated as a side product of an industrialized economy are being subjected to a more varied and fuller use. The output of the extracting economic sector is no longer an indicator of economic power. The scientific revision of existing technologies offers the possibility of integrating many operations, reducing and simplifying technological chains, and reducing procedures of the transportation and storing of semifinished goods between operations. The result is a reduction in production—material, energy and labor—outlays. Objects of labor and products of industry become part of nonmaterial and difficult to quantify hypostases, such as scientific knowledge, artistic image and administrative and daily life information. Biotechnology enables us to achieve useful transformations of matter without resorting to mechanical or chemical influences; it increases the output of agrocenoses without increasing efforts for the mechanical processing of the soil and the amount of man-made fertilizer and other chemicals which are used. Technological changes are triggering corresponding organizational-economic changes. The narrow specialization of technical-production systems and economic units is becoming part of the past while, output becomes increasingly varied and individualized.

What is growing in this age of universal technological and structural reconstructions? Is it output? Output, however, is physically noncomparable and the elements which remain unchanged are precisely those which do not express technological successes. Is it employment? Employment is moving to the nonmaterial areas, however, and to physically nonproductive sectors, such as the storing, procurement and distribution systems. Is it

the fleet of machines? They, however, have lost a general measurement, for a horsepower does not characterize in the least the production of information systems or chemical or biotechnological processes. Is it the volume of output in terms of value? This cannot be broken down into its inflationary and actual components. Well, in the final account, in some sectors and trends of technical development could outlays be compared to consumer parameters of new products? This is possible (although here as well we would have to struggle with reducing the monetary nominal outlays to a real measurement), but only if the parameters of the new item are exclusively qualitatively different from their prototype. Such an item cannot, strictly speaking, be considered new: it is no more than two (1.4 or 6.78) copies of the "basic" model.

"But how can it be!" the reader would exclaim. "Do consolidated production indicators not express technological development? Could one deny that the Japanese pace is based on technological success?" No, one cannot deny that in the past 30 years Japan's economy has undergone striking changes. These changes, however, are more clearly reflected in specific data on the structure of output and employment, the scale and nature of automation, the structure of foreign trade, the balance of payments and the amounts and areas of capital investments abroad.

As to the Japanese pace.... The growth of real volumes of the overall output is determined in Japan by deflating (reducing to a comparable level) the volume of sales in current prices. The deflator is the unweighted geometric based on individual price indices for a certain (periodically revised) set of goods. (Let us note that the mean geometrics are always lower than the mean mathematical and the lower the price index, the higher the "real" value becomes). We should also consider the periodical nature of the structure of representative commodities, the principles governing their selection and the accuracy of the assumption that all included components are of equal value. It would be suitable to apply here the healthy criticism displayed in the publicistic sections of literary and artistic journals. If Japanese statistics are approached with the same type of merciless naturalistic strictness that we apply to our own statistics, debunking the pace reached by Japan, Thailand, Brazil or anywhere else becomes possible. Political journalists, carried away by economic-statistical research, have had opportunities to see that trickery is an organic feature of macroeconomic figures and an inevitable feature in their nature, regardless of national affiliation or social origin.

III

Although the computation of "overall volumes of output" is identically conventional in both cases, the different economic systems are by no means identically affected by the faulty trends caused by aggregate economic figures. They are continuing to be derived in Japan and the United States, regardless of the fact that

the obvious operational meaninglessness of such computations diverts the business world from the true path. Business shows little concern with statistical abstractions of "real" output or such similar concepts. Among the macroeconomic indicators it is interested in the bulk of money and its dynamics (the rate of inflation), outlays needed for investments and consumption, interest rates and rates of foreign exchange. Generally speaking, decisions on major problems of medium- and long-term significance are made on the basis of the study of the condition and prospects of specific markets and trends of technical development or, in short, on the basis of research and management procedures of a substantive nature.

Unfortunately, in our country the computation of macroeconomic aggregates and their growth rates is not an independent observation, neutral in terms of economic management reasons. In a command-hierarchic structure any survey organized by superior agencies, regardless of the intentions of the managing authority, directly leads to establishing the target and way of action of the controlled projects. No indicator, the consideration of which would not also play the role of a controlling signal, can exist in an economy in which administrative-power relations prevail. It is true that the increased number of indicators leads, in the final account, only to the fact that management is increasingly reduced to setting compromise rules for the derivation of figures, which would satisfy both managers and managed. The traditions which developed in the administrative-hierarchical structures are still alive and the formulation of national objectives in terms of overall volumes and rates can hinder real improvements in the quality of economic management.

Sterile statistical abstractions are still considered a measure of well-being and expression of the degree of satisfaction of social needs. As though deliberately, the planning system tries to inflate tricky figures, for the sake of which great efforts are being made. Raw materials are broken down into heavy auxiliary mixtures (water, dirt, rocks) and shipped out in quantities which conceal excessive shrinkage, spillage, leakages from railroad cars and losses and spoilage at storage areas. Warehousing and transportation facilities and, in general, procurement and distribution concentrations and channels are so structured as to force and justify excess production which is doomed to excessive stockpiling and to incurring direct losses. The production infrastructure has been neglected because it is unproductive, "producing nothing." Strengthening it means not only removing resources from production sectors but also harming growth and exposing overproduction which, so far, has remained concealed. Machine tool fleets are expanded with items which are doomed to idling as a result of shortage of labor and other operational resources. The need for machines is artificially stimulated by reducing their reliability and durability and by limiting deliveries of spare parts. The accumulated machine fleets are

maintained in such a way that double and triple production becomes necessary. In terms of hydraulic power construction, Minvodkhoz and Minenergo are competing in looking for insanely ruinous projects because moving dirt and laying concrete provide, in terms of units of time, a maximum of use figures ranging into the millions, which become records of the used national income.

The artificial growth, supported by such instruments, assumes an increasingly nominal nature and is not accompanied by a development inherent in a mature industrial economy. This is the fourth consecutive 5-year period in which we shall by no means distinguish ourselves in a field of growing urgency, that of rejecting the heavy chains of surplus production which is needed only for the sake of figures but which satisfies no requirements whatsoever, and use the thus released resources for plugging innumerable holes in the production and social infrastructure and the renovation of our production system. The recombination of resources is necessarily paralleled by losses in quantitative results of output; resources must be released before they are put to use. Such losses, however, are an inevitable aspect of development and bemoaning them is totally groundless, for in the majority of cases this provides real benefits by abandoning fictitious ones which are only of abstract-statistical but not economic significance.

Intensification means making use of opportunities for the better satisfaction of needs without additional outlays and, consequently, without increasing volumes, the measurement of which, one way or another, is reduced to outlays—basic, accounting or somehow standardized. Any technical or structural change which increases the level of satisfaction of social needs without entailing a quantitative growth of invested resources and goods, measured in terms of pieces, tons or monetary costs means, in itself, intensification.

IV

In discussing the theoretical meaning of intensive reproduction we usually turn to the second volume of "Das Kapital," which discusses the question of the "gradual expansion of enterprises" with the help of amortization funds which can be used "in order to expand the enterprise or make improvements in the machines" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op cit., vol 24, p 193). The result has been expanded reproduction, extensive in the former case ("all that expands is the production area.") and intensive, in the latter ("use of more efficient means of production"). Despite the entire importance of this constantly quoted fragment and the interest shown in it, let us admit that this does not apply in the least to structural-technological changes which are the essence of present-day intensification, for if we are to seek the support of the classics, we should turn to the philosophical predecessors of Marxism.

Extensive size or quantity "is the type of definition to the changes in which a certain object remains indifferent.... In whatever area the change may take place in a specific value, the object remains the same" (Hegel, "Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences," vol 1. "Nauka Logiki." Mysl, Moscow, 1974, p 243). The economy, remaining what it is, could consequently, be measured in terms of quantities. However, one could hardly say that such an economy is in a process of revolutionary technological and structural change. An intensive value is represented not by quantity but by a degree, the degree to which the object is consistent with its purpose or idea, or any other model. The "intensive....is distinct in terms of its understanding from the extensive value or a certain quantity and it is inadmissible, therefore, although this is frequently done, to ignore this difference" (ibid., p 249). The use of "specific quantities" in describing intensification processes (volume-value amounts in their various combinations) means the use of extensive values in the case of an item which is subject to intensive definition. Such cases were encountered, obviously, in olden times as well: "The abstract mind...does not acknowledge intensive values in their entire characteristic definition wherever they actually exist but, relying on the hypothesis, which is groundless unto itself, tries coercively to reduce them to extensive values" (ibid., p 250).

If we proceed from logical-dialectical definitions, the measure of intensification and technical progress should be sought not in the quantity of robots which have been produced or installed and not in the specific share of the nuclear power industry in the overall generating of electric power and not in the share of strip mining for minerals in their overall extraction or, in general, not in technical-production indicators as published by the State Statistical Committee under the item "intensification," but in the extent to which the existing state of the economy is consistent with the technically attainable ideal of superior organization and efficiency. This is not a loose formulation. It is quite possible that good results may be achieved by measuring intensification with the help of sociological monitoring, and determining what is the view of workers, managers and consumers on whether or not the degree of slovenliness, negligence and administrative slipshod work is increasing or decreasing and how far is the observed situation from concepts of an efficient and expediently organized economy. Possibly, a disparity in views may turn out to be not much greater than the one among a group of professional judges in a competition of calisthenics or figure skating. For this is merely a measurement of quantity ("varied within itself") that requires a certain technique, sometimes a refined one, and an assessment of degree ("a simple determination within itself"), relying to a much greater extent on common sense and direct perception. Naturally, however, the assessment of the future development in various areas of technical progress and the expedient choice of their possibilities and arrangement require special competence within which, actually, the ability to handle extensive values is combined with a constructive imagination, an intuitive projection of the influence

which a new development may have on the entire production system and the direct and remote effects of any planned innovation.

Purely quantitative guidelines in the development of our economy lost grounds toward the end of the 1950s, when the mastery of thermonuclear weapons and missile technology secured the safety of the country from outside threat, while internal processes made the victory of socialism definitive and irreversible. The task of well-being was put on the agenda. It was poorly structured and could not be broken down into abstract quantitative prescriptions. Within the sociopolitical structures initially we began to feel a shortage of institutions and mechanisms for bringing to light, shaping and satisfying the specific and varied needs of the people. Suitable methods for the solution of such new problems, such as democratization in planning and economic management and the extensive use of socialist market mechanisms, were not found at that time.

It was only after April 1985 that the economy has been systematically considered within the context of social objectives and ideals, in connection with the renovation of sociopolitical structures and the reinterpretation of the means and purposes of economic development. An antioutlay economic mechanism, planning on the basis of orders reflecting specific needs, and granting priority attention to the social area and, partially, to the general economic infrastructure are manifestations of the new style of economic thinking, consistent with the real economic needs of society. However, common sense is still being distorted by the magic of percentage figures, the hypnosis of macroeconomic rates and the imperative of growth.

The durability of primitive concepts concerning the meaning and informative nature of macroeconomic abstractions relative to the "overall volume of output" and blind faith in the mandatory nature of their "steady growth" are among the most serious threats to restructuring and, if taken literally, as a technological structural reorganization of the national economy. They are its one and even only threat. The opponents of perestroika have well understood the type of ideological sauce with which outlay economic management and the gross output principles in assessing activities can be served. The difficulties, which are inevitable to a certain extent, of a conversion to economic methods may provide a favorable atmosphere for the popularization of the demagogic concept of the power-decree economic management system as a source of economic growth.

However, a growth may be healthy and, in general, meaningful only with a certain minimum of balance, when the population's monetary income and economic units have a material backing, a production system which is interested in the market and in the search of ways with which to satisfy (and stimulate!) growth,

receptive to innovation, broadens the varietal range and quality of output. Outside such a microeconomic rationality, macroeconomic dynamics is nothing but fiction.

Our economy, reorganized on the basis of the principles of expediency and common sense, could perfectly well fail to show for a number of years a trend toward a growth in traditional indicators; all too long we have delayed the necessary structural reorganizations, for which reasons the old debts will have to be paid with interest. We must break with the prejudice that economic development in the age of periodical and, obviously, increasingly frequent changes in technological systems, could be uniformly ascending. The phase of the start of the next generation of high technology cannot fail but be paralleled by stresses and difficulties which obstruct ordinary growth, whatever yardstick we use to measure it. To try to coerce the maintenance of a given pace set in advance by using a technological system which is becoming obsolete means to hinder true progress and to replace it with inflationary-wasteful increase in value amounts. The lengthier the hypnotic effect of self-delusion with figures is the more efforts will be necessary to return to reality.

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The First RSDWP Congress: Surmounting the Inertia of Antihistoricism

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[Text] Generally speaking, the first congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which took place in March 1898, has not been ignored by Soviet historiography. The very first generation of party historians, who had been trained in the harsh school of the revolution and the civil war, tried honestly to describe the actions and thoughts of those who were at the origins of the Russian social democratic movement. Based on the scientific study of the facts and events of the past they had to bring to light the true role of the First RSDWP Congress in the process of the establishment of the party. However, the way to the solution of such a seemingly simple task proved to be long and arduous.

Let us recall that V.I. Lenin considered the first and second party congresses, in their historical and logical unity, as two levels in the creation of the RSDWP. "Our party," he wrote in 1905, "began to be organized long

ago, immediately after the broad labor movements of 1895 and 1896. The first congress was held in 1898, at which the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party was founded, and at which its tasks were earmarked. The second congress was held in 1903. It gave the party a program and adopted a number of resolutions on tactics and, for the first time, tried to create an integral party organization" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.") [Complete Collected Works], vol 10, pp 205-206). Lenin referred to the fact that the First RSDWP Congress, despite all of its shortcomings, had marked the beginning of the actual existence of our party. He drew the conclusion that in the second half of the 1890s the Russian social democratic movement had taken a major step forward not only ideologically but organizationally as well. During Vladimir Ilich's life the assessment of the First RSDWP Congress as the starting point in the history of the founding of the party became universally acknowledged.

A debate broke out in the mid-1920s on the role of the congress. Two opposite viewpoints were argued. The supporters of the first willy-nilly suppressed the "economic trends" in the social democratic movement of the mid-1890s. Other authors clearly exaggerated the threat of the "economic slant," and respectively questioned the accuracy of the evaluations of the first congress which, in their view, had been "exaggerated."

Increased interpretation differences in publications on the First RSDWP Congress triggered concern among the scientific public. On 13 March 1928 Istpart (Commission on the History of the October Revolution and the RKP(b)) decided to discuss the existing situation at a council meeting. P.N. Lepeshinskiy, who opened the debates, argued that Lenin considered the party to have been founded in 1898. "This date," Lepeshinskiy said concerning Lenin's view, "was never denied by him. His attitude toward the first congress was most positive. I well remember the way, while still in exile, he welcomed with a great deal of joy the news that the first congress had been held and asked all of us to share in his joyful mood. At that time, all of us immediately considered ourselves members of the party.... All in all, this tradition of considering that the party was founded at the first congress was firmly established later."

At the congress, the majority of the speakers that day (S.I. Gusev, Ye.M. Yaroslavskiy and others) supported this viewpoint. M.N. Lyadov and M.A. Savelev were the only ones to suggest that the starting point in party history be considered either the moment of the founding of ISKRA or the Second RSDWP Congress. However, the Party History Council did not make a final decision, limiting itself to the promise of holding a discussion on this subject at some future date.

Soon afterwards the open discussions on the first congress were followed by a long hiatus. The hiatus ended in 1938 with the publication of the "Short Course" of the history of the VKP(b), written by a group of authors headed by J.V. Stalin. That work assigned to the First

RSDWP Congress an extremely scant, one could say a detrimental position. The official role which the first congress had played in founding the RSDWP was the only such role noted and a number of errors and blunders were unfairly ascribed to the congress.

Let us consider the accusations directed at it: it had failed to found a party, it had bypassed the task of having the proletariat seize political power and had said nothing about the hegemony of the proletariat and its allies. It was claimed, furthermore, that "it had been unable to unite and link organizationally individual Marxist circles and organizations. No standard line for the work of the local organizations had been established..., and there was no leadership coming from a single center." Essentially, these charges are antihistorical. The radical problems of the founding of the party, which we enumerated, and the formulation of its strategy and tactics could not all be solved at a single congress and a certain amount of time was needed for their implementation.

Therefore, the historians of the 1920s and 1930s were unable to formulate an accurate approach to the study of the first congress of the RSDWP. The overall trend of distorting party history and the unjustified exaggeration of Stalin's role intensified. That is why the "Short Course" provided erroneous assessments not only of the first but also the Second RSDWP Congress and the Sixth All-Russian Party Conference. At the same time, the inertia of antihistoricism cleared the grounds for new arbitrary interpretations of facts and events of the past and led to substituting subjectivistic and, frequently, circumstantial and prejudiced assessments for historical truth.

The situation changed after the 20th CPSU Congress, at which point the question of the ideological-theoretical and professional standards of party history research was enhanced substantially. This made it possible to shed a more extensive light on problems of pre-October party history. However, this process of increased knowledge was interrupted by the negative trends of the period of stagnation. Today CPSU historians face the urgent task of mastering a scientific method for the study of the past and the use and further creative development of the Leninist concept of party history from its very start.

The final decade of the 19th century marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of the worker and social democratic movements in Russia. Now, Lenin emphasize, Russian social democracy "will appear on earth as a social movement, as an upsurge of the popular masses, as a political party" (op cit., vol 6, p 180).

By the turn of the century objective as well as subjective prerequisites had developed for the creation of a social democratic workers party in Russia. The first Marxist circles and groups met in profound secrecy in large industrial and cultural centers throughout the country, such as Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Kazan and Samara. The works of Marx,

Engels and Plekhanov were studied. Gradually, verbal and circle propaganda of Marxism was involving in its orbit the progressive workers as well.

By the end of August 1893, Lenin came to Petersburg from Samara. Under his leadership the Petersburg social democrats were able to break the narrow limits of the period of the circles and to initiate the struggle for combining the theory of Marxism with the practice of the labor movement.

The Marxist social democratic trend in the Russian labor movement was established above all in the course of the struggle against liberal populism and "legal Marxism." That is precisely why virtually all of Lenin's major works written during his Petersburg period dealt with a criticism of the populist and liberal-bourgeois Struve-oriented views.

From the very beginning, Lenin's theoretical activities were directed toward the solution of the practical problems of the labor movement, above all the most crucial among them, the creation of a Marxist party of the Russian proletariat. The founding of Lenin's "Alliance for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class" was a major step along this way.

Lenin's arrest in December 1895 removed him from direct participation in the struggle for the unification of the revolutionary social democrats. Even in jail, however, he continued to manage the affairs of the party organization he had created. It was while in jail that he developed the idea of the need to convene a congress which would lead to founding the party. According to N.K. Krupskaya, Vladimir Ilich was impatient to organize the party and insisted most strongly on engaging in preparations for the first party congress.

The main trends of social development of post-reform Russia were brought to light and the place and role of the working class in society were described in the "Draft and Explanation of the Program of the Social Democratic Party," which Lenin wrote while in jail.

The initial program document drafted by Lenin was significantly different from two similar documents drafted by the "Liberation of Workers" group. It were totally free from the influence of populism and Lassallianism, reflecting the new level reached by the labor and social democratic movements in the country.

Lenin's comrades and supporters, who were still free, tried to implement his plan of preparations for the First RSDWP Congress. Thus, in July 1896, on the assignment of the Petersburg "Alliance for the Struggle," Krupskaya went to the Ukraine. In Poltava she met with representatives of the Kiev social democratic organization, with whom she agreed on the convening of a congress and the publication of a clandestine party

organ. New arrests, followed by exiling Lenin and other active leaders of the social democratic movement to Siberia, however, prevented the holding of the congress in 1896-1897.

However, ever since the second half of the 1890s, the idea of convening an all-Russian party congress was literally in the air. The question of preparations for the congress in 1896 and 1897 was raised and discussed by social democrats in Petersburg, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Vilno and the Alliance of Russian Social Democrats abroad. Under conditions marked by increased police repressions, convening a congress was a very difficult matter. It was only the Kiev social democratic organization, whose members were in contact with the Petersburg "Alliance for the Struggle," and which had escaped police pogroms and was properly concealed, that was able to engage in practical preparations for and to convene the congress.

The RABOCHYE DELO social democratic group in Kiev made an attempt to hold the congress as early as March 1897. A precongress conference was held at that time in Kiev, attended by representatives from Petersburg, the Kiev group of Polish social democrats and the RABOCHYE DELO group. Its participants favored changing the name of the social democratic organizations into "Alliances for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class," and passed a resolution on the preparations for the congress and the publication of a clandestine all-Russian RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Kiev. The practical preparations for the congress were assigned to the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group, which included members of the Kiev "Alliance for the Struggle," N.A. Vigdorchik, V.G. Kryzhanovskaya-Tuchapskaya, A.D. Polyak, S.V. Pomeranets, P.L. Tuchapskiy, B.L. Eydelman and others.

It took the group a relatively short time to organize the publication of a clandestine all-Russian printed organ—RABOCHAYA GAZETA. Its first issue came out in August 1897 and the second in December of the same year. Marx's and Engels' words from the "Communist Party Manifesto" were borrowed as the newspaper's epigraph: "Workers of the World, Unite!" The second issue carried the editorial "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Russian Workers Movement," which emphasized that "the time is coming when the individual worker circles and associations, scattered throughout, must become a single common alliance or a single common party. Such a party will contribute to the unification of the Russian workers and the growth of the Russian labor movement.... Any party, as it emerges on the historical arena, must, above all, unfurl its banner. On that banner it must inscribe the objectives for which it intends to struggle, not only the immediate but even the most distant, the end objectives.... This will be the red banner of the international social democratic movement. The Russian labor party will be a social democratic party." Lenin rated this article positively (see op cit., vol 4, p 174).

In engaging in preparations for convening the first congress, the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group and many other social democratic organizations paid great attention to drafting documents of a programmatic and statutory nature (a draft manifesto of the social democratic party, and "Statute of the Colloquium," "The Petersburg Statute," and the "Kiev Statute"). The study of these documents indicates that the social democratic groups and circles which participated in their drafting and discussion had tried to sum up and interpret the experience of the programmatic and organizational principles of the Western European social democratic movement and the "Liberation of Workers" group. However, the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group, without rejecting in principle the need for the formulation of a program, nonetheless concentrated on organizational problems. Those in charge of preparing for the congress considered as their main objective the unification of the individual social democratic organizations within a party.

In addition to the formulation of documents of a statutory nature, the members of the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group visited the social democratic organizations they were familiar with in Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Kharkov and other cities to acquaint the local social democrats with the "Statutes of the Colloquium," on the basis of which the party congress was to be summoned.

Preparations for the congress took place under extreme adverse circumstances. The point was that by that time symptoms of an opportunistic trend—"economism"—had already become clearly apparent within the ranks of the Russian social democrats of that time. Its supporters appeared also in the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats" abroad, where they mounted a struggle against the "Liberation of Workers" group. The opportunists did everything possible to prevent the convening of the congress and the forming of a single centralized social democratic party, supporting a spontaneous development within the labor movement.

Taking into consideration the situation which had developed within the social democratic movement, the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group was able to oppose the "economists" and promote the principled line drafted by Lenin's "Alliance for the Struggle." Having carefully studied the situation on the grassroots level, the group invited to the congress only the social democratic organizations which had identified their political affiliation and had proved through their actions their ability to head the mass labor movement. Minsk was chosen as the site of the congress, for at that time the city was not closely watched by the tsarist police. The strictest conspiratorial rules were observed and the delegates came to the city one by one. The congress was attended by representatives of the four "Alliances for the Struggle," as follows: Petersburg (S.I. Radchenko); Moscow (A.A. Vannovskiy); Kiev (P.L. Tuchapskiy); and Yekaterinoslav (K.A. Petrushevich); of the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group (B.L. Eydelman and N.A. Vigdorchik) and the Bundt (A.I. Kremer, A.Ya. Mutnik and Sh. Kats).

The delegates to the party congress were active participants in the social democratic movement of the 1890s. Thus, B.L. Eydelman began his social democratic work in 1893. Soon after the congress he was detained and exiled to Siberia. He actively participated in the 1905 revolutionary events. Under the Soviet system he taught and worked in the People's Commissariat of Labor.

S.I. Radchenko engaged in the propaganda of Marxism in worker circles in the capital starting with 1890; he was one of the organizers of the social democratic circle of technology students, which was joined by V.I. Lenin. After his detention in 1904 Radchenko was exiled to Vologda. He returned from exile in 1905 severely ill, and died in 1911.

We know that the majority of the delegates to the First RSDWP Congress worthily pursued their efforts until the victory of the October Revolution. Some of them (Vigdorchik, Petrushevich and Tuchapskiy) also worked under the Soviet system.

The First RSDWP Congress opened on 1 March, old style. The choice of the date was not accidental. The documents of the congress emphasized the continuity between the freshly founded social democratic party of the Russian proletariat and the preceding generations of the liberation movement in Russia, the "People's Will" in particular, the revolutionary possibilities of which had become exhausted by 1 March 1881.

The congress lasted 3 days, under strict secrecy. No minutes were kept. The other materials of the congress were such as to make their destruction possible at any time in a stove which was kept burning. This was the only congress held by our party on Russian territory under conditions of tsarist autocracy.

The main item on the agenda was the party's structure. Unanimously, without debates, the resolution was passed of merging the "Alliances in the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class," the RABOCHAYA GAZETA group and the "General Jewish Workers Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia" (Bundt) within a single organization. Debates were held only concerning the party's name. The delegates were presented with the following choices: "Russian Social Democratic Party," "Russian Workers Party" and "Russian Workers Union." No differences of opinion were triggered by the term "social democratic." This was followed by the adoption of the motion of one of the delegates to call the party "Russian." Lenin ascribed essential significance to this resolution. He wrote that "in order to void any idea of its national nature, the party called itself Russian [Rossiyskaya] and not of the Russians [Russkaya]" (op cit., vol 10, p 267).

Sharp debates were triggered also by the question of whether or not to include the word "workers" as part of the party's name. After extensive debates, with five votes to four, the congress approved the name "Russian Social

Democratic Party." The word "workers" was included after the congress, in drafting the "Manifesto," with the agreement of two members of the Central Committee.

The following important resolution was passed in the course of discussing the problem of relations with the Polish Socialist Party (PPS): "Through its central committee the party will establish relations with other revolutionary organizations to the extent to which this does not violate the principles of its program and its tactical means. The party acknowledges the right of self-determination to each nationality." It was thus that the congress accurately approached the solution of one of the basic problems of a general programmatic nature: the attitude of the Marxist party toward the national problem. Subsequently, this item was included in the party program, which was adopted at the Second RSDWP Congress.

Reports submitted by the delegates on grassroots social democratic activities were submitted at one of the sessions. As a whole, the new work methods related to a conversion from propaganda in circles to mass agitation were approved unanimously. The congress dedicated the balance of its proceedings to discussing the principles governing the party's organizational structure. They were presented in the 11 paragraphs of the congress' resolutions, which dealt with the founding of the party and its name, party congresses and procedures for holding them, the rights and obligations of the Central Committee and the local committees, the party's finances, its printed organ and its representation abroad. The organizational resolutions of the congress were the first attempt in drafting the statutes of the newly founded party.

Nonetheless, we should note that the lack of necessary organizational experience among the delegates could not fail to influence the congress' resolutions on matters of party structure. Some delegates, who feared that the organizational structure of the party may become excessively centralized, insisted on the retention of broad autonomy by the local committees. As a result, the congress gave a great deal of independence to the local party committees. Extensive autonomy was given to the Bundt, which became entirely independent on all matters especially pertaining to the Jewish proletariat. However, in matters of a general-Russian nature, the members of the Bundt were to act together with the social democrats of the other nationalities inhabiting Russia.

The resolutions of the congress on the autonomy of local committees and the Bundt unquestionably revealed the political immaturity and organizational discoordination of the first social democratic organizations and their inadequate understanding of the vital need of subjecting local interests to the general party tasks. The habit of clickishness was made apparent. Subsequently, at the Second RSDWP Congress, organizational problems

were solved in favor of the fuller and more consistent implementation of the principle of centralism, which was dictated above all by the need to observe strictest possible party discipline.

The congress elected a central committee consisting of S.I. Radchenko, B.L. Eydelman and A.I. Kremer. RABOCHAYA GAZETA was made the official party organ and the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats" abroad was accepted in the party and as its representative abroad. The congress also resolved to issue a party "Manifesto," and assigned its drafting to the Central Committee.

The First RSDWP Congress completed its work on the evening of 3 March. The delegates returned to their homes with an awareness of fulfilled duty and deep faith in the future liberation of the working class. However, the police made mass arrests on the night of 11 March 1898, in 27 cities of European Russia, the victims of which were about 500 people. The tsarist investigators were able to trace and detain congress delegates B.L. Eydelman, K.A. Petrusevich, A.A. Vannovskiy and P.L. Tuchapskiy. In Yekaterinoslav the police seized the printing press of the "Alliance for the Struggle," in which the third issue of RABOCHAYA GAZETA was being prepared for publications, thus closing it down.

Central Committee members S.I. Radchenko and A.I. Kremer, who were not detained, did everything possible to implement the resolutions of the First RSDWP Congress. In Petersburg Radchenko organized the drafting of the "Manifesto of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party." Due to the fact that at that time there was no major Marxist theoretician in Petersburg, he turned to P.B. Struve. As we know, at that time a political alliance existed between the revolutionary Marxists and the "legal Marxists" of the Struve type, concluded in the interest of the struggle against populism, the theoretical dogmas of which were increasingly hindering the revolutionary movement in Russia. As to Struve himself, he openly proclaimed at that time his closeness to the social democrats and quickly adopted Marxism as a "fashion." Krupskaya remembers that in 1897 Struve was "social democratizing." He was "totally unable to work within an organization, not to mention a clandestine one. However, he was unquestionably flattered that people had turned to him for advice."

The outline of a "Manifesto," which Struve drafted was reviewed and approved by Central Committee members Radchenko and Kremer. The "Manifesto," which became the first official document of the RSDWP, proclaimed the founding of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party. It provided an essentially accurate characterization of the growing social democratic movement in Russia and earmarked in a most general aspect its tasks. Nonetheless, we must say that the theoretical level of the "Manifesto," drafted by Struve, was below the standard of a number of theoretical works written by Marxists at that time.

As a whole, the "Manifesto" and the resolutions of the First RSDWP Congress were not only of agitation-propaganda value but also became a major organizing factor which marked the beginning of the unification of dispersed social democratic organizations in Russia within a single Marxist party. "We, Russian social democrats," Lenin wrote, "must unite and concentrate all efforts on the establishment of a strong party fighting under the united banner of revolutionary social democracy. It is precisely this task that had been earmarked already at the 1898 congress in forming the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party and publishing its 'Manifesto.'

"We consider ourselves members of this party and fully share the fundamental ideas in the 'Manifesto' and ascribe to it great importance as the open declaration of its objectives" (op cit., vol 4, p 356).

The news of the congress was enthusiastically welcomed by all revolutionary social democrats engaged in clandestine work in many parts of Russia. Immediately after the congress the "Alliance for the Struggle" and the social democratic groups began to reorganize themselves into party committees. Such was the case in Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa, Tiflis, Rostov-na-Donu, Kharkov, Gomel, Vilno and other cities.

The First RSDWP Congress attracted the interest of social democrats in all major European countries. The socialist foreign press noted, in publishing its documents, the creation of a social democratic workers party under the harshest possible clandestine conditions prevailing in tsarist Russia.

The congress was a legitimate stage in the development of the labor and social democratic movements in Russia. The proletariat became the first class in Russian society to found its independent political party, to head its struggle against autocracy and the bourgeoisie. The First RSDWP Congress marked the beginning of the unification of social democratic circles, groups and organizations, scattered throughout Russia, under the revolutionary Marxist banner. It would be difficult to overestimate the tremendous role which the very fact of convening the congress, its resolutions and its "Manifesto" played. This was a major step toward the linking of socialism with the labor movement, which contributed to the consolidation of the proletariat as an independent political force. After the congress, the Russian Marxists began to participate more actively in the congresses of the Second International and in the congress of the International Socialist Bureau, which was founded in Paris in 1900.

Nonetheless, the resolutions of the First RSDWP Congress were historically limited. The congress was unable to rise above the standard of its time. It adopted neither a program nor any whatsoever perfect party statute but

earmarked merely a most general structure for its organization. In fact, there was no party unity after the congress, and all that was left was an "idea, a directive" (see V.I. Lenin, op cit., vol 16, p 100). In short, the congress reflected both the strong and weak aspects of the social democratic movement and the ideological and organizational discoordination, which was not eliminated entirely.

The mass arrests in the spring of 1898 worsened the already difficult situation within the RSDWP. Under these conditions the activities of the "economists" intensified. They rejected the vanguard role of the Marxist party of the working class in the revolutionary movement. Supporting the idea that the workers must engage in economic struggle and the bourgeoisie in a political struggle, they caused within the RSDWP discord and confusion, turning it back to the period of circle work. This called for rebuilding the party, as it was founded at the first congress, and comprehensively preparing for its ideological and organizational unity.

The subsequent struggle which Lenin and his supporters waged against the "economists" was an entire historical age of intensive ideological-theoretical and organizational-practical activities of the old ISKRA, which made a decisive contribution to the creation of the first proletarian party of a new type—the Leninist Bolshevik Party. It was the Second RSDWP Congress which turned a new page in the history of the Russian and international labor movements.

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The Realism of Lenin's Art of Politics. Dialogue Between Historian V. Loginov and Economist O. Mikhaylov

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[Text] Seventy years have passed since the writing of a cycle of works by Lenin in the spring of 1918. This is in reference to Lenin's speech at the 7th Extraordinary Congress of the RKP(b), the articles "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System," "The Main Task of Our Days," "On Left Wing' Childishness and the Petit-Bourgeois," and many others. Putting together these works in a kind of cycle is made possible by the commonality of their problems, and unity of thought. All of them deal with an interpretation of the plan for building socialism, reflecting the sharp polemics which Lenin waged with the left wing communists' concerning the fate of the revolution.

What was the logic of Lenin's decisions during that difficult period of transition from war to peaceful building? What does it teach us today? This was the topic of a dialogue sponsored by KOMMUNIST editors between Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Loginov and Economist O. Mikhaylov.

V. Loginov. For a long time today's reader was raised on the quotation method in the study of Lenin's works. A contemporary topic would be chosen and illustrated, as though confirmed by quotes from Lenin. No concern was shown for the fact that one could find seemingly absolutely mutually exclusive thoughts and views on a specific problem. This was not a case of any kind of internal contradiction in his ideological legacy. Lenin had to work during moments of history in which circumstances continuously changed. Ideas and slogans which were absolutely correct yesterday frequently became incorrect today and harmful tomorrow. For that reason, we must always see where and in what connection did Lenin voice one thought or another and the aspects of social contradictions that such thoughts revealed.

O. Mikhaylov. Whereas specific tactical solutions could have changed frequently, the methodology of their formulation remains the perennially suitable and right key, in all cases, and for a lengthy period of time. What was Lenin's approach to the solution of the problems which had become pressing in the spring of 1918? We must be familiar with the principles. We must know the approaches and the objectives but not try to seek ready-made answers to questions of the future in what was said decades ago. At the 7th RKP(b) Congress, addressing the question of the party program, Lenin rejected the suggestion of providing a characterization of socialism in an expanded form, i.e., of communism. "We cannot provide a characterization of socialism; we neither know nor can describe what will be the nature of socialism and when will its finished form be reached.... We do not have as yet material with which to characterize socialism. The bricks have not been baked from which socialism will be built.... The program is a characterization of that which we have started to do and of the next steps we would like to take" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, pp 65-66).

V. Loginov A turning point had developed in 1918. After the relatively "easy" triumphal march of the Soviet system, priority was given to tasks of a constructive nature. It was necessary to begin building. Meanwhile, fierce debates broke out on the subject of the Brest peace treaty and a mentality of "left wing" phraseology spread which, essentially, hindered peaceful building. At that time Lenin described the situation in the country as one of chaos and disorganization. It appeared as though the ways for bringing order under such circumstances were clear: what were needed were administrative and even dictatorial methods. Yet Lenin wrote of the need to involve the broad masses in building and to promote their self-organization and self-discipline.

Or else consider thoughts on democratic centralism. They look as though all of this was written literally today. Lenin compared democratic centralism to its opposite, bureaucratic centralism and, finally, to anarchism. He considered the distinction between democratic centralism and bureaucratic centralism above all in terms of the attitude toward the masses and the ability to involve them in solving pressing problems. The mass, as an object of "philanthropy" provided by superiors, and the self-organization of the masses in relying on their activeness and consciousness are two essentially different approaches to centralism.

O. Mikhaylov To this day, however, we frequently argue about centralism. Many people are frightened by the loss of centralism in connection with restructuring and economic reform. This, however, is wrong. The best and most convincing proof of this is found in turning to Leninist methodology. We are not abandoning centralism but converting from bureaucratic to democratic centralism. We are converting because we have repeatedly realized that in fact bureaucratic centralism means bureaucratic anarchy under which economic processes cannot be managed.

Particularly relevant in solving this problem is Lenin's concept of "socialization in fact." He expanded this idea in his article "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System." However, he did not write a special theoretical work on this problem. After the October Revolution he wrote virtually no works on theory. At one point he said that it is more interesting to make a revolution than to write about it. That is why Lenin expressed his essential scientific ideas in political articles, reports and speeches at meetings. This offers a virgin area of work for the modern economists. We must interpret the meaning of "socialization in fact" as it applies to the present. In its most general aspect, it probably means to be able to plan, to handle the public resources, to be able to convert them into something truly social for everyone.

V. Loginov When Lenin speaks of "socialization in fact" he directly relates it to the organization of accountability and control. Unfortunately, these Leninist ideas are frequently used inaccurately. Control and accountability are conceived as control over the working people, i.e., as standing above the masses.

O. Mikhaylov Something like bookkeeping or warehousing accountability.

V. Loginov In fact, Lenin raised the question of nationwide control which would involve the entire mass of working people and which would become a step leading to the comprehensive participation of the population in the administration of governmental and social affairs.

O. Mikhaylov Generally speaking, in the works written in the spring of 1918 we see, in their embryonic, their initial stage, a number of ideas which were developed in greater detail in the course of converting to the new

economic policy. Lenin himself directly and persistently indicated this fact in 1921. At that time he said that the policy which we describe as new is, in fact, not all that new. It has more of the old than our economic policy which preceded it, i.e., the policy of "war communism."

I consider this point of essential significance. Today the NEP is triggering tremendous political interest. We are reassessing it. We are trying to understand its origins, nature and possible consequences. Frequently the NEP is characterized exclusively as a policy of retreat, of the use of capitalist relations, while its significances as a policy of building socialism is suppressed. However, Lenin ascribed several meanings to the word "retreat" itself. He said very soon that the retreat had ended and that we were converting to an offensive, but differently, after having reorganized our ranks, although such an offensive was by no means accompanied by a rejection of the NEP. Did this mean that the NEP was both a retreat and an advance? How to understand it? Unquestionably, the NEP was a retreat but a retreat from anticipation, from false optimistic concepts concerning the possibility of a direct conversion to communism, a retreat not from life but from views on life.

It was not the NEP but "war communism" that was the true retreat, a retreat from the basic plan for building socialism. That is precisely why we consider Lenin's 1918 works as being of essential importance. It is precisely they that prove that a policy consistent with the basic Leninist principles was a policy which developed subsequently during the NEP, whereas "war communism" was a retreat from it, forced by exceptional circumstances.

In the spring of 1918, in his polemics with the "left wing communists," Lenin earmarked entirely clearly the policy of a systematic and consistent transition to socialism. He emphasized that today we cannot even imagine the number and nature of transitions which await us on the way to socialism, not to mention full communism. In the spring everyone believed that the civil war had come to an end. No one knew that in the summer an even greater civil war would break out as a result of the Czechoslovak mutiny, a war which would sweep off all previous ideas and make the adoption of an emergency policy necessary in order to survive and defeat the enemy. It was precisely that policy that constituted a retreat from the initial plan, whereas the NEP was, actually, a return to it.

V. Loginov At the beginning of March 1919 Lenin met with the American writer L. Steffens. In their discussion Lenin supported the right of the revolution to defend itself and revolutionary coercion under the extreme conditions of civil war. "He took a piece of paper and a pencil," Steffens recalls. "Look, he said and drew a straight line. This is our course but...then he drew a sharp line in another direction and put a period, this is the point at which we are today. We were forced to come here but the day will come when we shall resume the

previous course, and he once again underscored the straight line." I believe that this proves Lenin's view that "war communism" was a retreat.

Today, actually, another viewpoint has been expressed as well. Essentially it is that after the completion of the triumphal march of the Soviet system, headed by Lenin, the party undertook to implement the theoretical model of the classics of Marxism. It was this, it is claimed, that triggered the policy of "war communism" and the civil war. I consider this viewpoint unfounded. Whatever the case, Lenin cannot be accused of doctrinairism. He discarded a number of ideas in the interest of the people.

For example, we are well familiar with the story of the Decree on Land. From the viewpoint of the program of the Marxist party, an egalitarian use of the land was not ideal, to say the least. Lenin, however, believed that a democratic government cannot go against the will and wish of the peasant masses. Let the peasants themselves see through their personal experience what was preferable.

O. Mikhaylov The attitude toward the people is a problem of essential importance. We either consider the masses as an object of charity, at which point they are "pushed off" into the bright future, or else they are considered a subject of the historical process. In the later case Marxist philosophy takes shape in the course of a direct interaction with experience in real life. Let me remind you, for example, of the importance which Lenin ascribed to the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. He considered that a concession for the sake of the preservation of this alliance could not be anticipated in advance.

V. Loginov Naturally, his works written in the spring of 1918 reveal a number of concepts based on former ideas. Perhaps this begins with a rejection of commodity production. Here as well, however, there is an important aspect which we frequently ignore. The chaos triggered by the war had virtually destroyed economic relations and normal economic exchanges between town and country. The following problem arose: either to follow the task of restoring a commodity-based economy (for which there were virtually no real possibilities) or else to try to solve the problem through barter, consumer communes, etc. Nonetheless, even toward such measures the approach was frequently "commodity" oriented, so to say.

We find indicative, for example, Lenin's thoughts on the activities of enterprises and agricultural communities as recorded in the initial draft of the work "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System." Lenin cautioned that if despite all of our appeals enterprises failed to increase their labor productivity, they would be "either classified as sick, in which case measures for their recovery should be taken...or else classified as penalized enterprises which should be closed down...." (op cit., vol 36, p 149).

O. Mikhaylov This is literally the point we have reached today.

Not only in 1918 but even before the October Revolution, in his work "*The State and Revolution*," Lenin persistently repeated that we neither do nor could know the ways, turns and twists which would lead us to socialism. The details can be determined only through practical experience. At the 29 April 1918 session of the VTsIK, in his speech on the forthcoming tasks of the Soviet system, in criticizing the "left wing communists," Lenin said: "...What happened to those people, how could they ignore reality for the sake of books?"

Here is a typical Leninist statement: "Reality says that state capitalism could be in our case a step forward" (ibid., p 254). It is precisely the argument on state capitalism that indicates particularly convincingly that these works were not a step toward "war communism" but an initial approach to the ideas of a new economic policy. Naturally, in some of the details, such as consumer communes, let us say, the maximal encouragement of public consumption, preparations for the elimination of cash and the rejection of commodity-monetary relations, one could find an anticipation of a number of ideas adopted by "war communism." To emphasize this, however, means essentially to blame Lenin for the fact that he had not guessed all of this at the time the revolution was being made.

Certain concepts, not only scientific but particularly strong mass, popular ideas to the effect that capitalism means money and that money is the entire evil, had taken dozens of hundreds of years to develop. Leo Tolstoy was the one who expressed in full these ideas. However, the Marxists as well had the same view on the matter. Could people who had just made a revolution, who were storming capitalism, acknowledge at that very time that the fundamental tool of a capitalist society would suit them? One can only be amazed at the speed with which they were able to reach the right decisions. Lenin formulated the new economic policy only a few months after the end of the civil war, whereas we launched the present reform decades after it had become necessary. One can only be stricken by the speed with which Lenin formulated an entire range of new concepts and if within this complex of ideas a single element—the applicability of commodity-monetary relations specifically—was not developed immediately but only in the autumn of 1921, it is not this that characterizes the main course of Lenin's thinking. The main trend was expressed as early as 1918, in his view on the role of state capitalism. This precisely proves how superior he was to the "leftists."

V. Loginov In this connection it would be suitable to mention the ideology of the "left wing" in general. It was manifested most clearly precisely during crucial periods. In describing the "leftists," Lenin wrote about the petit-bourgeois element. What are the present social grounds for revolutionary phraseology?

O. Mikhaylov This, indeed, is an interesting question. We must admit that we have not answered it fully, even when describing earlier periods. How to describe N.I. Bukharin, the leader of the "left wing communists" in 1918, as the bearer of a petit-bourgeois mentality? He was an old party member and its greatest theoretician. He did not come in the least from petit-bourgeois strata.

V. Loginov His social origin was the right one.

O. Mikhaylov Yes, everything was in order in terms of his social origin, as was the case of many other "leftists." The point is, however, that a mentality and an origin are not all that rigidly interdependent. You raised a question to which no complete answer can be found in Lenin's 1918 articles. He developed it better in 1922, in his letters on the conditions for the acceptance of new party members. In them Lenin considered the problem of petit-bourgeois influence and the consequent political instability.

This was followed by a cycle of works which ended with a "Letter to the Congress" and the articles "How to Reorganized the Rabkrin," and "Better Less but Better," in which Lenin combined within a single entity his views on the difficult social structure of the population, which was adverse in terms of the revolution, the predominance of the petit-bourgeois mass and, under such circumstances, what were the party and the working class to do.

He analyzed the mechanism of petit-bourgeois influence in its entire complexity. Understandably, it was not in the least a question of the fact that a private farmer would run to Bukharin, the "left wing communist," and would be heard out by him. Not everything was all that simple. The point was that the petit-bourgeois mass, the peasant mass above all was the principal environment from which came reinforcements of the working class. To Lenin the petit-bourgeois influence was the voice of the still not "proletarianized" workers, including those within the party itself, of "raw" workers, workers who had not undergone a truly lengthy tempering at industrial enterprises, had not acquired a proper awareness and customs, etc. Before the 11th RKP(b) Congress Lenin wrote that "Unquestionably, today in terms of the majority of its members, our party is insufficiently proletarian" (op cit., vol 45 p 19). In his view one could consider as real workers only those "who in fact, based on their status in life, should master a proletarian mentality. This is impossible without working for many years in a factory with no side objectives, and observing the general conditions of an economic and social way of life" (ibid., p 20). He suggested that a minimal apprenticeship for party membership be applicable only for workers who had spent 10 years working at large industrial enterprises.

As to your question of where are today the "leftists" and where do leftist concepts come from, this reminds me of another question which I hear frequently: Who are today

the opponents of perestroyka and would there be a split between some social groups such as, for example, between workers and the intelligentsia? It seems to me that the line separating proponents and opponents of restructuring, those who demand today the impossible, displaying a leftist impatience, and those who realize that today one must persistently work rather than rely on immediate miracles or "pies from the sky," does not pass along class borders. It is within all social strata. It is not a line separating workers from nonworkers but frontfranking from lagging workers. Among the intelligentsia, we must distinguish between those who have a good understanding and are willing to work long and in an organized fashion to make our life better, and those who demand everything instantly.

V. Loginov What about age divisions?

O. Mikhaylov This line does not run either among age groups or in terms of position or social status, for the most important feature of society is its tremendous mobility. A continuing process is taking place of conversion of peasants into workers and workers into employees and intellectuals. There is a constant mixing of psychological concepts and political views within the separate social strata.

A "left wing" onslaught does not mandatorily come from a specific party or class. It could develop within any individual who, for specific and quite frequently personal reasons, has somehow been affected by "revolutionary impatience," but who engages in "saber rattling," albeit ideological, and uses this "saber" in solving all problems. However, such problems cannot be solved by a cavalry charge but require that which Lenin described as "an even advance of the steel-clad battalions of the proletariat" (see op cit., p 208). This difference between a cavalry charge and an even-paced advance does not exist today strictly on the basis of class or social position.

V. Loginov Incidentally, Lenin never idealized the working class. He did not believe that if one is a worker it means that one is a revolutionary. We find this thought in his "What Is to Be Done?" To say the least, it would be naive to assume that a socialist awareness must be promoted only at the initial periods in the development of a revolutionary workers movement and that the completion of this one-time historical act would solve the problem once and for all. In the course of the proletarian struggle there are not only periods of upsurge or decline but even reverse movements. Furthermore, each new generation of the working class does not acquire a ready-made socialist awareness, together with its genetic code. Lenin mentions backward moods by workers and the existence of thieves and profiteers among them. A person may be officially a worker but, in fact, he may act against the working class and against the revolution. That is why personally I am quite concerned by efforts to lay some kind of "social ground" under our debates on the ways of perestroyka, and to hurl labels in

all directions, such as being the grandsons of former landlords, factory owners, kulaks, and so on. To say the least, it is shameful to introduce as an argument someone's proletarian origin. Origin must not be converted into an indulgence which forgives the "sins" of sluggishness of thought and action. Let me repeat that today we are divided between those who want change and are ready to work for its sake and those who do not want any change, who frequently hide behind fictitious concern for the "purity of socialism," and the good of the state and, in the course of discussions about principles, try to conceal their lack of same.

O. Mikhaylov Let me go back to the question of a petit-bourgeois mentality. It is not merely a question of mentality. In other words, mentality does not exist somewhere by itself.

V. Loginov You know, when I was thinking of the way the petit-bourgeois or, to put it even better, the philistine mentality appears today, with its hesitations and left-wing phraseology and a passive attitude or, conversely, aggressiveness, I imagined this process as being more complex. In this case we are largely dealing with a narrowing of democracy which was characteristic of the recent past. Hence the process of alienation. This also led to a rebirth of philistine mentality and individualism. The only solution to this situation is the total and comprehensive development of democracy.

Look at how interestingly Lenin formulates this problem. The fact is that one-man command in the national economy he considers unquestionable. Also clear is his view that one must move on from the period of holding meetings to practical daily work. However, Lenin does not call for prohibiting meetings and discussions. He speaks of combining meetings and discussions in decisionmaking with strict discipline, with self-discipline at the time of implementation of a specific practical task. Lenin closely links democratization with strengthening discipline and self-discipline. Clearly, this process of democratization is the strongest antidote to bureaucratism and petit-bourgeois moods which the working people must eliminate.

O. Mikhaylov I believe that we must go back also to Lenin's distinction between formal and real socialization. We must bluntly say that at the present state of socialization and with the present unquestionable domination of large scale socialist production, big enterprises and big organizations, the actual revival of petit-bourgeois feelings is nonetheless possible, not only in the mentality but also in the actual behavior of a great variety of people.

A manager who looks at his position not as a job subordinate to the interests of the collective and society but as his private domain which he can use for purposes of extracting personal privileges and who considers the realm of his managerial activities not as part of public ownership but as his own private practice is a person

displaying a petit-bourgeois mentality. A worker who is only looking for the possibility of grabbing, starting with the person who takes literally everything he can and ending with those who produce faulty goods or are concerned with obtaining a profitable order, regardless of what the results will be to the enterprise and society; or the peasant, who is totally indifferent to what he does as long as he can fulfill his norm, are all most primitive individualists and bearers of petit-bourgeois and philistine concepts, although they may be employed at large socialist enterprises. Our socialist enterprises themselves become socialist only to the extent to which such phenomena are being eliminated.

V. Loginov Finally, we must also mention the position which Bukharin adopted during the period when Lenin waged a struggle against the "left wing communists." In the discussions of 1918 he was the central figure among Lenin's opponents.

O. Mikhaylov Unquestionably, we give Bukharin his due as the greatest theoretician and politician who tried to prevent the negative phenomena related to Stalin's activities in the 1920s and 1930s. However, we must also point out the serious nature of his erroneous position during the period when he was a "left wing communist," and acknowledge the tremendous threat which this movement was to the party. In subsequent years Bukharin abandoned "leftism" and accepted Lenin's criticism. Life itself debunked the "leftist" ideas quite soon.

V. Loginov In criticizing Bukharin, Lenin never questioned his loyalty to the revolution and his sincerity. At the very peak of the polemics, at the 7th Congress, Vladimir Ilich said: the fact that you and I are together within the same party "proves that we agree with Bukharin in nine things out of 10." However, he also knew that even one "tenth" of the "leftists" was quite dangerous. A great revolution always triggers great hopes. Great hopes trigger the mentality of impatience when one wishes to obtain real results immediately, right away.

O. Mikhaylov Naturally, we should distinguish between political black marketeers and people who, with the entire honesty of revolutionaries, displayed unattainable or excessive hopes. Such precisely were the "left wing communists" of 1918. At the 7th Party Congress D. Ryazanov described them as Lenin's young friends. Vladimir Ilich indeed loved these people for their honesty, sincerity and purity. We must distinguish between such "leftists" and those who speculated on the "leftist" aspirations and exploited the immaturity of the masses. This applies, for example, to the "new opposition," the Trotsky-Zinov'ev bloc and, subsequently, the manipulations of Stalin who made use of by no means the best qualities of the people.

V. Loginov Nonetheless, Lenin always cautioned against the danger of "leftism." This meant lack of sober political thinking. Great hopes were nurtured initially and,

when such hopes failed to materialize, for in real life there were simply no conditions for their realization, great disappointment and passiveness resulted.

O. Mikhaylov None of this negates the need for showing persistence in striving toward the set objectives. Some things are impossible but also a great deal is possible. We must not identify the true revolutionism which we need a great deal with "leftism." It was no accident that Lenin warned us about the irresponsibility of the petite bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie was in favor of "cutting the rich down but was not interested in being accountable to and controlled by an organization..." (op cit., vol 36, p 260). "The only way is for you to become organized to the very last man," Lenin said. "Organize accountability over production, organize accountability and control over consumption and see to it that we do not waste hundreds of millions of rubles we have printed, not a single hundred-ruble bill which has found wrongly its way into someone's hands and which must be returned to the state treasury. In this case there must be no fit of revolution and no question of finishing off the bourgeoisie. This can be accomplished only through self-discipline, through the organization of the work of workers and peasants, accountability and control" (ibid., p 263). At each new turn in life we find ever new facets within these ideas. Today they have become particularly relevant to us.

V. Loginov Nonetheless, I would not like to see the readers to stop exclusively on the question of the "one hundred-ruble note" in reading Lenin's thoughts on self-organization and self-discipline....

In 1921, in reading Bernard Shaw's pentalogy "Back to Methuselah," which the author had sent to him, Lenin particularly marked one place: "It is being said if one were to wash a cat that cat will never subsequently wash itself. I do not know whether this is true or not but one thing is unquestionable: if a person learns something he will never unlearn it.... For that reason if you wish for your cat to be clean, poor some dirt on it: it will immediately begin to clean itself so zealously that it will end up cleaner than before..."

An obvious truth can be perceived behind Shaw's humor: independent activities and initiative are a principle of life in general and of human life in particular. The most important prerequisite for human development is found precisely in the organic need of man to be the master of his destiny. It is precisely in the social area that the possibility of individual initiative and activity make the people rise, more than anywhere else, over their strictly private and egotistical interests. An awareness of the commonality of the people's interests, without which neither the development of man himself nor the progress of mankind are conceivable, arises precisely on the basis of uniting on the grounds of social aspirations.

That is why in defining one of the most important criteria of Marxism, Vladimir Ilich wrote: "Marx valued more than anything else the historical initiative of the masses" (op cit., vol 14, p 377).

Talk recorded by O. Khlevnyuk.

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05003

"Amazingly Live, Sober and Clear Mind, Greatest Possible Willpower and Firmness"

18020012h Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 60-64

[From the notes of French socialist Jacques Sadoul on V.I. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party]

[Text] Note by V. Sedykh, political commentator, Novosti News Agency:

Increasingly fewer are the number of people who had the good fortune of being personally acquainted with Vladimir Ilich Lenin and of having spoken with him. They include Jacques and Yvonne Sadoul, a French couple who happened to be in Russia during the October Revolution. Jacques Sadoul died in 1956 and his wife recently celebrated her 98th birthday.

As PRAVDA correspondent in France, I have frequently talked with Yvonne Sadoul about V.I. Lenin. One of these talks was tape recorded and I keep the tape in my files along with Jacques Sadoul's book "Notes on the Bolshevik Revolution," which Yvonne sent to me.

Jacques Sadoul was born in Paris exactly 10 years after the defeat of the Commune, on 22 May 1881. As early as 1903 he joined the French Socialist Party. In World War I he worked at the Ministry of Armaments, headed by Albert Thomas, the right-wing socialist.

In the autumn of 1917 the minister sent Sadoul to Russia on a confidential mission: he was to report to the leadership of the French socialists about events in that revolutionary country. However, in Petrograd Jacques Sadoul, a captain and member of the French military mission, "exceeded" his rights: he not only provided a thorough description in his letters on events in Russia but also rapidly developed a sympathy for the Bolsheviks and soon took the side of those who had made the proletarian revolution. Together with Jeanne Labourbe, Robert and Marie-Louise Petit and other compatriots, he actively participated in the activities of the French communist group, which was founded in the autumn of 1918 in Moscow, and volunteered in the ranks of the Red Army.

The French authorities, who charged Sadoul with "state treason," sentenced him to death in absentia. In 1925, after diplomatic relations between France and the USSR were restored, Jacques Sadoul who had meanwhile clandestinely returned to his homeland and had immediately found himself in jail, was exonerated and, until the end of his days he struggled for a rapprochement between France and the USSR and for strengthening mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the two countries.

As the Paris correspondent for IZVESTIYA since 1932, he wrote a great deal of articles and essays and the book "The Birth of the USSR." His main work, unquestionably, is his "Notes on the Bolshevik Revolution." The history of the first edition of these "Notes" is interesting. Initially, V.I. Lenin mistrusted this member of the military mission of the French government, which had shown exceptional hostility to the October Revolution. In his "Letter to the American Workers," Vladimir Ilich did not refer in very flattering terms to the French representative. Deeply disturbed by this reference, Jacques Sadoul sent to Lenin copies of his letters he had sent to France. Several days later Sadoul was invited to the Kremlin. There he was welcomed by Vladimir Ilich who, as he said, had read with pleasure the copies of the letters and had recommended to the author to publish them. In October 1919 Cyrene Publishers put out the first edition of the "Notes on the Bolshevik Revolution," with a preface by Henri Barbusse (1). Subsequent to that talk in the Kremlin, Lenin's attitude toward Jacques Sadoul changed for the better.

"At one point," Yvonne Sadoul recalled, "we were invited by Lenin for dinner. In the entrance hall of his small apartment in the Kremlin we were warmly welcomed by Nadezhda Krupskaya. The modest dinner was informal, without any kind of protocol. Vladimir Ilich was interested in our impressions on life in Moscow and other cities which we had visited as we traveled around Russia. He then started to ask us about news from Paris. Lenin wanted to know the way France had experienced the war and the way the French people lived. I was particularly impressed by the touching concern which Vladimir Ilich and Nadezhda Konstantinovna showed for each other.

I believe that our readers would find it interesting to read excerpts from some messages by Jacques Sadoul, written 7 decades ago, during the days of those historical events.

To Mr. Albert Thomas, deputy (Champigny-sur-Marne) (2)

Petrograd, 25 October (7 November) 1917

The Bolshevik offensive began last night. I could hear from my room in the distance isolated shots. This morning the street is calm but at Hotel Astoria, which is

housing several hundred Russian officers and most officers of the allied missions, the guard of cadets loyal to the Provisional Government, was replaced by a bolshevik detachment, without any conflict whatsoever...

The mission is in turmoil. The rumor has spread that the bolsheviks may make attempts on the lives of the allied officers. On my own initiative I decided to meet with the heads of the uprising, who were attending the Congress of Soviets in Smolny... I immediately met with Steklov, Kamenev, Lapinskiy, and so on; these were happy people, practical and who spoke French. They welcomed me fraternally and willingly answered even the most difficult questions. Above all they were indignant at the slanderous rumors which I reported. Tomorrow a statement for the press will guarantee to all embassy and mission personnel the respect which the second revolution (3) would like to show to the allies. They then spoke to me about their successes. The entire garrison in Petrograd had joined them with the exception of several hundred cossacks, military academy cadets and the women's battalion. They held in their hands all administrative offices. The Provisional Government was under siege in the Winter Palace. It could have already been arrested had the Revolutionary Committee wanted to resort to force. However, the second revolution should be such as to prevent the shedding of a single drop of blood. These were splendid but unrealistic hopes... The bolsheviks are becoming increasingly enthusiastic. The mensheviks, in any case many of them, look pitiful. They have lost faith. They do not know what to do. Indeed, among all of these revolutionaries the bolsheviks alone appear like people of action, full of initiative and daring...

Petrograd, 26 October (8 November) 1917

As agreed with the embassy and the mission, I will be carefully watching events in Smolny for I have had the exceptional luck (at this point I do not yet dare call it honor) to be considered by the bolsheviks as a comrade... I met with Lenin and Trotsky. The meeting of the Congress (of Soviets—Sedykh), which was scheduled to open at 2 PM, opened at 9 PM only...

Met in the crowded hall with tempestuous ovations, Lenin read and then commented on the appeal to the peoples and governments of all belligerent countries and on the draft law on the agrarian reform (4). His words were drowned in thunderous applause. Is it possible that such enthusiastic people would be considered incapable of continuing the struggle? After the appeal to the world was read, all those present, solemnly, with a single thrust, sang the "Internationale"...

Petrograd, 29 December 1917 (11 January 1918)

This evening I met with Lenin. He seemed tired and disturbed. I had already seen him yesterday after his return (5)... The short respite had improved neither his physical nor moral condition. The fever has dropped but

the fatigue remains. I know, however, that this person, who has a truly demonic energy and willpower will soon, I am confident, bounce back.

Obviously, the domestic situation is not brilliant. The situation with the transportation system is worsening and making even worse the crisis with supplies, which has worsened because of the fight in the Ukraine, which is preventing the shipment of grain to the north. Industry is collapsing with every passing day. It is deprived of raw materials coming from the south and industrialists, bankers and higher technical personnel are boycotting it...

An energetic and large leading staff is needed to bring proper order. However, as in the past, the bolsheviks remain short of cadres.

On the other hand, Lenin fears that the talks in Brest will break up soon... The collapse (of the talks—V.S.) would enable the Germans to seize new positions and, somewhat later, with the complicity of the Entente, impose conditions which will be even more degrading for Russia than those which the enemy is demanding now...

Petrograd, 6 (19) January 1918

The Central Executive Committee passed a decree disbanding the Constituent Assembly. This has scattered even the final illusions of the allies who, persisting in their blindness, stubbornly continued to put all their hopes on that assembly.

This session of the VTsIK was exceptionally interesting. Lenin spoke out against the (Constituent) assembly. He reminded that the members of that assembly had been elected on the basis of slates drawn up as early as September or, in other words, prior to the Bolshevik revolution... Refusing to vote in favor of a declaration of the rights of the working and exploited people, which had been suggested by the VTsIK, the Assembly thus proved its hostility to the popular masses and opposed the Republic of Soviets. It had sentenced itself to disappearance.

Soviet power must indeed be indivisible. The soviets, which are the most important product of the revolution, had begun rapidly to develop after February 1917. Initially restricting their activities to controlling the government, in October they proved that they were able themselves to seize the power. Since then they have secured true power by the people. This is indeed the only political system which makes it possible to exercise supervision and the constant cooperation between voters and their representatives. This thesis, something I know well, was developed with great emphasis by Lenin... Naturally, the Soviet system is an infinitely superior system to the parliamentary one with which we are familiar. It will provide for more direct representation and a more efficient management of public affairs. It is a centrifugal system. The actions come from the periphery

or, in other words, from the people toward the center... Clearly, our centripetal system is absolutely less democratic. The Soviet regime is more effective and much more popular and more capable of meeting the expectations of the masses. It is more lively and flexible. However, all of these advantages have their counter-weight. The Soviet system presumes, it seems to me, a political and social education of the masses, relatively developed among workers and peasants. In the absence of such a necessary training it risks, even more easily than would a bourgeois parliamentary regime, to tend either toward anarchy or tyranny by a handful of people.

Petrograd, 22 January (4 February) 1918

Had a long talk with Lenin. The strike in Germany seems to have ended. Obviously, the people there had neither the scope nor the revolutionary strength which some wanted to see in them and they ended without having any hope of influencing the Brest talks. Naturally, this is a symptom of displeasure which the German imperialists should take into consideration. However, the efforts were too weak and the threat they represented was too distant. One should expect an increased intransigence of German claims... However, Lenin believes that this breathing spell (the Brest peace—V.S.) will enable the Soviet government to strengthen its position within the country and to make preparations for the economic and military reorganization which will demand time, a great deal of time. Russia will not perish. The monstrous humiliation it has experienced will increase its energy even further. If the international revolution does not take place soon, thus correcting the injustices committed against it, at the proper time Russia will rise alone. At the present time the main thing for bolshevism is to save the revolution, to preserve the power of the people until the European proletariat decides to follow its example (Russia's—V.S.). In order to achieve this one must survive. And in order to survive, one must make peace...

Petrograd, 30 January (12 February) 1918

Unexpected outcome. Trotsky did not make peace but proclaimed that the war between the central powers (Germany and its allies—V.S.) and Russia had come to an end. On the eve of his departure to Brest he had let me vaguely anticipate the possibility of such a fantastic conclusion of the talks. I did not believe it and still do not. In his idealistic concepts he tries to fly so high, to rise to the dizzying peaks of socialism and, with one daring and drastic action, to turn into reality Tolstoy's concept of nonviolent resistance to evil. Finally, he hopes that the various Hoffmanns, Kuhlmanns and Hindenburghs will suddenly become touched by such benevolence and will pinch like fathers the round cheek of the muzhik offered to them by the bolsheviks with simple trust—what dangerous madness!...

Smolny is grumbling. Some are enthusiastic, others are catatonic. Some are crying, these are the sensible people. Like myself, they realize that this gesture is too romantic,

too futile, that it will exceed the expectations of the pan-Germanists, that a thunderous explosion of laughter will burst out in Germany and that tomorrow the German forces will resume their offensive with a vengeance, feeling stronger thanks to the pleasant prospect of easy and rich gains...

Moscow, 5 July 1918

The threats which Spiridonov is so rudely making at all bolsheviks are heavily weighing on the course of the discussions (6). We know what the SR terrorists are capable of. Lenin rises. His unusual face is calm, with a mocking expression. He kept laughing, even under the flood of curses, attacks and open threats hurled at him from the rostrum and the hall. In these tragic circumstances, when this person knows that his entire undertaking, his ideas, his life are being questioned, this rolling, happy and honest laughter, which some people may find inappropriate, impresses me inordinately... Trotsky, sitting next to Lenin, is also trying to laugh. However, anger, emotion and nervousness twist his laughter into a painful grimace. At that point his lively and mobile expression dies out, disappears behind a Mephistophelian horrifying mask. He lacks the highest possible willpower of the "master," the master's composure and absolute self-control... The bolsheviks, all those who were present with the exception of the left-wing SR, who remained silently seated, gave Lenin a stormy ovation... Lenin defended the policy of Brest. It is becoming increasingly obvious that countries which continue to be plunged into the war are heading for the precipice. The bolsheviks are marching toward socialism and they will continue their march unless criminals involve Russia in a war "which it cannot and should not wage."... During the night Lenin's resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes in the Congress, naturally, expressing a full approval of Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

Moscow, 25 July 1918

Everything is ready for the return of the military mission to France... I am preparing myself for completing my editing of these daily notes which I started on 25 October (7 November) 1917. I believe that the time has come to make an effort, to determine the distance covered since that date which marks a new phase in the Russian Revolution which, so far, has been essentially politically and unexpectedly made a maximalist (bolshevik—V.S.) sharp turn into an economic and social revolution... The solution of the problem is particularly difficult in a country with a backward administrative and industrial system, consisting of workers and peasants most of whom are illiterate, without political knowledge, neglected because of age-old serfdom, technically below their European comrades, workers and peasants who have been incredibly exhausted by 3 years of war and 16 months of revolution. With persistence and extraordinary faith, led by Lenin with his amazingly lively, sober and clear mind, with his highest willpower and firmness,

the bolsheviks mounted an offensive against this problem, the greatest possible importance of which they can clearly see, as they realize the difficulty of solving it.

Footnotes

1. The second printing of Jacques Sadoul's book "*Notes On the Bolshevik Revolution*" came out in Paris in 1971 (Jacques Sadoul, "*Notes sur la Revolution Bolchevique*." Francois Maspero, Paris, 1971, 465 pp. It was not translated into Russian.
2. In order to avoid repetitions, we have omitted similar references to Albert Thomas found in other letters.
3. The author refers to the Great October Socialist Revolution.
4. This refers to the Decrees on Peace and Land.
5. Because of excessive fatigue, by decision of the SNK, V.I. Lenin took a short rest (from 6 to 10 January 1918) at the Khalila Sanatorium. In the sanatorium, Lenin worked hard on problems of building socialism; he drafted an outline for "From The Diary of a Publicist (Topics for Development)," and the preliminary theses and final text of the "Draft Decree on Consumer Communes;" he wrote the articles "Confused by the Breakdown of the Old and Struggling for the New," and "How to Organize the Competition?"
6. This refers to the polemics which developed in connection with the speech of the left-wing SR at the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

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05003

Has the Ice Cracked? On Demographic Processes and Social Policy

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[Article by Anatoliy Grigorevich Vishnevskiy, doctor of economic sciences, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Production Forces and Natural Resources]

[Text] Perestroika is affecting ever more profoundly various aspects of life in Soviet society. One of the most pleasing changes of late has been the appearance of positive demographic trends. For many years specialists and public opinion have been concerned with the difficulties existing in the area of the reproduction of the Soviet population. The life span had stopped increasing and, furthermore, had begun to decrease, thus worsening our lag in this area behind other developed countries. The drop in the birthrate in many parts of the country, some of which were steadily coming closer to a level

beyond which population size would begin to decline, was a subject of increasing concern. As early as 1986, when my previous article (see KOMMUNIST No 17, 1986) came out nothing else could be said.

The situation today has changed. We are beginning to pull out of the demographic stagnation. However, the grounds for concern have still not vanished and the situation remains difficult, which makes it even more important to look at the positive changes which have taken place and determine the direction which must be followed in order to develop and consolidate successes.

Positive Changes and Unsolved Problems

A turn in the trends of the mortality rate and the span of life was noted starting with 1985, the first since the mid-1960s when such statistics were the most favorable throughout the country's history (although we must note that at that time records were kept worse than they are now, for which reason indicators of the mortality rate for the first half of the 1960s for some territories had been obviously reduced and the average life span increased). Here is what the figures say on our average life span (in years):

Year	Total Population	Men	Women
1964-1965	70.4	66.1	73.8
1978-1979	67.9	62.5	72.6
1984	67.7	62.4	72.6
1986	69.6	65.0	73.6

As we may see, for the first time in 20 years there was a clear and very significant increase in the average life span for a short 2-year period (1985 and 1986). It affected more men than women and more rural the urban population. In other words, those who benefited were, above all, population groups in which the mortality rate indicators had been the worst until that time. Naturally, increasing the average life span is important in itself. However, it is important also as proof that the long-term adverse trend which, until recently, was passively tolerated, can be turned around.

While giving due credit to the results which were achieved, we cannot fail to see that these are merely the initial steps. According to specialists at the USSR State Statistical Committee R. Dimitriyeva and Ye. Andreyev, improvements in the average life span of men were achieved essentially by reducing the mortality rate in the active-age groups caused by accidents, poisoning and traumas. There is an unquestionable connection between this shift and the offensive which was mounted in the country against drunkenness, the more so since chronologically as well it was started in June 1985, i.e., after energetic steps were taken to combat drunkenness and

alcoholism. Obviously, some contribution to this struggle was also made by reducing the death rate from diseases in the blood circulation system, which is the second source of progress in extending the life of men and the first in extending the life of women. However, so far we have been unable to achieve a major reduction in the other causes of death.

The level of the infant mortality rate has remained virtually unchanged. Yet in our country it is quite high: more than 25 children per 1,000 under 1 year of age die, compared to 10 in the United States, 8 in France and 5 in Japan. The reasons for such deaths are by no means esoteric and fixed, leading to the fact that in our country many more children aged 1 to 5 die compared with other developed countries. Statistical figures may be dry but try to imagine 10 Russian or Uzbek women who have lost a child because of stomach infection or pneumonia, compared to 1 American or Japanese woman grieving for the same reason...

Naturally, there is no immortality. People are mortal. The reasons for mortality are not all that varied: today in all developed countries most people die from cardiovascular and oncological diseases, accidents, poisonings and traumas, or diseases of the respiratory organs; 80 to 90 percent of people of each generation lose their lives for one of these reasons and our country is no exception. However, why is it that in Britain or Japan, where chances of dying from diseases of the respiratory organs are as a whole higher than they are in our country, respectively 7 and 4 percent of people who die for this type of reasons do not live to be 60, whereas their numbers in our country are significantly higher? A similar situation prevails with diseases of the cardiovascular system and malignant tumors. So far we have been unable to reduce the incidence of the diseases themselves nor the mortality they cause at higher ages to the extent to which this has been accomplished in many other countries.

So far the most obvious reserves have been used, which has led to success. Naturally this is a satisfying phenomenon. Nonetheless, many available mechanisms for protecting the health and life of the people remain inefficient and no new ones have been created. A great deal remains to be changed and reorganized in this area.

Obvious positive changes have affected also the second most important demographic process: the birthrate. The number of children which were born in our country in 1986 and 1987 (5.6 million each) was the highest for the entire postwar period. Let us remember that this figure increased until 1960, when more than 5.3 million children were born, after which it began to decline, reaching a minimum (4.1 million) in 1969. Since then it once again increased by 1.5 million and more than 1 half of this increase was between 1981 and 1986. The absolute number of people born in the country depends, naturally, on the size of the population, which has been

steadily increasing. That is why it would be more accurate to compare relative values: the overall birthrate coefficients. The overall coefficient for 1986 was the highest since 1964: 20 per 1,000 population.

Yet another more accurate measure exists, which, unlike the general coefficient, does not depend on the age structure: the indicator of the resulting population birthrate. This indicator was 246 children per 100 women in the so-called nominal generation in 1985-1986 and, if we ignore a short increase at the beginning of the 1970s, it was the highest since the 1965-1966 period. The birthrate of these nominal generations have been declining, with some fluctuation, for the entire postwar period, reaching its minimal values (225 children per 100 women) in 1980-1981; now, 5 years later, it has returned to the level it had reached 15 years ago.

The increased birthrate and reduced mortality rate have changed for the better the basic characteristics of Soviet population reproduction. For the first time since 1966, in 1986 the coefficient of the natural population growth exceeded 1 percent. The net coefficient of population reproduction, which had been declining over a long period of time, also increased. This indicator shows the correlation for changes between the parent generation and the generation of their children. Until quite recently it was coming threateningly close to the unit, i.e., to a level beyond which even a simple replacement of generations could not be secured. Today it has increased once again and for the country as a whole this results not only in the simple but also the expanded reproduction of the population.

However, this cannot be said for all parts of the country. In many republics the birthrate remains insufficiently high to ensure even simple reproduction. Given the current level of the mortality rate, it would require the birth of approximately 210-220 children per 100 women of each generation; so far, however, this cannot be found in any one of the 6 republics which show the lowest birthrate (the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia). In the 1960s and 1970s, with the exception of Belorussia, these republics had periods in which the birthrate in them dropped below 200 children per 100 women. By the mid-1980s this indicator had increased everywhere and by 1986 it ranged between 207 for the Ukraine and 214 for Lithuania. In the majority of cases this is insufficient to ensure the simple reproduction of the population.

Furthermore, we should point out that such data, which are most extensively used by demographers, are not entirely accurate and embellish the situation. They pertain to the "nominal" generation, which has been artificially structured from different age groups and parallel actual generations of women who were born at different times. A nominal generation for any given year, 1987 for example, includes various age groups the birthrate indicators of which are recorded for such age groups in 1987. In fact, 10 years ago women who are thirty today may

have had entirely different birthrate indicators compared to women who are 20 today. In order to determine the true situation regarding the population reproduction, we must have the indicators of the birthrate in the actual

generations. Following are data on the number of children born by the time women are 35, with the different real generations in republics with a low birthrate.

Year During Which Women Attained the Age of 35	RSFSR	The Ukraine	Belorussia	Lithuanian	Latvia	Estonia
1974-1978	177	171	182	174	153	173
1978-1982	169	177	184	179	158	172
1982-1986	172	180	185	191	168	184
1986-1990	177	178	182	180	172	184

With a low birthrate by the time a woman is 35, usually more than 90 percent of the offspring of each generation has already appeared, so that it is possible to say that for a long period of time in none of the Union republics we listed the birthrate of real generations had reached 200 children per 100 women but had remained far below the level needed even for the simple replacement of the parent generation with that of their children. The upsurge in the birthrate in recent years has led to the fact that in the generation of women which follow the gap indicated in the table between the actual and the minimally necessary reproduction levels, the population will decline. However, this decline will not disappear if the present growth trend in the birthrate has not been consolidated and increased. To consider that we are already on the way to solving the problem of the low birthrate would be premature.

It is true that no such problem exists in a segment of the Soviet population, essentially among the native ethnic groups of the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Here, as in the past, several children are born to a family, which greatly helps to maintain favorable average-Union birthrate and population reproduction indicators. However, assessing the situation in areas with a high birthrate from exclusively demographic positions would be erroneous. This situation requires a comprehensive interpretation and has its difficulties, as noted by a great variety of specialists. Physicians are concerned by the adverse influence of excessive frequent births on the health of mothers and children; high infant mortality is also related to having multiple children (I am not discussing here the question of the quality of medical care). Economists are concerned by the disproportion between the increased population size and the development of the economic base and the transformation of the sectorial structure of the national economy and the improved quality of manpower. Sociologists pay attention to the low territorial and social mobility of families with several children and the sometimes conservative role which they play in the reproduction of social relations and structures and the public awareness. All of this must be taken into consideration in assessing the increased birthrate noted in recent years in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Population Reproduction and Family Policy

The solution of problems related to further lowering the mortality rate and optimizing population reproduction, which have retained their gravity, is closely related to the

trends, activeness and methods of social policy affecting the demographic area. We have acquired extensive experience in the exercise of such a policy. However, at each historical turn some of the available experience becomes obsolete and new problems demand new approaches to their solution. Obviously, we must take a new look also at those aspects of social policy which are above all of interest to the demographer. This applies mainly to family policy.

It would be difficult to find an area of social policy which would not affect the family one way or another. However, general measures the purpose of which is to upgrade the well-being or cultural standards of the people, the protection of their health or the solution of the housing problem are one thing, and special family policy, the task of which is to support the family as an institution and, under certain conditions, also a specific model (or perhaps several models) of a family, is another.

In our country this task was formulated by no means always and to this day, obviously, its fullest extent has not been realized. In the first post-revolutionary years, when the country entered the period of socioeconomic change, a profound restructuring of the family institution developed, perceived by many as the beginning of its end. Ideas of breaking family relations and the total socialization of children's life and upbringing became widespread. As early as 1930 these ideas were criticized in a resolution of the VKP(b) Central Committee, which noted that "the implementation of such harmful utopian initiatives, which do not take into consideration the country's material resources and the extent to which the population is prepared for them, would lead to a huge waste of funds and would greatly discredit the very idea of the socialist reorganization of the way of life." At that time, however, the criticism was addressed less to the very idea of the total socialization of the way of life than to its premature nature. It was as though its implementation had been postponed for better times, when resources would be available and the population would be better prepared. The idea itself had supporters long after that. In 1964 S.G. Strumilin assumed that in the near future "each individual family, like an economic cell, merging with others, and growing into a big economic collective, will develop into a new 'zadruza' of the future household commune" (S.G. Strumilin, *"Izbrannyye Proizvedeniya v 5 Tomakh"* [Selected Works in 5 Volumes]. Vol 5, p 440).

This type of approach did not contribute in the least to an awareness of the specific problems related to the development of the institution of the family and the formulation and implementation of a profoundly planned family policy. It is only of late that the underestimating of this problem, both theoretically and practically, has begun to be surmounted. The prestige of family relations in social awareness has been enhanced and they have begun to be considered as the most important part of the entire system of social relations. The increased prestige of the family has been reflected in the party documents which note that the CPSU ascribes tremendous governmental significance to increased concern for the family. In the realm of practical activities and in actual social policy this was manifested by considerably increasing aid to the families—economic, legal, etc. Today we can speak of the fact that we have developed a specific direction of social policy the task of which is to support and strengthen the institution of the family.

However, as we pointed out, the policy toward the family cannot be limited to this task but must also contribute to the preferential popularization of specific models of family providing that socially significant grounds exist for this purpose.

Demographers, concerned with the reduced birthrate, were the first to pay attention to this aspect of family policy, for the question of the birthrate is, above all, one of the most popular family models. In our country today, at least among the urban population, the so-called nuclear family predominates, consisting of parents and children. As to the number of children, both in fact and in the preferences expressed in various population surveys, it is most frequently in favor of a family with two children. Naturally, this does not mean that everyone has or would like to have two children. Such a family turns out to be fashionable (in the statistical meaning of the term) in terms of the classification of families by the number of children, and nothing more. What is important is the nature of this classification. For example, if one half of each 100 families has two children, while 30 women have three, ten women have one, five have no children and five have four or more children, the simple reproduction of the population would be ensured. In our republics with a low birthrate a different type of breakdown prevails: a two-child family remains most popular in the majority of cases followed, however, not by families with three children but with one child.

Such a mass preference cannot be accidental. Clearly, giving birth to and raising one or two children is most consistent with the possibilities of the contemporary family, urban in particular, and with its way of life. On the one hand, children are a mandatory component of this way of life and its most important value; contacts with them, concern for their health and their material well-being, education and social status play a primary role in the life of most people; the success of the children enhances the rating of the success of the parents in their

own eyes and in the eyes of public opinion. On the other hand, the existing system of activities, involving the time budget of the adult members of the family, their material sufficiency, structure of needs and most widespread type of residential premises all make the raising of three or even two children a difficult project which competes with our other interests and objectives.

A birthrate which does not ensure even a simple replacement of generations is a feature of obvious demographic difficulty. It demands a reaction on the part of society and efforts to correct the situation. What kind of reaction should this be?

It is usually related to the pursuit of a policy which supports the family model considered best from the viewpoint of population reproduction. In turn, most frequently such a policy is identified with various types of family aid. In practice, however, such aid is virtually never exclusively demographic; it reflects a more general family policy which pursues a variety of objectives, for the model family involves not only the number of children but also its structure in the broad meaning of the term (a family could consist of two or three generations), and a variety of social characteristics, such as sources of support, status of the women, type of relations between spouses and many others. A family policy, even if it has a clearly manifested demographic trend, cannot remain indifferent to other aspects of family life.

To what extent can family policy influence demographic trends? We should not forget that it is only part of overall social policy. In terms of its significance, it is much less important to policy related to employment, wages, prices, housing construction, development of health care, education, and so on. It is precisely these fundamental types of social policy that predetermine, in their essential features, the conditions under which families live. A special family policy can ensure only an additional correction to such conditions applicable to the specific circumstances governing the life of one or another type of family or particular stage in its development. It cannot change the way of life of the people or their value systems and preferences. However, by purposefully influencing, albeit on a rather minor scale, the status within each specific family, it can somewhat modify its behavior.

If social policy as a whole contributes to broadening the "kingdom of freedom" for every individual and every family, and to increasing their choices, a special family policy can, to a certain extent, influence the choice itself and direct it. In particular, it could contribute to the essentially minor change in demographic behavior which is needed for some two-children families to become families with three children and some families with a single child to have two children. Success greatly depends on how well planned and actively promoted the adopted measures are.

The introduction of partially paid leave for taking care of a child under one and of additional unpaid leave lasting up to 18 months, as well as other steps in this area, taken of late, were of important significance. The resolutions of the 27th Party Congress call for the further increase in aid to the family and, in particular, for extending the length of partially paid leave to mothers to take care of children and granting the right to additional unpaid leave.

Nonetheless, the steps which were taken at the beginning of the 1980s, although somewhat improving the demographic situation, did not, as we saw, ensure the radical solution of the birthrate problem. This must be taken into consideration as we formulate our future strategy in the area of social policies.

Let us look closely at the objectives which could be pursued by a family policy under our conditions. Naturally, they include demographic objectives, such as increasing the number of children in the family, although such objectives could be conceived in broader terms as well. It would be desirable for women not simply to have two or three children but for such children to be born when the mother is at an age optimal from the viewpoint of her health and that of the child (roughly between the ages of 20 and 35); the intervals between births, also for considerations of health, should be quite long (no less than 2 years); and women should avoid a dangerous step for controlling childbirth, such as abortion.

Nonetheless, we must not forget many other social objectives and the need to protect a variety of individual and collective interests. They include, among others, the social interests of women, family as well as professional and social; the interests of the children, their health and their upbringing; the interests of the family as a whole, of its unity and well-being. Society as well has its own interests—economic and other. It is easy to note that such interests could conflict with the other and that in pursuing a policy aimed at solving such contradictions priority may be given to one objective or another. For example, protecting the social interests of women would require, under a given situation, increasing the opportunity to stay at home and take care of family and children; under another set of circumstances, conversely, the social interests of women would be inconceivable without their active involvement in public production and social life and without relieving them from "household slavery."

Could we attain different and occasionally conflicting objectives of family policy with the help of universal steps, identically applicable to all? Most likely, we cannot. Does our family policy take this into consideration? If it does, it does so extremely inadequately. We must seriously reinterpret this policy from a number of viewpoints, for it developed gradually and its origins may be traced to a time when many of the current problems, including that of a low birthrate, did not exist. However, at that time there were problems which are now part of

the past. For example, does family policy today hold a proper place in the system of social priorities? In a number of countries outlays for family aid are higher by 1, 2 or even 3 percent than the value of the GNP; in our country, the share of such aid does not reach even 1 half of 1 percent.

We must also consider the principle of equalization which prevails in our family policy. Equalization of the entire series of most important standards which regulate the status and rights of mothers is frequently accepted as an unquestionable accomplishment, as a triumph of social justice. To begin with, a uniform stereotyped approach to different situations by no means always turns into real social justice; second, with this kind of approach, various aids to families and family benefits lose their meaning as political instruments and turn into some kind of social philanthropy. The proper instruments should be differentiated. They should take into consideration the variety and sequence of priorities of the objectives we are pursuing as well as the different nature of families which are the target of such policy. Above all, clarity is needed in determining the type of model (or models) of family pursued by our policy and the requirements proceeding from this fact. For example, if this policy is aimed at equalizing living standards, any type of aid or benefits which does not take into consideration the size of family earnings becomes meaningless. If its objective is to contribute to increasing the production activeness of women and upgrading their practical skills, policy measures should not be indifferent to labor seniority or earnings and should not contribute to women dropping out of the production process.

In precisely the same way, measures of family policy aimed at influencing the birthrate must not be indifferent to the main point for the sake of which such measures are adopted: the number of children in the family and, perhaps, the period during which they are born. In our country today only certain secondary measures are related to the number of children such as, for example, one-time and monthly aid to mothers of several children. The length of leave for pregnancy and giving birth and for caring for infants and their wages (which absorb 70 percent of all costs for family aid) are the same whether a first, third or fifth child is born. This situation will be retained in the future and perfecting the system of benefits to mothers is conceived above all as their even expansion, regardless of the number of children a woman has already had.

The experience of many other countries, socialist above all, indicates a different way. The demographic component of family policy is manifested in the fact that its steps clearly underline the desirability of giving birth to a second and, particularly, a third child. Aids and benefits granted to mothers or families become greater with the second child and then with the third, after which their increase is terminated and, sometimes, even replaced by a decrease. This is a manifestation of support of the model of the two and three-children family. This

does not exclude the existence of other types of aid or benefits unrelated to the number of children, for their objectives are different (such as aid to needy families, regardless of the number of children). Should we not make use of this experience and, as we improve our family policy, confidently set up a system which would benefit most the type of family which under our circumstances could be considered optimal (which, naturally, should not result in discriminating against any other type of family)?

Another major problem is that of taking into consideration regional and national features in pursuing a family policy. We must not approach with the same yardstick the small families, which predominate in the Baltic republics, and the large families in the republics of Central Asia. Whereas in some parts of the country priority is given to concern for the small number of children, which calls for upgrading the significance of the demographic component in family policy and its stimulating effect on the birthrate, in other areas such a policy must have a much stronger social sense and be such as to maintain the level of well-being of large families. The difference of objectives, as we pointed out, would involve differences in policy instruments. Naturally, it is not a question of differences in strategic, in final objectives. In the more distant future it is more likely that a single model of family will prevail in the country, at which point the objectives of family policy will become uniform. At the present stage, however, major regional differences remain and require a corresponding "regionalizing" of family policy and, possibly, its decentralization, based on republic legislation. This is a complex problem which requires thorough study but without the solution of which we would hardly be able to make our family policy sufficiently flexible and effective.

Demography and Democracy

On the surface these concepts sound similar. Such, however, is not the case. Today there is a profound organic connection between them, ignoring which would make inefficient any social policy in the field of population reproduction. If such a policy takes into consideration the demands of our time and is based on the increased activeness of the people in solving their family or any other problems of demographic significance, and the various forms of self-organization of the population, this would not only contribute to upgrading the efficiency of sociodemographic policy but would also constitute a major contribution to the democratization of all social structures and relations.

I have written on the demographic revolution a number of times, as a historical turn which in the course of several decades radically changed conditions for population reproduction in our country. One of the main and profound consequences of this turn was the headlong increase in the demographic awareness of the people which, in turn, influenced the upsurge of their general civic self-awareness, for until very recently the entire life

of man in the demographic area obeyed the rigid rules, and religious and laic prescriptions and prohibitions, inherited from the past. Man could not freely structure his family life and decide when to have any children, and how many; he was unable to protect himself from diseases and premature death. All of this did not contribute to the developing of an active stance and shaped a mentality of passiveness, and noninterference in the seemingly natural course of demographic processes.

Such mentality prevailed for a while even after socioeconomic and scientific and technical progress had created objective prerequisites for broadening the conscious activeness of human demographic behavior. Sociodemographic policy had new opportunities but, initially, the most efficient frequently turned out to be steps which were compatible with underdeveloped demographic behavior. For example, the huge successes achieved in reducing the mortality rate were due to the mass measures which were taken (development of a quarantine service, universal vaccination, sanitary control over water supply sources, etc.), which did not demand individual initiatives and could be carried out by the health care authorities or under their control while the population remained largely passive.

Typical of the early stages of the demographic revolution were efforts to reproduce through the steps taken in social policy the obsolete methods of social control over demographic behavior and to restrict the people's freedom of choice. Legal standards were drafted in the various countries (and, occasionally, practices not founded on such standards), which limited or banned divorce, abortions and the production or sale of contraceptives. However, since by their very nature such steps belong to the past, they turn out to be unviable under the new conditions, trigger the growing opposition of the population and, sooner or later, are abandoned.

Our present sociodemographic policy must be structured on an entirely different foundation, for it is not dealing in the least with the type of person which existed 50 or 60 years ago. Substantial changes must be made in the entire structure of demographic relations, i.e., relations among people, and between the individual and society, pertaining to health care, childbirth and setting up a family.

Let us consider, for example, the policy in the area of protecting the health and life of the population. Who should be "making" such policy? Is it the Ministry of Health? Naturally, it too but by no means alone. It is true that in our country the "medical paternalism" which can be traced back to times when the person wearing a white smock worked among ignorant and illiterate people who did not have even an embryo of knowledge of hygiene, remains strong. The word of a physician or a medical certificate was the final truth and the hospitalization of a patient seemed like a virtual guarantee for restoring his health. All the patient had to do was to obey medical prescriptions. Today, however, such paternalism is

becoming obsolete. The general and hygiene standards of the population, and its level of information and understanding the interests of its health and the right to protect it have grown sharply. Correspondingly, dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs, its critique and the activeness of the people who feel that their health is being threatened could not fail to increase.

It is very important to make use of the positive potential created by such changes and to assist in having the person feel himself the master of his health, responsible for its preservation and possessing the respective rights and opportunities to this effect. To accomplish this, however, the person needs a field of active effort. We need channels for the manifestation of individual and collective activeness in health protection and restoration and means for the expression of the population's will when it is a question of decisions which could affect the health of a given population group (workers in an enterprise, and people living in a given city or rayon). The people must participate in discussions of problems on locating potentially health-hazardous production facilities or the use of harmful technologies. They must be given the right to choose their own physician or hospital, to recheck a diagnosis and supervise the course of the use of a new drug or method of treatment. New democratic forms are needed for the self-organization of the population, which would help its various groups better to understand their interests and would encourage their initiative and, at the same time, would be an instrument for social influence on various departments, whether the Ministry of Health, the State Environmental Protection Committee or any other governmental authority, and would not allow them to become alienated from life and bureaucratized.

Let me explain my idea with an example I am familiar with, as a demographer. A great deal has been written in our country about the harm to human health and economic damage related to the insufficient accessibility of modern contraceptives and the respectively excessively high number of abortions. Everyone realizes that this situation must be changed yet it goes on. The experience of most developed countries indicates that matters can be moved with the help of a public organization, such as a family planning association, which would help women to be aware of their interests when facing different departments and would influence the shaping of public opinion and promote a healthy way of life and a healthy family. It is only now that we have started to discuss the question of creating such an organization (which, unfortunately, does not exist for the time being).

This example merely illustrates a general principle. We need a great variety of voluntary public organizations which would protect both the health interests and the interests of the various categories of sick people and the disabled. As a whole, we need a consistent democratization of our somewhat patriarchal health care system and

we must involve in the struggle for a longer life span the activeness, energy and, partially and possibly, the resources of the population itself.

The same approach is important in the area of family policy. It too should not be paternalistic. Family, like social policy in general, today can be effective only if it is understood and accepted by the people. This means that the people should not receive it as a gift from heaven but must participate in its elaboration, in the discussion of suggested measures and achieved results and, through their own experience, determine the accuracy or faultiness of the decisions which were made and, if necessary, change them. Extremely important here also is a permanent dialogue between state authorities and the population represented by different public organizations. Let me cite the example of France where a great variety of family associations have been created and are rallied, in turn, in regional and national unions of family associations, which play an important consulting role in the adoption of any decision affecting the interests of the family.

All of this does not reduce the role of the socialist state in the least nor does it question the need for a single authority responsible for the overall exercise of family policy, determining its basic trends, coordinating the various forms of its exercise and defending the interests of the entire society. Its activities, however, must not be separated from the work of the public organizations representing interested population groups, and not lead to unnecessary centralization of family policy and the formulation of a uniform stereotype applicable to the entire country; it must not restrict unnecessarily the initiative of republic or local soviet authorities and labor collectives which, in many cases, are better able to take into consideration local specifics and possibilities.

A sociodemographic policy which is based on the initiative and independent activities of the masses presumes the ability of the population to take stock of a situation and to determine the real opportunities of influencing it. Therefore, it presumes extensive glasnost and accessibility of information on demographic processes. Of late in this area as well positive changes have taken place. The publication of statistical data has been increased and problems of population reproduction are now being covered in mass publications more frequently and more fully. Nonetheless, if the population remains merely a passive consumer of information, which has been the case so far, no major changes could be expected in its behavior. It is a different matter if a person knows that his views on one problem or another could influence the course of events and if there are public organizations which could accept and express this view. In such cases information assumes a new meaning to the individual, who becomes more critical in assessing it. The publication of figures which trigger "information noise," something which does unfortunately occur sometimes, becomes impossible. For example, the USSR State Statistical Committee published data on causes of death in

the active-age groups. They show, in particular, that in 1970 88 per 100,000 population within that group died of diseases of the blood circulation system and that 120 died in 1986. Does this mean that the situation has worsened greatly? Nothing of the sort. Simply these figures are not comparable. They do not take into consideration the aging of the able-bodied population, for which reason they can only mislead us. However, is it allowed when calling upon the masses to be active, to supply them with worthless information?

I would like to end this article on an optimistic note. Demographic trends in recent years provide some reasons for this. Optimism, albeit substantiated, should not lead us to underestimate the seriousness and difficulty of the tasks awaiting us. Both demographic development itself as well as the more general changes which are taking place in the country will require new approaches in assessing population reproduction processes and the way they are influenced by the methods of social policy. Such approaches are as yet to be developed, scientifically substantiated and practically tested. Extensive joint work lies ahead by state authorities, public organizations and scientific institutions, without which we cannot consolidate and develop the positive demographic trends which have been noted in recent years.

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Loyalty to Revolutionary Behests

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[Article by Gustav Kusak, member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium and president of the CSSR]

[Text] Knowledge of historical laws is an important component of socialist social consciousness which actively influences people's standpoints and actions. It helps to explain the link between past and present historical events and phenomena and what they have influenced and are influencing. The lessons of the past make it possible to get better bearings in the present, and to ensure continuity and development of everything that promotes progress.

Striving to create a meaningful and truthful picture of the past we turn to the historical dates which the Czechoslovak people will celebrate this year. The 40th anniversary of the working people's victory over the forces of bourgeois reaction in February 1948 is the most momentous among them.

Victorious February was a milestone in the destiny of the Czechoslovak people. It clearly demarcated their capitalist past from their socialist present and future. It was the fruit of the revolutionary resolution of class antagonisms and of the stubborn struggle to implement the national

and sociopolitical demands, interests and rights of the working people. It was preceded by historical experience which was acquired at a high price and which was based on profound internal requirements of social development. February is an inseparable part of the Czechoslovak people's historical consciousness and an important source for their historical thought.

The revolutionary behest of February, which has been maintained for 40 years, also helps us to solve qualitatively new problems today. When we turn to the fundamental political, ideological and moral values of the communist movement which the Czechoslovak people acquired after their triumph over reaction in 1948, we are prompted to proceed from the highest criteria in assessing both the results which have been achieved and the tasks of accelerating the development of socialism, of restructuring and of deepening democracy in society.

In one of the first program documents of the international communist movement, Karl Marx wrote that "all societies and individuals who join it will have to recognize truth, justice, and morality as the basis for their relations with one another... There are no rights without obligations, and no obligations without rights" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 44, p 438). He thus clearly lets the whole world understand that the class ideal for which the revolutionary proletariat entered the struggle to liberate itself and transform the whole world, has its roots in the working people's age-old aspiration for happiness, as well as in the greatness of humanist traditions.

From the very moment it was founded in 1921, and at the most critical stages of the struggle for revolutionary transformations of social relations, the CPCZ has honorably fulfilled its historical mission as the most consistent channel for the class, national and social aspirations of working people, acquiring authority and a high level of the masses' moral and political trust. It became a recognized social force and drafted an attractive platform of programs to unite all progressive strata in society for the struggle against capital, the struggle to overthrow capital and to implement profound socialist changes. The CPCZ courageously strove for the fulfillment of the demands of the masses, who were subject to exploitation and national oppression during the global economic crisis in the first half of the thirties. It acted as the most consistent political force when it was necessary to defend the republic against the fascist threat which arose as a result of Hitler coming to power in Germany. After the partition of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939, the Communist Party was, in spite of the harsh terror, in the vanguard of the struggle against Nazi occupation of Czech lands and the clerical-fascist regime in Slovakia, and became recognized as the leading political party in the course of the national liberation struggle in World War II.

The Slovak national uprising of 29 August 1944 and the May 1945 uprising of the Czech people were the culmination of the Czech and Slovak peoples' antifascist

struggle, which was given great impetus by the Red Army's historic victories on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. These armed operations served as the prologue to the Czechoslovak national democratic revolution which went down in history as a clearly expressed manifestation of the people's will to throw off the yoke of slavery and restore the republic on the basis of political, social and national justice. An alliance with the Soviet Union was to become the foundation of the country's foreign policy. In order to achieve these goals the CPCZ was able to rally a broad antifascist National Front and to combine the interests of the workers class, peasantry, tradesmen, intelligentsia and the antifascist bourgeoisie.

The victory won in the national liberation struggle laid the foundations for the people's new life on the territory which the Red Army gradually liberated. In March 1945, a meeting in Moscow between representatives of members of the resistance in Czechoslovakia and in exile, the leaders of which operated from the Soviet Union and in the West, agreed on the principles of the policy and the formation of the first postwar government in liberated Czechoslovakia. On 5 April 1945 in the town of Kosice these principles were promulgated as the program for the first government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks.

On the basis of the program of the National Front government, of which the CPCZ formed an important component, the political parties assumed an obligation actively to ensure the building of the national democratic republic as a socially just state of two equal peoples—Czechs and Slovaks. The alliance with the USSR was defined as the main trend of foreign policy. "With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic will be concluded, in order that its freedom and independence be ensured with Soviet support, and that with comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union, peaceful development and a happy future may be ensured for the peoples of Czechoslovakia," the Kosice government program noted.

As early as at a meeting of the aktiv of Communist Party functionaries in Kosice at the beginning of April 1945, when only part of Slovakia had been liberated, Klement Gottwald posed the question: "What characterizes the correlation of class forces in our republic and specifically in Slovakia? Today, neither the Czech nor the Slovak bourgeoisie can rely on a single one of the legal, constitutional and state authorities which they created prior to Munich. They cannot rely either on the pre-Munich government or on the pre-Munich parliament. The bourgeoisie has no definite constitutional authorities under its control, and by means of which it could rule the country in the name of law, constitutionality and the continuity of authority."

The bourgeoisie was, however, still holding important positions in the legislative, government, and executive agencies of the liberated country, and was participating

in the activities of national committees and other institutions within the political system. The bourgeoisie could no longer defend its interests by the old methods, however. Under the conditions of national democracy it was forced to become involved in the competition for the people's trust, and it could not avoid a political struggle resulting from the conflicting nature of the interests of the broad strata of the people, which were expressed by the CPCZ, and the bourgeoisie's interests, represented by the leaders of the National Socialist and Populist Parties, and in Slovakia by the Democratic Party.

After the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the CPCZ's positions strengthened as constructive and creative work was undertaken in the struggle to revitalize the country laid waste by war. The communists were the most selfless builders of the new life. They gained increasing political influence in the national committees and agencies of popular power. Not only was the bourgeoisie unable to ignore the mass participation of CPCZ members in the activities of the authorities, but it was forced to take into account their constantly strengthening political positions and rising influence in mass organizations, especially trade unions, antifascist fighters' unions, and youth organizations. At the above-mentioned meeting Gottwald expressed this as follows: "They cannot rule without us, or we without them, but they can do without us to a lesser extent than we can do without them."

In the years 1945 to 1948 a stubborn class and political struggle unfolded which was to decide the direction in which the republic would develop either toward socialism by way of deepening the national democratic system, or back to capitalism by way of dismantling the revolutionary achievements.

Within the framework of the National Front program, the CPCZ achieved the gradual nationalization of natural resources, mines, the power industry, major enterprises, banks and insurance companies; the implementation of the first stage of a land reform; and other revolutionary measures aimed at consolidating national democracy. Together with efforts consistently to purge social life of reactionary, collaborationist elements which had compromised themselves through complicity with fascism, this strengthened the CPCZ's influence and revealed political antagonisms in social life. The more persistent the efforts made by the National Socialist, Populist and Democratic Parties to block the consistent implementation of the Kosice government program's aims, the clearer the divide between the interests of the bourgeoisie and the working people became.

The CPCZ's leading positions in society were confirmed during the general elections in the spring of 1946. The communists achieved the highest results at them, on a nationwide scale. The working people clearly indicated that they trusted the communists and considered them the consistent spokesmen for their hopes and the most honest fighters of the people's national and social

demands. As the most powerful political party in the republic, the CPCZ acquired the possibility of forming the new government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks.

The program which Prime Minister Klement Gottwald put forward was a clear continuation of the first postwar government program. On matters of principle, it proceeded from the policy affirmed by the 8th CPCZ Congress in March 1946. What was involved here was a set of measures aimed at deepening revolutionary processes and intensifying socialist trends. The first Czechoslovak plan for developing the national economy in the years 1947-48; the measures to solve social problems, to conclude the cleansing of political life, and to ensure the economic and cultural rise of Slovakia; as well as other provisions in the constructive program of Gottwald's government, all attested to the fact that the CPCZ was striving to pave the way toward socialism on the basis of consolidation of the national democratic system.

The forces of political regression and their allies decided to frustrate and ultimately foil the implementation of the program of Gottwald's cabinet. This made the domestic political situation extraordinarily complicated. The attempts made by these circles to halt the process whereby the national democratic revolution was being transformed into a socialist one, and to achieve a fundamental change—in their own favor—in the development of events, met with the resolute resistance of the working people.

A joint offensive against the achievements of the national democratic revolution was mounted before the elections in Slovakia, when the Democratic Party formed a bloc with the clerical fascist elements which had compromised themselves and been defeated in the Slovak national uprising, and which attempted to use the people's religious feelings to their own ends. Through its actions the Democratic Party provoked a crisis in the autumn of 1947, but suffered a political and moral defeat. This was the overture to the February conflict in the power struggle. Revolutionary trade unions, the unions of former antifascist Resistance fighters, peasants and young people came out in support of the Communist Party.

The culmination of the power struggle between the forces of reaction and the Czechoslovak people came on 20th February when 12 non-communist ministers handed in their resignations to the president of the republic. They were counting on being able to weaken and divide the Gottwald government. In taking this step they hoped to turn back the republic's political development and divert it from the course which it had followed since the liberation.

In response to the challenge to the Communist Party, the solution to issues of getting out of the government crisis and of the republic's further development shifted from the secretariats of political parties to the broad strata of people in factories and the countryside.

The voice of the working peoples sounded out resolutely during the demonstration on the historic Old Town Square in Prague and in Bratislava on 21 February. Support for the Communist Party's proposals aimed at solving the political conflict and the question of power was expressed at the statewide conference of plant councils and during the general strike of 24 February. The workers insistently demanded that the resignations of the reactionary ministers be accepted and that the government's ranks be replenished with representatives of all political parties in the National Front and deputies from the major social organizations, all of whom should be devoted to the republic and the national democratic front. People's Militia formations—armed detachments of the popular masses—were set up.

The demands of the popular masses led to a deep split within the ranks of all the non-communist parties. Supporters of the continuation of constructive cooperation with the CPCZ recalled reactionary figures from their posts. Progressive people joined the leadership of these parties. The National Front of Czechs and Slovaks was reborn, with members who also included representatives of various mass organizations.

Under the influence of the revolutionary situation which had been created, Eduard Benes, the republic's president, accepted the resignations of the 12 ministers and signed decrees naming new members of the National Front government. Bourgeois reaction had been defeated.

Victorious February demonstrated the high degree of theoretical and political maturity of the CPCZ, its organizational work and moral strength, and its readiness and ability to carry out the mission of vanguard of the workers class and of the entire Czechoslovak people. The Communist Party was able creatively to develop and implement the Marxist-Leninist concept of socialist revolution under specific Czechoslovak conditions. Moreover, the constitutional norms and laws of the state were consistently observed. This was a momentous event in the international communist movement. The Czechoslovak Republic became part of the community of socialist states which was gradually taking shape.

February 1948 finally resolved the issue of Czechoslovak society's further movement along the road of socialism. For the first time in the history of mankind, a relatively highly developed country with rich democratic traditions had taken this road. The Czech and Slovak peoples faced the historical task of using the advantages inherent in the socialist organization of society. The anniversary of victorious February gives us reason to ponder all that they have achieved in fulfilling this task, as well as the problems which have to be resolved at the present stage by augmenting revolutionary achievements.

We highly value and take pride in the accomplishments of the last 40 years in our homeland. Socialist industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, and the

profound changes in the cultural sphere have all led to significant positive shifts in all areas of life of the Czech and Slovak peoples, and of the other ethnic groups in the republic. Historical facts provide unambiguous evidence of the great successes in developing productive forces and new social relations. There has been a qualitative change in the situation of the working man. His socialist consciousness has been formed and his standard of living is constantly rising. Socialism in our country demonstrated its advantages within a short period of time. Its paramount principles and the essence of the socialist political system—the authority of the working people led by the Communist Party—have completely justified themselves.

Conscientious work has ensured a high standard for the Czechoslovak economy and other areas of the social structure.

The differences between the development of the Czech lands and that of Slovakia which had formed under capitalism, have been surmounted. The Marxist-Leninist resolution of questions of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks on principles of socialist federation which have entirely proved themselves has to be credited as one of the successes of the CPCZ's national policy.

In the general policy of socialist construction adopted at the 9th CPCZ Congress in May 1949, the part which expresses the immutable concept of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy orientation toward an inviolable alliance and fraternal ties with the Soviet Union, in accordance with historical experience and on the basis of the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship sealed in blood, has been consistently implemented. Life has confirmed that this is a decisive factor in the construction of socialist society and in ensuring the CSSR's sovereignty and security.

The political, economic, social, and most important, spiritual development of the Czechoslovak social organism has been complex and contradictory. Along with decisive successes in the implementation of socialist social transformations, there have also been a number of difficulties caused by the newness and complexity of the tasks of socialist building. We have not been able to avoid errors and shortcomings of a subjective nature. We have been unable to block trends which have exerted an increasingly powerful negative influence primarily on society's political and spiritual life; which have fettered creative thinking, initiative, and the spread of socialist democracy; and which have led to theoretical miscalculations and to deformations in sociopolitical practice, including violations of socialist legality. Serious problems have also accumulated in internal party life.

We have had no lack of appeals to resolve urgent issues, solve existing problems, and develop a real program of socialist construction. However, inconsistent actions by the party and state leadership and an unwillingness to finally draw a line under the negative phenomena of the

fifties, to formulate a policy for society's further development, and purposefully to combat phenomena which are alien to socialism—all this, in conjunction with arbitrary attempts to rush ahead, has given rise to all kinds of improvisations in the economic, political and ideological areas and has led to the disorientation of the party, to quote the assessment made at the 14th CPCZ Congress. The attempts to democratize social life and carry out economic reform which were undertaken in the second half of the sixties were not carried through to their conclusion.

The January 1968 CPCZ Central Committee Plenum, the 20th anniversary of which we recently marked, was an expression of the aspiration to prevent the sociopolitical crisis in the CSSR from deepening, to solve urgent problems, and to respond to the new demands for social development. Unfortunately, the great expectations and hopes which communists and working people had placed in this plenum were not justified. It did not become the starting point for a new upsurge in party activity and socialist construction. Conversely, the weak and heterogeneous CPCZ leadership, in which right-wing opportunists gradually assumed key positions, opened up scope for destructive trends. As the crisis intensified, the socialist ideals which had inspired Czechoslovak working people to make a socialist revolution were threatened, as was the leading political role of the workers class and working people. Direct damage was done to the foundations of socialist society. The CSSR's alliance with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community was disrupted. We are fully justified in saying that the antisocialist forces made an attempt to return to the pre-1948 situation.

The Marxist-Leninist forces in the CPCZ were faced with the urgent task of mounting a struggle to change the situation, rebuffing the attacks of right-wing and antisocialist forces, conducting a principled struggle against the deformations which had affected all areas of social life, and overcoming the chaos caused by the crisis. The accomplishment of this task with the help of our friends was a historic test for the CPCZ, the National Front, the state and the Czechoslovak people. The new leadership which headed the party after the April 1969 CPCZ Central Committee Plenum coped with this task.

After several months of acute political conflict, the new CPCZ leadership was able, thanks to its principled policy and on the basis of the best revolutionary traditions, to restore the Marxist-Leninist nature, power, unity and effectiveness of the party, to rebuff the attacks of right-wing and antisocialist forces, to inflict defeat on them by political means, and to renew and consolidate the socialist character of the state and the Marxist-Leninist concept of the National Front. It was able to halt inflation, gradually make the national economy healthier, consolidate social security, strengthen the confidence placed in the socialist system by millions of

working people, restore the CSSR's international position, which had become precarious, and lead the party and society out of deep crisis and onto the path of further socialist development.

After sociopolitical life had been successfully consolidated and the national economy stabilized, a new stage of socialist construction began in the CSSR on the basis of the program adopted by the 14th CPCZ Congress in the spring of 1970. It was later supplemented and made more specific in line with developing conditions at the 15th, 16th and 17th CPCZ Congresses. The concept of this program was based on the fact that at the beginning of the seventies, urgent issues appeared on the agenda in connection with new conditions for an economic upsurge and the fact that further growth in production could no longer be based on extensive production factors, which had largely become exhausted. The introduction of achievements of scientific and technological progress and modern management methods, as well as reaching a higher level of international socialist economic integration, were to become effective new levers for dynamic socioeconomic development. As the 14th CPCZ Congress stressed, it was above all important to ensure "a consistent and comprehensive increase in the effectiveness of national economic development, an increase based on maximum use of intensive growth factors."

The 17th CPCZ Congress, held in 1986, noted that because of the implementation of the long-term general policy declared by the CPCZ at the beginning of the seventies, "socialist Czechoslovakia has attained great heights in all spheres of social, economic and cultural life." The party forum stated that in the 15 years which had passed since the 14th CPCZ Congress the country's economic potential had increased considerably. National income had risen by 81 percent, industrial output by 97 percent, agricultural production by one third, and the volume of construction work by 84 percent. Self-sufficiency in food production had increased. Economic and scientific and technological cooperation with the CEMA countries, and above all the Soviet Union, had substantially deepened. The Soviet Union accounts for 45 percent of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade.

The basis for a rise in people's standard of living was created. Personal consumption has risen by 44 percent, while consumption from social funds has risen by 10 percent. Pensions and workers' social insurance against illness have been improved, and greater care is being taken of families with children. The solution of the housing problem has advanced: almost 1.8 million apartments have been built. The system of social guarantees has been substantially consolidated. The 17th CPCZ Congress noted that "Czechoslovakia is entering the second half of the eighties as a united, politically strong, economically and socially developed state with a high standard of living and culture."

Today, as is always the case at critical historical moments, when the interwoven nature of domestic and external problems and of the contradictions in the social process call for qualitatively new tasks of socialist social relations to be accomplished, we turn to the fundamental ideological sources and values of our communist movement. They help us to understand the historical and human meaning of the tireless struggle to improve socialism, by relying on the achieved results and revealing unavoidable errors and miscalculations.

The deep meaning and relevance of the words in which Friedrich Engels formulated the goal of the communist movement in one of his speeches in Elberfeld comes across more clearly in the light of the experience of socialist construction and of the solution of urgent global problems facing mankind: "...What is involved is the creation of conditions of life for all people in which everyone will have an opportunity to freely develop his human nature, to live in human relationships with his near ones, and not fear the violent destruction of his prosperity..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 2, p 554).

This idea defines the framework and criteria for evaluating our achievements in the 40 years since victorious February. It makes it possible to pass judgment on the rightness of the chosen path and on the degree to which the tasks facing the Czechoslovak people have been accomplished. At the same time it insistently warns us against indifference toward the people's fate and prevents us from plunging into the abyss of pragmatism or moral relativity. It expresses the indissoluble connection between the improvement of socialism and the careful treatment and cultivation of such general human values as conscientious and socially useful work, honesty, responsibility, respect for the individual, and the desire to make a contribution to the cause of progress and peace. What is especially important today is the fact that in political and ideological activities this idea makes us seek and find effective ways and new means to convert man's natural aspiration for happiness, dignity, and self-discovery in work for the good of society into a motive force in the solution of urgent problems.

Priority is assigned to the need to change the social atmosphere and mobilize the intellectual and moral potential of working people, especially the young, for the socialist motherland to rise to a qualitatively new level and in the interests of making better use of the advantages of socialist social development. "Our task is to provide a very responsible assessment of the situation in which we are working; to pass objective judgment on what we have been able to achieve, and at the same time to display communist principle, openness, and honesty in pointing out the weak points and shortcomings which obstruct forward movement," noted the CPCZ Central Committee's Political Report to the 17th Party Congress. "This will provide an opportunity to put forward tasks and to outline ways of more effectively utilizing the potential and advantages of socialism."

From the point of view of the domestic and international situation, the key problem today is the need to accelerate socioeconomic development and substantially to increase the effectiveness of the national economy. In order to do this it is necessary to be more active in harnessing all of our material and spiritual potential. The tasks arising from this must be regarded in all their revolutionary scope as the principal battlefield on which the destiny of socialism's further successes will be decided. This also creates the precondition of a constant rise in the standard of living, modernization of the national economy, improvement of living and working conditions, and the satisfaction of other requirements.

We attach paramount importance to a radical turn away from the predominantly extensive type of development to an intensive one on the basis of the most wide-scale introduction of the achievements of scientific and technological progress; of the implementation of progressive structural shifts; and of deeper involvement of the Czechoslovak economy in the international division of labor, especially through the intensification of its participation in socialist economic integration and the application of its highest forms. The implementation of the Comprehensive Program for the Scientific and Technical Progress of the CEMA Member Countries Through the Year 2000 and the Long-Term Program for Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation with the Soviet Union is a vitally important task for Czechoslovakia.

The strategy of acceleration also presupposes deep restructuring of the system of socialist social relations, a process which affects all areas of life. What is involved is the restructuring not only of production, but also of the superstructure, of the political system, science and research, the education system, culture, and all of spiritual life.

The fact that we can rely on the experience of fraternal countries engaged in analogous tasks is of principled importance for us, just as in the past. The CPCZ is particularly inspired by the principled positions formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and by the bold and innovative approaches to the revolutionary restructuring of Soviet society. They are an example and incentive to us in our work.

After the 17th Congress we took further steps to develop the program line, using our own and international experience and relying on deeper analysis. On the basis of the decisions of the December 1986 CPCZ Central Committee Plenum, the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and the CSSR government approved principles for restructuring the economic mechanism which define the concept and most important directions for changes in its operation. The March 1987 Central Committee Plenum outlined the main areas of the restructuring process throughout society and approved a complex of

measures to improve socialist democracy. The December 1987 CPCZ Central Committee Plenum intensified all that had been done in the 2 years to prepare for comprehensive restructuring, and initiated its implementation. Very important measures and principles were approved so that the drafting of the 9th 5-Year Plan could be started as early as in 1988, with a new orientation in the substance and postulation of specific goals in accordance with the need to restructure the economic mechanism.

Purposeful reorganization of the existing economic mechanism, which is of key importance for the restructuring of society's economic basis, lies at the center of attention. In carrying out far-reaching economic reforms, which were conceptually and programmatically prepared by the decisions of the 17th Congress and subsequent CPCZ Central Committee Plenums, we are striving to create favorable conditions in the management, organizational, legal, and social spheres for a shift in the political, ideological and economic thinking and behavior on all levels of management, and for progress in labor collectives and in each citizen's consciousness. By means of these changes in the economic mechanism—the most revolutionary since 1948—we want to reach a point where the working man is not only aware of himself as an individual, but also becomes the genuine owner of socialist property. This is also a prerequisite and a condition for our economy's conversion to an intensive path of development.

The basic provisions of the new economic mechanism, the broad rights of labor collectives, and their responsibility for the results of economic operation have been laid down in the draft laws on the state enterprise, on agricultural cooperatives, and on production, consumer, and housing cooperation. After the results of the nationwide discussion had been summed up, these draft documents, which form the legal foundations of the restructuring process, were submitted for approval by the legislative agencies.

The principles of restructuring are undergoing their second year of verification on an experimental basis. This year approximately 30 percent of those employed in industry are working on the basis of these principles. The experiment has embraced the construction industry, trade, transportation and a number of other areas. The restructuring of the production-technological base on principles of two-tier management and new organization of the central management sphere is also being drafted.

Acceleration of the dynamics of socioeconomic development is connected with the activation of society's creative forces and calls for a high degree of work and social activity on the part of working people, and also for reliance on their interest, energy, wisdom and experience. All the measures to deepen socialist democracy and all the steps to develop self-management and the democratic traditions which are deeply rooted in our society, are oriented toward this. Whatever the level, areas and

living situations in which they are applied, their meaning lies in increasing respect for citizens' opinion and questions, strengthening their sense of their own worth and their awareness that they are the creators of all spiritual and material values. The struggle against bureaucracy and indifference to people, the development of the *glasnost* and control policy, and the policy of strengthening discipline and order are connected with this. As society moves along this road there must be further consolidation of the voluntary alliance between political parties, social organizations, and interest groups within the framework of the National Front, which, under the Communist Party's leadership, ensures a nationwide basis for our political system. The National Front organizations rally virtually the entire adult population of the country. If this force can be relied on and used in a better way, it will help to cope with many tasks of shaping and implementing our policy.

We consider the most important factors in the construction of socialism at the contemporary stage to be the restructuring of the economic mechanism and other areas of social life, the deepening of socialist democracy, people's more active participation in leadership and management, the expansion of *glasnost*, and the intensification of control. These are the levers with which it will be possible to achieve a substantial increase in the economically and socially effective functioning of the social system, and fuller utilization of the socialist system's humanist potential.

Today it is already clear that the dynamics of social transformations can be intensified and economic and social progress can be accelerated only on the basis of overcoming the contradictions which arise between the requirements of socialism's development and the management mechanism on which the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia has been based since February 1948.

The integral nature and dialectical unity of the socialist social system demand that the process of improving it be extraordinarily comprehensive. The external and internal factors of our social development have substantially increased the significance of policy as a key problem-solving instrument. It is impossible to organize sociopolitical life more effectively without this. What is involved is a process of constantly completing and remaking socialism, the importance of which was pointed out by V.I. Lenin. This is an indispensable condition for the comprehensive improvement of socialism at a stage where it is not only necessary to master the achievements of scientific and technological progress, but also to ensure that they are organically linked to the advantages of the socialist system. As the December 1987 CPCZ Central Committee Plenum noted, "this calls for a high degree of activity in all sectors of the political system, from central authorities to the agencies and organizations directly involved in the production sectors, activity which is based on the fullest involvement of working people in management and economic work."

Today, as in that February 40 years ago, the CPCZ's ties with the workers class and working people, as well as its ability to provide political leadership of the people and nationalities of the CSSR, are the key to success in the socioeconomic and other areas. In the interests of the unity between party and people, which is the decisive political factor, it is necessary for Czechoslovak socialist society to develop more dynamically and harmoniously, and to make an effective contribution to the realization of the historical ideal of socialism.

The acceleration of social progress, the consolidation of the authority of party and socialism, a happier life for our citizens, and the strengthening of peace throughout the world depend on an understanding of the need to get rid of routine thinking and on the ability to adopt new theoretical, political and ideological approaches.

The program policy of the 17th CPCZ Congress, which was developed at subsequent CPCZ Central Committee plenums, opens up an immense field of activity for communists, Czechoslovak citizens, and all social structures. It creates real possibilities for ensuring the further rise of socialist society and consistently revealing the advantages of the socialist system. It enjoys wide-scale support from the entire National Front and the majority of working people. As initial experience shows, its implementation will not be easy. What is involved is not only the newness and complexity of the tasks, the solution of which will require new approaches and frequent experimentation, but also the elimination of the force of inertia.

For this reason, it is important that communists and all party organizations and organs should be at the head of the struggle for new thinking and should approach their work from a standpoint of high demands, critical interpretation and a new spirit.

Victorious February and the historical necessity of ensuring the continuity of its behests in the new revolutionary tasks oblige us to wage a resolute struggle against everything that holds back our progress at the present critical stage.

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CEMA: New Concept of Cooperation
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[Text] The Great October Socialist Revolution laid firm foundations for new relations among countries and peoples. One of the most important components of the constructive task of socialism, formulated by V.I. Lenin, was "to build new economic relations and set the example of how this is accomplished" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." 18020012k Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 6, Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 87-96ba)

[Complete Collected Works], vol 42, pp 27-28). The substantial acceleration of socioeconomic progress and successes in the economic building of CEMA members are related to the systematic utilization of the advantages of the international division of labor, and even more so, of the integration among socialist states. A contributory factor to their cooperation was the strengthening of the economic base of national sovereignty which, in turn, created prerequisites for the intensification of international interaction among them. The role of the community in world economics and politics increased.

Nonetheless, said interaction must not be viewed simplistically, as a straight-line process without contradictions. In this case contradictions of various kinds will be inevitable, particularly at each new stage of socioeconomic development. The present phase, characterized by a transition to an essentially intensive type of reproduction, has put on the agenda the question of the radical restructuring of the entire system of interrelationships within CEMA in the interest of socioeconomic acceleration through the assimilation of the latest achievements of science and technology, and eliminating obstacles on the way to efficient international cooperation.

The urgency of restructuring is determined by the fact that in addition to the indisputable successes achieved by the community in past decades, some obstructing factors appeared within it. Their influence was the strongest on quality parameters of cooperation, (structure of reciprocal procurements, dynamics of trade in science-intensive and scarce goods, etc.) and positions in global trade.

The resolve of the communist and worker parties in CEMA member countries collectively to surmount obstruction factors and use to its fullest extent the potential of the new type of international division of labor determine the contemporary concept governing their cooperation. Its components are real orientation toward the gradual technical retooling of the national economy, the formulation of a coordinated economic and scientific and technical policy, and a multi-tiered and flexible mechanism for managing foreign economic activities, supplied with all the necessary economic and organizational-legal tools. As the participants in the conference of secretaries of central committees of communists and workers parties of CEMA member countries on economic problems emphasized (the conference was held on 1-2 September 1987 in Sofia), cooperation among these countries and improvements of its mechanism must be such as to make a more substantial contribution to the implementation of the strategic objectives of their economic and social development, as set by the ruling parties.

The CEMA members are truly equal and sovereign partners in all areas. That is why in order to determine the reasons for obstructions attention should be focused above all on the international socioeconomic and other

circumstances which have held back the dynamic division of labor and the enhancement of its efficiency. Naturally, without forgetting here the initial "starting" economic base (economic publications have provided detailed descriptions of the problems encountered by the European CEMA members in the post-war period. Currently the socialist republic of Vietnam, Cuba and Mongolia are engaged in solving the difficult problems of reaching higher levels of socioeconomic development), we must mention above all the economic mechanisms which developed in the socialist countries the purpose of which was to serve a corresponding socioeconomic policy. In particular, they targeted economic activities primarily on anti-import policies in the processing industry instead of increasing high-quality exports. To a certain extent this orientation was justified by the existence of numerous shortages in the economies of the fraternal countries and the poor development of the export base of their partners which, in principle, should have been able to contribute to the elimination of such shortages.

The anti-import orientation was theoretically supported as well. The concept that in a planned socialist economy there are virtually no surplus investment and other resources which could be used to a broader or lesser extent abroad appeared and became dogma. Special studies were even conducted in the 1960s to establish the "maximal" quotas of national investment funds which could be used abroad by a given national economic complex. The building of a number of joint projects, which accounted for a small share of the overall investment fund of the community did not essentially change the nature of things. It was directed less toward upgrading the efficiency with which each individual country could use its resources than toward ensuring a more equal distribution of the investment load among the countries, which appeared in connection with the fast growth of the most capital-intensive sectors in the extracting industry.

Indeed, a planned socialist economy can find a use on its territory for the full amount of resources generated by society. They could be distributed or redistributed among the individual sectors and areas of production and nonproduction activities. It does not follow from this, however, that one could ignore the essential difference between **absolute and relative resource surpluses**.

The concept of "relative resource surplus" could be explained with the following theoretical example: let us assume that a given country can, through major outlays, solve and is solving on one level or another a certain national economic problem. As practical experience indicates, however, many such problems could be solved with fewer labor and fund outlays had the resources been used collectively on the basis of bilateral or multilateral cooperation on the territory of the country where such outlays would be minimized or else would yield the

highest returns. Underestimating the factor of the **relative surplus** of investment and other resources objectively restrained their joint use. Furthermore, in frequent cases outlays of national resources, substantial in terms of global measurements were wasted.

As a result, already at the stage of capital construction, a parallelism frequently developed, weakening the impulse to engage in international cooperation. Within the national economic mechanisms themselves (at least until the end of the 1970s), as a general rule there were no efficient instruments which would motivate producers to compete and cooperate, thus stimulating international cooperation.

The poor orientation of national economic mechanisms toward the division and cooperation of labor was reflected also in stagnation phenomena in international cooperation. By virtue of their feedback, such phenomena seemed to enhance trends of development of the national economic mechanism which restrained foreign economic activities of commodity producers and consumers and their real interaction along the entire reproduction cycle. Thus, production specialization which, in itself, is progressive, was obviously insufficiently contributing to improving the quality of produced and reciprocally procured goods because of the poor development within the national mechanisms of problems of commodity updating and upgrading their technical standards. In the first decades of CEMA activities a paradox appeared: the longer the period during which cooperation was oriented toward specialization was kept, the longer was the "indulgence" of continuing to produce goods which were becoming obsolete not from one 5-year period to another but even with every passing year.

More than anything else, shortcomings in the national planning systems were made apparent by the major deficiencies existing in the coordination of economic plans. After signing protocols on reciprocal procurements for the next 5 years, the incentive to engage in significant structural changes and to update output in the course of the 5-year period diminished. Therefore, the traditional coordination of national economic plans, which, lacking the formulation of 5-year plans was of a discrete nature, made it possible to take up the most essential problems concerning the structure and quality of reciprocal procurements only once every 5 years. Current corrections in the set of reciprocal obligations, agreed upon on the international level, "on the run," so to say, most frequently proved to be ineffective. The expansion or reduction of procurements of commodities and services, caused by changes in the economic situation, were accompanied, as a rule, by changes in the volumes of procurement of other commodities and services based on strictly balance-oriented considerations.

Another feature which had an adverse effect on the scale and depth of economic relations among CEMA countries was the fact that it was only an extremely small share of

the steps to promote cooperation that was really aimed at long-range development. The question of the need for a comprehensive development of long-term trends in the development of reciprocal cooperation was raised in the "Fundamental Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor" (1962) and, later, the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Integration (1971). In the 1970s cooperation was developed in forecasting; reciprocal consultations were held on basic problems of economic policy. In practice, however, the approach of the individual countries to suggestions on cooperation were almost always based on current needs and, at most, on the tasks of the 5-year period, whereas long-term interests, with the exception of specific cases, were put on the back burner.

Efforts to convert to practical long-term planning of cooperation failed to yield expected results. For example, the long-term target cooperation programs, which were adopted in the second half of the 1970s, had not been sufficiently developed from the viewpoint of resources, the realistic nature of objectives and expected results. It was this, in the final account, that predetermined their reduction to the implementation of no more than individual subprograms and steps (errors in the implementation of long-term programs should be the subject of a special study).

In this case as well the reasons for this should be sought above all in the shortcomings plaguing the national economic mechanisms of the majority of CEMA members. The authorities in charge of managing the national economy and foreign economic relations "issued" to production enterprises and associations decisions which had been essentially formulated from the viewpoint of a single 5-year period instead of 15 to 20 years. Correspondingly the resource backing of joint long-term initiatives proved to be extremely weak.

Stagnation phenomena in the national mechanisms and, therefore, in the international ones, were caused by underestimating commodity-monetary instruments. This is a universally known fact. It was caused also by the primarily bilateral nature of accounts, shortcomings in the transferable ruble and the crediting system within CEMA, and so on. Lesser attention was paid to the fact that many specific and very important agreements had been concluded as though on the "emotional" level, without proper technical and economic substantiations. For that reason the adequacy or inadequacy of agreements was frequently determined only in the course of their implementation.

In other words, cooperation developed along two very poorly coordinated trends. On the one hand, extensive work was done on the material aspect of reciprocal procurements, particularly in the case of the most important commodities in terms of the functioning of the national economy; on the other, problems of prices and

accounts were frequently solved without proper substantiation and with delays. Occasionally efficiency was sacrificed for the sake of maintaining a strict balance in procurements.

Because of insufficiently coordinated activities by CEMA countries on third-country markets, uncoordinated and disparate contacts with them objectively also became an element hindering the international socialist division of labor. Let us add to this the influence of the heavy debts assumed by many of the fraternal countries. This motivated and still does such countries to give preference to foreign economic operations which enabled them to earn the necessary funds to service their debts in freely convertible currency. As a result, many types of commodities extremely needed by the partners were withdrawn from the CEMA market.

The situation was worsened also by the uncoordinated purchases of equipment and licenses from Western companies. A "second parallelism" appeared, related to the purchasing of licenses and equipment aimed at satisfying the same type of social needs. In addition to wasting the resources of the members of the community, this also triggered a more substantial problem. Some sectors and production facilities in the fraternal countries, using different types of equipment, developed substantial disparities in terms of technological concepts which, in turn, created additional obstacles in the organization of mutually profitable production cooperation and specialization.

The effect of the obstructing factors are manifested with particular clarity in comparing production and exports among CEMA member countries. For example, although accounting for one quarter of the global national income, the CEMA members account for some 9.5 percent of total exports; one-third of the global industrial output in the foreign economic area yields 10 to 11 percent of exports of such commodities; 20 percent of global agricultural production accounts for 7 percent of global agricultural exports, correspondingly.

We find particularly intolerable the situation which has developed on the world technology and inventions markets. Although the CEMA countries account for one-third of all scientific workers and approximately 40 percent of annually registered inventions, the share of these countries in the trade in licenses was roughly under 5 percent. Their export share of science-intensive goods remained extremely low.

Dogmatism as well made a certain "contribution" to the mechanism of obstruction processes. The lack of profound developments related to the objective nature of national economic interests and the ways of combining them within common international interests of the community and the abstract consideration of international principles led to the fact that many mutually profitably and voluntarily undertaken collective actions were occasionally interpreted in the spirit of violating national

sovereignty. This did not make possible actively to counter the imperialist principle of multinationalism with the principle of socialist internationalism. It slowed down the international socialist socialization of science, technology and production.

One of the dogmatic deformations was the fact that for many long years the question of the real economic contradictions among the individual socialist countries, contradictions which inevitably arise in the course of cooperation, were considered a "forbidden zone" for researchers in most CEMA countries. However, the refusal to study the mechanism of the appearance (and resolution) of such contradictions did not prevent their existence. This led to a certain dualism. The conflict-free approach to foreign economic, including foreign trade, relations predominated in official and scientific publications (although, for example a contradiction between sellers and buyers has existed ever since trade appeared in the world). This approach, however, was refuted by the efforts of foreign trade and other practical organizations, which were forced to ignore sometimes quite difficult specific problems. The result was that the science of economics seemed to have abandoned this problem by turning it over to the practical workers who resolved it by calling it something else.

By the turn of the 1960s CEMA started a set of studies related to a comparative analysis of the efficiency of capital investments, levels of economic development, labor productivity, similarity and difference among national price-setting systems, and the components of production outlays. They could have been properly used in scientific work on such problems and in clearly distinguishing among the essential coincidence of basic socioeconomic interests shared by the fraternal countries and possible lack of coincidence in specific and, in particular, daily economic interests prevailing in many areas of cooperation. For a number of reasons, however, such works were not developed further. The short blossoming of economic research based on a detailed international comparative analysis, was replaced by a lengthy period of stagnation. The unique statistical and methodical base for such work was lost, for it was not expanded and updated. In practical terms, the work of major international collectives was depreciated.

For a number of years there were no frank scientific discussions which would contribute to the identification and rapprochement of viewpoints among scientists in fraternal countries or, at least discussions resulting in the clear determination of the realities of economic cooperation and the correlation between the general and specific interests of the partners. The result was a widening gap between theory and practice.

Today the key task of the socialist countries is, above all, that of ensuring greater dynamism in their economic, technological, social and political development. This was clearly formulated in the political report delivered to the 27th CPSU Congress: The need for such dynamism is

dictated by concern for the well-being of the nations. "However, it is needed by the socialist world also from the viewpoint of countering the threat of war. Finally, it is a proof of the possibilities offered by a socialist way of life." In this case it is a question not only of economic results. Emerging on the cutting edge in science, technology and production is related to the greatest possible social results, such as upgrading the creative nature of labor, changing living conditions and surmounting the "production inferiority" complex prevailing among a significant segment of the working people still employed in technically backward sectors of economic activities and producing goods considered by no means contemporary.

In the light of the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the congresses and plenums held by the other fraternal parties and collective summit agreements, the comprehensive development of theoretical and practical problems of cooperation among CEMA countries and problems of perfecting the national systems of managing foreign economic activities, based on comprehensive experience gained by the socialist world in the past, assumed particular relevance. We cannot consider normal the fact that the quite extensive scientific and technical potential developed by the CEMA countries largely remains nothing but a potential which, for reasons which are of an essentially qualitative nature, is by no means fully used in domestic economic activities and, particularly, in foreign economic work. The restructuring of this area, based on the need for the development and assimilation of the latest types of equipment and technologies is included in the current plan of activities of CEMA countries and agencies. A vitally needed transition must be made from increasing the volume of export-import relations with a practically unchanged commodity structure to directing such relations toward the utilization of the latest scientific and technical achievements.

The formulation and practical implementation of the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress of CEMA members until the year 2000 (1985), the working meeting of heads of communists and workers parties (1986) and the 43rd CEMA session (1987) became the new starting points for the development of socialist economic integration.

Today the replacement of models of economic growth and division of labor under the conditions of the scientific and production revolution is facing the members of the community on the practical level, determining the strategy and tactics of their economic interaction. It also demands radical changes in the mechanism of socialist economic integration and in the ways and means of ties among national economic management subjects.

Changes in the international socialist division of labor, such as shifting the center of gravity from intersectorial to intrasectorial cooperation, upgrading the level of

comprehensiveness and the systematic nature of collectively solved problems, and the use of flexible forms of interaction assume great importance. This enables us radically to react to changes in production and consumption requirements and maximally to shorten the time for organizing the production of new commodities on an optimal scale. The system for managing cooperation, which had developed in recent decades, turned out, from this viewpoint, to be insufficiently flexible and poorly equipped with the modern tools which help to dynamize reciprocal exchanges.

The accelerated pace of scientific and technical development, fast changes in consumer demand and the market situation demand of the production process greater flexibility and operative reaction to change. Production mobility and flexibility is increasingly becoming an important factor of competitiveness and of the social and economic efficiency of socialist production and its long term development. The use of opportunities related to this is impossible without the active and interested participation of direct commodity producers and consumers. The development of direct relations among them enables us better to determine (and make joint use of) the scientific and production potential of partners in such cooperation and offers the opportunity to have a broader choice of such partners. Within such relations it becomes easier to take joint steps for upgrading the scientific and technical standard of output, efficiently to solve specific problems of production cooperation and exchange materials in short supply, modernization facilities and experience in economic management. They promote reciprocal interest and upgrade the responsibility of the parties.

In the final account, it is a question of abandoning the obsolete interpretation of the subject of integration. This, along with national economic complexes, involves all of their economic units, their main production unit above all. The maximal interconnection in the area of foreign economic activities between the national economic interests of the socialist countries and the cost accounting interest of labor collectives, which are the main production units, is, at the present stage, the main requirement facing the economic mechanism of socialist integration and external relations as a whole.

The essence of the new concept of cooperation can be formulated in its general aspects as follows: **real international interaction among CEMA countries, based on the development of active production, scientific and technical and other contacts among basic economic units and among all subjects of economic activities on different levels.** Figuratively speaking, interaction "along the parameter" of the national economies is transferred to the center of the national economic complexes. This drastically expands the number of specific "point of contact" among the components of the scientific and production apparatus of the individual countries and leads to a new quality in their cooperation.

The democratization of economic life and the enhancement of the initiative and responsibility of all economic units participating in foreign economic relations not only contributes to harnessing reserves for achieving efficient foreign relations, the full amount of which can be brought to light in the course of production and scientific activities. Of equally essentially importance is the fact that this eliminates the alienation of enterprises and sectors from the foreign economic area and their "indifference" toward it.

Understandably, such a development of integration demands modifications and adaptations of the specific instruments of the economic mechanism to the various levels of interaction among fraternal countries. For example, we cannot use unchanged the same forms of planning and accountability in intergovernmental accords and direct relations among enterprises. At the same time, the tools for multiple-level cooperation which are being developed currently must possess a certain internal unity.

From this viewpoint the accumulation and summation of practical experience, which are still quite insignificant, and the broadening of direct relations and activities of bilateral and multilateral scientific and production associations and new forms of cooperation assume great importance. All of this creates prerequisites for more extensive scientific-production cooperation, for replacing extensive with intensive factors of division of labor and, in the final account, achieving a substantial dynamizing of international trade-economic and production relations.

The new concept of cooperation, therefore, presumes improving their international economic mechanisms in accordance with the overall line of intensification and socioeconomic acceleration. For that reason, the documents on perestroika in foreign economic relations, adopted by the Soviet Union, are not of internal importance alone. It is on their basis that a set of steps is being taken aimed at radically improving the management of foreign economic relations, their planning and the more systematic utilization of cost accounting and perfecting the management of economic and scientific and technical cooperation with the socialist countries, including the creation and activities on the territory of the USSR of joint enterprises and international associations and organizations. The USSR Law on the State Enterprise (Association) pays great attention to ensuring dynamic cooperation with the socialist countries, the creation of economic and organizational conditions for the all-round broadening of direct production relations among associations and enterprises within CEMA and to joint enterprises and production facilities.

As was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, the intensification of integration of the basis of intensive production cooperation and specialization "opens new prospects for

the further comprehensive expansion of economic relations among fraternal countries and for accelerating the solution of our common task of intensification; it increases technical and economic invulnerability to imperialist actions."

Programs for accelerating socioeconomic development, based on scientific and technical progress and on converting the national economy to intensification with a high pace of economic growth, were adopted at the latest congresses of communists and workers parties held in foreign CEMA countries.

The new levels of intensification set by the majority of fraternal countries are related to solving problems, such as radically improving the utilization of raw and other materials, fuel and energy, and upgrading the technical standards and quality of output; increasing the share of capital investments in the reconstruction and technical retooling of operating enterprises; accelerating the development of building and shortening the investment cycle.

In addition to upgrading the technical standards and competitiveness of output, in this connection particular attention should be paid to steps aimed at blocking the draining of resources for unproductive objectives (from the viewpoint of end social requirements). Protecting the ability of maintaining a high rate of accumulations, used for purposes of development, presumes waging a struggle for reducing expenditures on armaments and for conversion from confrontation to extensive mutually profitable cooperation within the framework of the global community.

This also includes counteracting the new tactics of usurious capital in Western countries, aimed at "washing off" resources by increasing the amount of funds to service the debt. As a result of the substantial increase in the amount of the basic debts, interest payments are increasingly widening the gap between the national income produced and spent for consumption and accumulation. This leads to a gradual lowering of investment possibilities of debtor countries. If the existing indebtedness of a number of socialist countries is retained, it could become a long-term hindrance to efficient economic growth and a source of stress.

The implementation of the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress by CEMA countries until the year 2000 will enable us to convert basic scientific ideas into specific progressive technologies and to create new generations of high-efficiency machinery and most modern materials. The intensification of scientific and production cooperation among fraternal countries will save substantial amounts of time and resources and help them to reach global levels of scientific and technical progress and output. The socialist community has the virtually entire set of necessary prerequisites, ranging from production resources to the greatest scientific and technical potential in the world, for solving the problems included in the comprehensive

program. What is important is to keep this process under steady control and to take collective steps to surmount the lag which has been noted in a number of specific developments.

The crucial problems singled out in the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress by CEMA members should obviously be considered also from the viewpoint of the long-term establishment of broad international scientific-production systems whose level of efficiency and competitiveness would equal that of the multinational corporations of developed capitalist countries. Naturally, socialist international scientific and production systems, as practical experience indicates, should make use of the results of concentration in forms which would be consistent with the principles of relations among socialist countries.

Changes in the national economic mechanism do not in themselves mean a qualitative restructuring of CEMA activities. Such restructuring mandatorily includes the adoption of a new approach to the international mechanism. It effects improvements in planning, monetary relations and activities of the representative authorities and the permanent machinery of the Council, which must engage more energetically in analytical work and the preparation of substantiated suggestions on the further intensification of socialist economic integration. Specific trends of *perestroika* in CEMA activities are defined in the course of the preparations for the 44th CEMA session. However, naturally, restructuring does not end with the adoption of essential decisions or taking pressing organizational steps. The Council is at the start of a complex positive process of developing a contemporary highly efficient structure of the international socialist division of labor.

As we improve CEMA activities, constant attention must be paid to the drafting of suggestions aimed at increasing the efficiency of reciprocal cooperation and the intensification of socialist integration. Currently this function is taking place on the interparty and intergovernmental levels, where the most important problems of activities of CEMA in the area of socialist economic integration are discussed. This mechanism has been developed. It will continue to have a determining influence on the solution of essential problems of cooperation.

Nonetheless, a large number of complex specific problems arise in the course of cooperation, which require a comprehensive detailed work and the substantiation of the best way for solving them from the viewpoint of maximizing economic and social efficiency. Previously the many decisions which, in the final account, mark the interaction among fraternal countries were achieved essentially on the level of the sectorial and functional agencies of CEMA in accordance with their "departmental" affiliation.

In addition to the inevitable one-sidedness of this approach, a more essential shortcoming appeared as well. The point was that each representative CEMA agency is an organ of intergovernmental cooperation. For that reason, its members are guided above all by national interests. CEMA does not have an institutionally established structure the purposes of which is to work on problems of intensification of economic integration from the viewpoint of the entire community. Such a structure can be created, for example, on the basis of international and national institutes engaged (interacting with the analytical machinery of CEMA) in the formulation of scientific suggestions aimed at the further intensification of economic integration and upgrading its efficiency, to be considered by representative Council authorities. The organizational work of the structure (initially perhaps covering a limited range of problems) as a dialogue, testing the suggestions from the position of the consistency between the common interests of the community and the national interests of its members, would make it possible to eliminate an essential anonymity in CEMA activities.

Difficult problems are facing science and practice in connection with the creation of a long-term concept of international socialist division of labor. This is particularly important from the viewpoint of concentrating all trends, forms and methods of cooperation toward attaining collectively set objectives. For example, the new (multiple-level) methods for coordinating national economic plans will not in itself, automatically, bring about any improvement. If the strategic approach is lost, the shortcomings and errors which were manifested on the macrolevel would be inevitably reproduced (and, possibly, even increased) on the microlevel. Consequently, it is important to formulate a system which would exclude the possibility of loss of strategic control over cooperation.

The collective determination of the strategic trends of cooperation will contribute to orientation on the microeconomic level. The development of direct relations among enterprises and associations will lead to the expansion of scientific and production cooperation and contribute to creation within CEMA of a homogeneous economic area and provide conditions for competitiveness among domestic and foreign producers. To this effect, in particular, we must convert from the simple combination of planning the use of commodity-monetary instruments to their organic synthesis. The proposal submitted by the countries on any level must not be adopted without any detailed economic evaluation (cost), without sources and guarantees of monetary backing and without assessing expected results or contemplating ways for the full compensation of damages caused by nonfulfillment of obligations.

Naturally, by no means are all specific problems of implementation of the new concept of cooperation clear from both practical and theoretical viewpoints. Obviously, they cannot be clarified immediately without

gaining experience and engaging in bold and varied experimentation. However, the process of change in the contemporary reproduction situation has assumed an irreversible nature, for it is based on the objective needs governing the development of the socialist economy.

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Law on the Cooperative and Paid Services
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[Text] The current state of affairs in the service industry justifiably triggers the criticism of the population. The radical restructuring of the entire service area has become urgently necessary. The extensive development of cooperative forms of economic management offers extensive opportunities for this. Furthermore, the draft Law on the Cooperative in the USSR sets the main trends to be followed in the application of collective (group) methods of organizing activities in the area of paid services and makes us take a new look at the state system for providing services to the population.

Pluralism of Ownership

Until very recently the approach which predominated in economic practice placed people engaged in individual labor activity and members of cooperatives in a subordinate position compared to the state forms of population services. How did this appear and is manifested today? Above all, it is shown in the utilization of resources. According to still valid instructions, essentially the cooperatives were able to use only the labor of moonlighting population.

This was motivated by the fear that there would be an outflow of manpower from industry. However, no excessive aspiration to join a cooperative or engage in individual labor activity has been noted (there is a risk in engaging in such activities, there is no sponsorship, problems of social security have not been settled and there is a lesser degree of social protection). We must also bear in mind that without such an outflow we would be unable to function in the future, for otherwise we cannot ensure the increased share of the service industry in the population's employment. Finally, and probably

most importantly, far-fetched restrictions did not work, for the members of cooperatives were able, as it were, to find loopholes. According to available data, in a number of areas it is only some people employed in cooperatives who work there as a second job; for the others this is their primary employment.

According to the instructions, everything should have been different. What was the result of all this? On the one hand, it was frequently those who, in general, are indifferent to violations of legislation, who frequently became members of cooperatives. To many honest working people, however, violations of legislation were unacceptable. On the other hand, the possibility of making such violations obvious made members of cooperatives and individuals engaged in private labor activity defenseless in the face of arbitrary behavior on the part of the local authorities.

The uncertainty still prevailing in the solution of this problem hindered the fast expansion of cooperative and individual sectors. Meanwhile, this was also a reason for occasional manifestations of indignation and claims that the members of cooperatives were playing a "dishonest game," by engaging in full-time work, for which reason they should be taken in hand.

Realizing that society was not entirely clear as to the extent to which it was expedient to develop individual and cooperative sectors, the people in them felt as though they were jobbers, the more so since there were frequent articles in the press in which members of cooperatives and citizens engaged in individual labor activity were being scoured for high earnings and prices. Jobbers, however, have their own mentality: to earn more and earn faster. One can struggle against such mentality only by clearly indicating the long-term line to be followed in dealing with the cooperative and individual sectors. Every working person must feel himself the full master of his work, the more so when his work turns out to be truly highly productive. A study made by the Estonian SSR Ministry of Consumer Services revealed that hourly labor productivity of members of cooperatives is on an average higher than among workers of state consumer services by a factor of 2-2.5. Naturally, on the one hand, members of cooperatives who work for themselves care for their time. On the other, this is the result of their greater economic autonomy. The population is acknowledging the fact that the cooperatives concentrate on consumer services. A television program linking Leningrad with Tallin, which took place in October 1987, and discussed problems of cooperatives and individual labor activity, indicated the following pattern: citizens who have nothing to do with cooperatives show caution, whereas those who have made use of the services of cooperatives become their supporters in 85 percent of the cases.

Another formula concerning members of cooperatives had to be refined: for the time being they cannot provide services to state enterprises, public organizations and

kolkhozes. Otherwise, in the opinion of the initiators of such restrictions, there may be a conversion of "inactive" money (cashless trade) into "active" money, i.e., paying for the labor of the members of cooperatives. However, even if the cooperatives are forbidden from servicing state enterprises, the latter, as a rule, nonetheless obtain the services they need, as a result of which the "inactive" money converts into cash—wages and bonuses to workers of state enterprises providing population services. Why is such a "conversion" of the money of state organizations possible for them and not for the members of cooperatives?

In our view, the essence of the matter is that the state organizations fear their loss of monopoly on providing services to "their own" (state) enterprises, for the latter are not all that squeamish in their assessment of the quality of services. Therefore, in this case they can always rely on a "guaranteed" market.

The draft Law on the Cooperative in the USSR, which is based on accepting the cooperative sector as an equal component of the single national economic complex, removes the unnecessary restrictions which have existed so far. All citizens in the country are given the right to join cooperatives. This means rejecting the principle of establishing collectives of members of cooperatives primarily on a second-job basis. Cooperatives will be allowed to provide services to state enterprises and organizations. Furthermore, they will be given the right to compete for state orders. As a result, there will be no area in paid services closed to rivalry and competitiveness. Under these circumstances priority will be given to those who can ensure a more efficient utilization of resources. In the past consumer services to the population were known as craft cooperatives. In the 1960s such cooperatives were closed down. All of their studios, enterprises and workshops were transferred to state enterprises. Later, main administrations for consumer services were created under the councils of ministers of Union republics; in 1963-1964 they were reorganized into republic ministries.

Therefore, the present state system of population consumer services appeared on the basis of cooperative ownership. We believe that some state enterprises could be reorganized as cooperatives. Organizationally, such conversion will depend on the decision of a given labor collective and the local soviet. If the majority of members of the labor collective (let us say two thirds) wish to become members of cooperatives, no obstacle should be put on their way. Such a process, which is essentially one of restoration of cooperatives, should be assisted in all possible ways.

This approach has a number of opponents, particularly among the administrative personnel who have become accustomed to the command-order management methods. Many managers believe that the only form of providing services worthy of socialism is the present

organization, which presumes the existence of a large management apparatus. Therefore, who would cut off the branch of the tree, on which he is sitting?

The draft law says little about the possibility of converting the state form of ownership into a cooperative one. We believe that an item should be included which would regulate the conditions for this conversion, such as, for example, rules governing the full or partial purchasing of fixed capital by the members of cooperatives. Nor should we ignore the possibility of transforming ownership in a different direction: from cooperative into state. The general principles of such reorganization also should be reflected in the draft law.

The cooperative movement was revived with the expansion of individual labor activity. In our view, the steps stipulated in the draft concerning the development of cooperatives should be considered from this viewpoint as well. It is necessary to eliminate, as soon as possible, any restrictions of employment in the area of application of individual labor activity and in the possibility of using it in filling orders placed by state organizations.

Leasing Procedures and Mentality

If we were to retain as fixed the forms of ownership in state enterprises and organizations providing paid population services, they would prove to be uncompetitive. Bound hand and foot by various instructions, they are unable to compete for customers. The heads of consumer services enterprises, who favor the preservation of existing economic management methods, realize that state enterprises could lose a number of consumers who would increasingly turn to the cooperatives. Could this be the reason for which they frequently display their anti-cooperative feelings and willingly inflate information—both true and fabricated—on the poor work of cooperatives and people engaged in individual labor activity? Yes, they say, we receive many complaints but state enterprises provide services to the population at low state-set prices. So, what do you prefer: low prices or lack of complaints? If you wish to get better service, go to the cooperatives and the private craftsmen. Do not forget, however, that their prices are higher.

Characteristically, major opposition is also provided to the development of forms of economic management practiced by state enterprises, particularly those which lease equipment and which operate in a way similar to the cooperatives.

Leasing, as part of paid services to the population, "grew" out of a second type of contractual form of wages. Accordingly, a labor collective operating on the basis of contractual conditions (or an individual worker) undertakes to make to the enterprise with which it has signed the contract fixed payments based on orders for performing paid services to the population. Such payments, which are essentially rentals, include withholdings from profits which go into social security and other

types of payments (including payments for resources used). The balance of the earnings is the income of the labor collective, used mainly to meet the payroll. The principles on the basis of which wages are determined and distributed under such leasing procedures are approximately the same as those practiced by the cooperatives. Leasing enterprises operating in the area of paid services can compete with cooperatives whereas state enterprises operating under the usual type of organization are frequently sluggish and inefficient.

The use of such leasing procedures makes it possible to combine the interests of individual workers, labor collectives and the state. What matters is for the amounts of fixed payments be such as not to lower the workers' labor incentive and, at the same time, not to harm the interests of the state. The best way to organize them is through the use of the competitive mechanism, according to which a variety of labor collectives submit their offers, while representatives of the state sign contracts with collectives which undertake to make the highest fixed payments withheld from their profits.

Leasing is an efficient economic and social system. In this case labor productivity is higher compared to collectives working according to the old system by a factor of 1.3-1.4, and population complaints virtually disappear. The mentality of the workers converted to contractual wage conditions changes. They see for themselves that the results of their work are reflected most directly in their wages. The honor of the firm also assumes a realistic meaning. Collectivistic principles are strengthened in the work of consumer service enterprises. Here there is no place for those who have become accustomed to hide behind the backs of others.

Naturally, such changes in the mentality of the people are preferable to indifference and lack of interest in economic activities which, over a long period of time, encouraged egalitarianism in the allocation of benefits. In this connection, we consider unjustified the frequently expressed fears that the broadening of individual and cooperative labor activities and, perhaps, even leasing, could result in an undesirable stratification of the population. Naturally, differentiations in earnings will increase. However, they will be the result of real differences in the quantity and quality of labor. How could this be bad?

We cannot agree with the fact that society should set limits to earnings. This suggestion seems far-fetched. If the money has been earned honestly it is only labor outlays and results that can determine its upper limits.

We believe that mistakenly some authors dramatize the possibility of changes in the mentality of children raised in families of parents engaged in individual and cooperative labor activities or working in leasing enterprises. Why is it bad for children to become aware of the value of money and to see the results of high labor returns? Is the mentality of the worker who lacks initiative superior?

How to Manage Consumer Services?

The new forms of economic management and the fast development of cooperatives create prerequisites for self-development and self-regulation of the comprehensive area of consumer services. Under these circumstances superior administrative activities should operate primarily as a system of methods for financial influence. Cooperatives and state enterprises for paid services will develop on the basis of consumer demand. Any stipulation from superior authorities concerning the intensification of the system of paid services becomes unnecessary, for one can provide only the type of services for which there is demand.

Cooperatives and state enterprises (workshops, salons, studios, etc.), operating on a lease basis but who do not meet consumer demand, must obtain their additional resources in exchange for their own services. How to use such resources? They should use them where the level of satisfaction of demand is the lowest. This as well has its logic: having received money from the population, cooperatives and state enterprises must spend such money as the consumers demand, i.e., they must invest it in areas in which unsatisfied demand is the highest.

The draft Law on the Cooperative in the USSR virtually excludes any kind of administrative interference by superiors in the economic activities of cooperatives. Possibilities of such interference become substantially reduced in terms of the work of state enterprises providing paid services, who lease their equipment. Demand for increased earnings and increased share of withholdings from earnings or dictating internal conditions for the distribution of the income which remains after making the fixed payments become impossible.

The conversion to leasing changes the style and methods of management. Exaggerated control functions lose their significance. The need is eliminated for drafting a tremendous number of reports and implementing various regulations which duplicate administrative activities. It turns out that at this point none of this is necessary, for the amount of earnings declared by an enterprise leasing its equipment is strictly defined. This also makes unnecessary the administrative apparatus in the area of paid population services, which had become hugely inflated over the past 10 to 15 years.

The initial practical conclusions from this were drawn in Estonia. At the January 1988 Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum K.G. Vayno, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, suggested the closing down of the ministries of trade, consumer services and housing-communal economy. They will be replaced by a small Services Committee. This committee will deal primarily with problems of coordinating activities in the area of paid population services provided by state and cooperative enterprises and private individuals.

However, an enterprise operating on a lease basis is still unable to solve a number of problems of current and long-term economic activities. This applies essentially to performing functions of material and technical supplies, applying the achievements of scientific and technical progress, retraining cadres, popularizing efficient forms of labor and management organization and forecasting demand for paid services. All such functions must be assumed by specialized cost-accounting organizations which will provide them against payment, based on contracts with enterprises, including cooperatives and people engaged in individual labor activity.

The draft Law on the Cooperative in the USSR defines the conditions for the voluntary association of cooperatives on a vertical basis (sectorially) as well as horizontally (territorially). The right to participate in such associations or to leave them will be granted to the cooperatives themselves. A similar method should be used in solving the problem of leasing enterprises providing paid population services. The possibility of creating specialized associations providing paid services must be based on the economic needs of the enterprises themselves which lease their equipment, and on centralizing a number of management functions. That is why the question of establishing or not establishing such associations must be solved by the enterprises which need such activities. Some of the resources of such associations could be based on shareholding. Specialized associations (voluntary associations) must act as equal partners of those who are engaged in providing direct population services. They must be partners rather than superiors. It is not the enterprises which must be managed by specialized associations but, conversely, it is the associations which must be managed by the enterprises themselves.

For the time being, however, such developments are frequently following a different direction. Here is a typical example: the reorganization of the system for managing consumer services in Moscow, which resulted in a huge concentration of economic power in the hands of the administrative superstructure. In the case of some types of services, custom-made clothing in particular, the three-step management system was replaced by a four- or five-step one. The seeming reduction in the number of enterprise managers was paralleled by increased withholdings from profits for the superior management levels. The managers of the Moscow Consumer Services system have never said that they oppose cost-accounting, self-financing or self-support. However, they would like to apply all of them on the level of the Main Moscow Marketing Administration as a whole and its large associations, which is inconceivable without usurping the economic rights of subordinate enterprises. We believe that each enterprise providing paid services should decide for itself whether or not it needs superior economic management. For example, does it find necessary to join the Main Moscow Marketing Administration or not? If the question is formulated thus, the need for the existence of that administration as a command management system becomes problematical.

The existing system of management of paid services finds it easier to deal with large enterprises. However, the consumers also need small enterprises, which are better oriented toward meeting the needs of the people and adapt more readily to changes in demand. Based on consumer interests, it would be expedient to split the large state enterprises into small, economically independent workshops and studios. Some of them could be converted into cooperatives while the others should be leased to labor collectives. Such deconcentration would help to surmount monopoly trends which are inherent in large-scale production. We must also make use of the possibility of mergers and the creation of mixed state-cooperative enterprises and associations. In this area no rigid systems should exist. Economic necessity itself must control such processes.

Real cost-accounting is inconceivable without having a separate bank account. All cooperatives will have such accounts. As to state producers of services, the overwhelming majority of them have no such accounts, nor do they need them, one could frequently hear consumer service managers say. Why solve the problems of others? Let the enterprises themselves do that.

Consumer Services: What Are Their Limits?

The concept itself of "population consumer services" appeared relatively recently, at the start of the 1960s. Planning and statistics combined within it heterogeneous activities. Some of them, as in the past, pertain to the nonproduction area and some to material production. The sector found itself somehow sitting between two chairs. Efforts were made to eliminate such an undetermined status with detailed regulations of what could and what could not be classified as population consumer services. The list of types of services which the sector could provide was strictly encoded in instructions to filling statistical form "I-Services." Anything which was not included in the approved list could not be included in the plans for expanding population services.

Such a casuistic regulation of consumer services greatly hindered their development. Sectorial management became accustomed to having superiors decide which services could be developed and which could not. Initiative, the search for new areas of application of resources and all such qualities without which a contemporary economic manager would be inconceivable, are almost entirely lacking in the majority of consumer service organizers.

The draft Law on the Cooperative in the USSR lifts the boundaries of specialization of cooperatives. Any cooperative could engage in any type of activity (with the exception of those prohibited legislatively). This means the possibility of interweaving various types of paid services within a single cooperative.

This approach should apply to state enterprises as well. The best would be to eliminate the very concept of "population consumer services." We must delete all planning and statistical instructions in this area. Any restriction in the development of paid population services should be equally voided.

The object of the activities of enterprises and organizations providing paid services (we are using this concept instead of the popular "population consumer services") should be limited only by the solvent interest of consumers. Any restrictions in satisfying population demand, based on such interest, should be eliminated (naturally, with the exception of moral restrictions). The consumers themselves, rather than instructions, should regulate the development of paid population services.

The draft Law on the Cooperative in the USSR covers a broad range of problems involved in the reorganization of the economic mechanism, and will provide a new impetus for such work. The further course of the radical economic reform will largely depend on the speed with which it will be possible to combine the principles of this law with the new conditions governing the economic activities of state enterprises.

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The Difficult Problems of the Region

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[Article by Anvar Chamkin, candidate of philosophical sciences, senior scientific associate, Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Institute of Party History Tashkent]

[Text] In no area of social life in Central Asia has such a variegated picture developed as in rural life: a fastest possible population increase; a significant lagging behind the pace of agricultural production; and a noticeable influence of socioeconomic relations prevailing in the agrarian sector on the psychological climate of the republic as a whole. All of this, it seems to me, makes it necessary seriously to consider the specific nature of the development of this region and, in particular, the role which the human factor plays in it.

Unquestionably, economic problems should be discussed as a separate item. I shall try to depict them in their general features, as a set, concentrating on the social aspects of the matter. From the socioeconomic viewpoint, the various parts of the country not only had different initial opportunities but are also developing at different speeds. The pace depends above all on balancing economic and technical resources with the labor potential.

Whereas on a national scale economic and technical policy is structured taking into account manpower shortages, in Uzbekistan, for example, everything must be based on labor surplus. About 1 million people among the able-bodied population in the republic are not engaged in public production (excluding women with children and the disabled). The situation of a large number of young people of working age is worsening. In 1986 alone there were 250,000 of them (150,000 went into training or found jobs). To the best of my knowledge, such dynamics is not showing any declining trend.

Surveys conducted in a number of Uzbek rural rayons indicate that here as much as 90 percent of the working people perform essentially manual labor: a large number of jobs do not require any special professional skills and, respectively, the people lack an incentive to acquire specialized training. The level of mechanization here is one of the lowest in the country. Let me add to this the strongly seasonal nature of employment, the underemployment of workers and, as a result, low earnings.

Understandably, the use of a large share of manual labor in agriculture cannot lead to a high level of productivity which, in Central Asia, is lower by a factor of 1.8 compared to the national average. The present efficiency of agricultural production in Uzbekistan is confirmed by the indicator of per capita food production: in 1987 it averaged 21 kilograms of meat (compared to the national average of 66 kilograms); respective figures were 136 and 365 liters for milk and 113 and 290 for eggs. In general, the gap in the most important indicators is wider by a factor of 2 or 3. As a result, our area is one of the largest consumers of food produced elsewhere.

Three years have passed since the April Plenum, at which ways of public production intensification were earmarked, yet no changes are visible in our republic: the 1985-1987 plans for agricultural production were not fulfilled (although they were drastically reduced compared with previous years). In my view, one of the most important reasons for this lagging is the insufficient consideration of the social features of farm labor in Central Asia.

The following illustration helps to understand the problems of the area. According to those same surveys, about 80 percent of the working people expressed overall satisfaction with their work; 15 percent were pleased with their specific jobs (no other jobs were available); only 5 percent were dissatisfied with their jobs. For official purposes, the picture is quite favorable and the people have no major complaints. Their traditional needs are being satisfied in full. But let us think: it is a strange situation for labor conditions to be such as to trigger a negative attitude toward the work although this is not noticed in actual life. What is happening? Above all, I believe, the reason is the insufficient development of needs. It is on such grounds that develop what I fear irreversible processes which lead to the deformation of the personality. This is the most serious obstacle to

perestroika in Central Asia. That is why the problem of the human factor, considered precisely from this viewpoint, unquestionably should assume a pivotal position in the long-term program for regional development.

Today our republic urgently faces the task of agricultural intensification. One of its most important aspects is the manner in which the projected process will be reflected on the individual workers, how many such workers will be needed, what skills should they have, what should they expect and who would be laid off as a result of intensification. Equally important is the problem of providing jobs to those entering a working-age group.

It appears that no light on this matter has been shed as yet. Various methods are being tested. For example, branches of factories and plants are being opened in the villages, and a cottage industry is being promoted. However, the workers recruited in these industries are unskilled. As a rule, the equipment is primitive and these enterprises are last in line in obtaining raw and other materials. Or else, let us consider changing jobs: the view has developed that the native population's mobility is low. This is not the case. Attachment to one's native place is a feeling characteristic of any nation. Russians and Ukrainians who resettle in Siberia, Kazakhstan or the Far East have experienced such parting as painfully as Uzbeks or Tajiks who went to the virgin lands in the Golodnaya or Karshinskaya Steppe. The fact that the republic economic authorities encounter major difficulties in this area is largely due to their lack of knowledge or unwillingness to understand the system of values which guide the life of the native population in Central Asia, something which, in my view, should not be underestimated. A socioeconomic mechanism for job transfers, consistent with the specific sociocultural environment which took centuries to develop, should be formulated.

Another equally important problem is the following: the demand formulated by other areas experiencing labor shortages applies above all to specialists. Central Asia, however, can offer only unskilled manpower. The main hindrance is found again in the underdeveloped need for new types of labor activity. The people do not go elsewhere, particularly outside of the republic, because they are internally unprepared to take up new and unfamiliar jobs. The schools could develop such internal needs but are failing to do so. Rural secondary school students spend a great deal of their training time in doing farm work (they actually go to school 8 rather than 10 years). The teachers themselves have been trained on the basis of a reduced program, both in secondary schools and VUZs. Let us not conceal what is obvious: graduates do not acquire the amount of knowledge needed by a modern person for purposes of confidently orienting himself in the world around him and mastering industrial skills and the ability to live and work under conditions of democracy and the economic autonomy of

collectives, which was precisely the way the most important task facing the schools was formulated at the February Plenum of the party's Central Committee.

The conclusion is obvious: the lack of jobs despite the availability of labor resources, the use of young people with secondary training in unskilled work, etc., indicate most severe defects in the existing system for managing socioeconomic development. I believe that equally important is the sociopolitical aspect related to the universal right to work. Social justice applies not merely to the consumption and accessibility of material goods. Matters in the area of labor relations influence political and social rights in general. In order for all citizens in our country, in all of its areas, and members of all social groups to have equal access to complex equipment and progressive technology, we must provide equal starting opportunities. This aspect of the problem of employment becomes particularly pressing in the period of restructuring.

The articles by O. Yanitskiy and I. Kon in KOMMUNIST (No 11, 1987; No 1, 1988) discuss thoroughly and rightly the sociopsychological roots of obstruction and inertia. The existence of a strong resistance to perestroika, based on group and personality interests, is characteristic of Central Asia as well. In addition to everything else, however, here such factors are intensified. It is important, in my view, to realize that people who have been harmed to one extent or another in the efforts to realize their potential for work will not become supporters of radical reforms. Most likely, consciously or subconsciously, they will find themselves in the ranks of those who oppose them. This is a reality which cannot be ignored.

The significance of such problems increases with the development of the acceleration process. In order to help the person develop the new qualities which are needed under the new circumstances, we must know whether he is prepared for this and to what extent, and whether proper conditions have been created. Naturally, considered solutions must be found for such crucial problems, for otherwise it would be hardly possible to hope for any progress.

Under the Soviet system tremendous changes have taken place in the republics of Central Asia. However, there are areas of social life which have not experienced revolutionary changes to the fullest extent. This applies above all to the individual and social mentality. Before socialism the people in this area were familiar with feudal-despotic regimes only. Here capitalism with its developed commodity-monetary relations had been unable to do its work. Precapitalist elements of the social mechanism which regulates social life were not totally destroyed but continued to operate. Personalities were shaped under the influence of essentially feudal social institutions, such as the community, religion, etc. Based on tribal communities, they were interested in strengthening them by shaping and instilling to this effect a

certain ideology and social mentality. The individual grew up and was educated on the basis of a communal awareness, in which everyone considered himself only within the context of an impersonal "we," feeling himself safe only within the framework of social relations in which the community both protected and punished. These relations, thickly interwoven with Islam, were not only the social but also the moral support which enabled the individual to survive in the cruel world of Oriental feudalism.

In past decades the social mechanism was restructured in accordance with the new tasks: socialism with its social guarantees greatly emancipated the individual in Central Asia. However, the qualitatively new mentality, distinct from the traditional communal one, did not sink deep roots on a mass scale. Even the kolkhozes which were set up in our area were more interested in preserving the old social mentality: an administrative management system which did not allow any manifestation of economic independence, did not need any individuality; conversely, in frequent cases the activeness of the individual was obstructed. The process of defeating a mentality oriented toward group behavior within the community (and, subsequently, in the kolkhoz and sovkhoz) has still not gone beyond that framework in Central Asia. A view of the place of man in society in the course of which the individual "I" has not assumed a distinct aspect and a self-awareness had not been shaped, still determines the social behavior of the individual in this area in many respects.

We believe that this will enable us to understand the serious social and sociopsychological phenomena which have made their appearance in this region in recent years. Until recently the opinion prevailed that everything was the work of individual "degenerates" which the collective had been unable to re-educate: the individual who worked poorly or was unable to manage was to be blamed for everything. Negative examples in the life of the party and economic organizations in Central Asia and Kazakhstan proved the groundlessness of the illusion of the automatic shaping of cohesion and collectivism on the basis of the socialist ownership of means of production. These processes developed spontaneously but only on a different basis, on the grounds of the social mentality which prevails in the area.

Many party, soviet and economic workers were united by their communal group collectivity which was characterized by personal loyalty. Machinations, cheating and other criminally punishable actions, combining the medieval cruelty of some and the silent obedience of others, became possible only on the basis of corrupt informal relations. Characteristically, the real behavior of a substantial segment of the superior echelon of party, soviet and economic managers was dictated by standards which had been developed as early as the feudal peasant community and had been preserved to this day: socialist

ideology with its inherent democratism was considered by them a convenient external attribute, a ready-made structure which enabled them to legitimize their position.

The preservation of this type of social awareness over such a long period of time was made possible, in my view, by several circumstances. Above all, this applies to the still-retained objective foundations for the reproduction of such a mentality: low level of development of production forces, poor development of economic relations and coercive forms of organization of labor and economic management methods; and the accelerated growth of the size of the party organizations, most of whose members grew up in an atmosphere which was essentially governed by tribal and communal mores, traditions and behavioral standards. We should not assume, however, that by increasing the number of workers in party ranks would change the situation: the workers of the native nationalities were peasants only a few years ago and they have been raised in the countryside where their mentality as well had been formed.

Finally, there was cadre policy. Traditionally, in the national republics in recent decades the aspiration was to appoint in leading positions on all levels people of native nationalities. In my view, we should not consider such a cadre policy one-sidedly. What is important is something else: by virtue of the position held by the "leading personalities" in a centralized management system, their views, interests and values become determining in the elimination or preservation of the old social relations and psychological attitudes. In this case it is difficult to ignore trends toward the preservation of some tribal and communal forms of social behavior of individuals. One could simulate and active and tempestuous restructuring activity while the very foundations of the social mechanism, which determine the condition and development of social processes, may remain unchanged.

The situation which appeared in the country at the end of the 1920s, when democratic forms of management were replaced by centralized and authoritarian forms, explains many of the negative phenomena which took place in Central Asia. The "erosion" of party ranks by adding to them people with an undeveloped democratic mentality led to the fact that many deformations of the socialist principles were considered "natural." Strict forms of management did not appear to this mass unacceptable. Conversely, the democratic atmosphere made the masses feel unstable and internally unbalanced. A similar situation appeared in its specific form in Central Asia in the 1970s and beginning of 1980s.

A time of change stimulates active efforts in restructuring all areas of life, including the social. However, without a profound study and accurate understanding of social processes it would be difficult to hope for any success. Social sciences, such as sociology and general and social psychology have as a whole already elaborated relatively reliable methods for the study of local social

phenomena and could provide quite objective assessments of social processes. In the republics of Central Asia, however, one could count on one's fingers the number of such scientists who are actively at work. The scarcity of funds appropriated for their development is explained, in my view, by no means by poverty: the need for this was not realized, for the administrative management did not need accurate knowledge. Under the conditions of the democratization of management, however, such knowledge is necessary. The restructuring of the economic mechanism and the conversion of labor collectives to cost-accounting and self-management will demand the involvement of all groups of workers. So far, unfortunately, hardly anyone has sufficiently accurate information on the attitude of the various social strata of the local population toward the reforms which are being implemented on a national scale. The difficulty of the socioeconomic and political situation in Central Asia demands specific and purposeful steps on the part of the party organizations in the area. The secondary role which has been assigned to social problems has also triggered a corresponding attitude toward them on the part of the party committees. This was expressed in the establishment of organizational structures in which there is simply no one to deal with such problems. Nor is there anyone to be held accountable for the unsatisfactory solution of the problem of the working man. Organizational structures have become frozen for decades and do not allow any flexible restructuring of the party apparatus. Yet, in the final account, it is not only a matter of the skill of party workers but also the functions and structure of the apparatus and its purposeful and skillfully coordinated and organized work. In order to solve the problems the implementation of which determines the outcome of restructuring throughout the country, a reliable mechanism must be created. Its creation is a vital need, for otherwise social processes in the area would remain uncontrolled and managers on different levels would merely record events like statisticians.

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'Here One Must Be 1,000 Times More Cautious'
18020012n Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 105-108

[Letter to the editors by V. Ogres, communal economy worker, Riga, and answer by Professor Yuriy Mikhaylovich Lotman]

[Text] Dear editors:

Perhaps my letter should have been entitled "Give the Floor to a Nationalist," for here anyone who expresses views different from those included in textbooks is considered such. "Nationalistic ideas" and "nationalistic slogans" are labels to which we in Latvia even have

already become accustomed. I nonetheless write to you because, it seems to me, it is time to speak about such matters frankly and openly, and try to find out what they mean.

In my view, one of the features of nationalism is to put one's nation above others. Nationalism, I believe, is manifested in specific actions aimed at denigrating and insulting members of other nations (or, conversely, displaying inaction against such manifestations). If no such things exist, then there is no case to speak of nationalism.

In our country, unless one speaks Russian and, after the war, knowledge of the Russian language became mandatory, one could automatically be classified as a "nationalist." At the same time, many high officials in the republic do not speak Latvian. Is this not the other side of the same phenomenon? All meetings are held in the Russian language. Orders, and so on, are issued in Russian. Under the existing situation, this is understandable, for according to available data, by the end of the 1970s only 38 percent of Riga's population was Latvian and today, in all likelihood, the figure is even lower. A substantial migration from other republics could not fail to leave its mark. If this were to continue, we would soon become a minority in our own country. Problems related to language are serious. One cannot say that nothing is being done to solve them. Something is being done, but too little. It is obviously easier to accuse someone of nationalism than to find the true reasons for the contradictions which have appeared and to seek ways to solve them.

V. Ogres, communal economy worker, Riga.

This letter is one of the many received by our editors on various aspects of relations among nations and ethnic groups. Although it is a question of specific examples borrowed from the practices of a specific republic, naturally, this question is formulated more broadly. That is why we decided to submit this letter to Professor Yuriy Mikhaylovich Lotman, a noted researcher in the field of culture, Russian literature historian and one of the greatest specialists in semiotics, a doctor of philological sciences. For nearly 4 decades he has lived in the Baltic area and his scientific and pedagogical activities have been related to his work at the university in Tartu. What is his view on such complex problems?

Life itself and, above all, the recent events we have witnessed make us consider and try to understand problems of this nature, the more so since frequently such questions arise in discussions with students and at this point ready-made convenient formulas will not do. I personally was born and grew up in Leningrad. The fact that after my university training I found myself in Tartu includes an element of chance. However, I am thankful for the development of circumstances which have firmly linked me to the fate of a republic which I already consider my own. In the course of a practical talk this may sound somewhat sentimental. However, I love

Estonia and the people who live here, and respond with all my heart to their needs and aspirations. Therefore, I shall extensively rely on the phenomena and events which are occurring here, for I am best familiar with them, and I hope that I understand them better, although, in all probability, such problems are quite typical of other parts of the country as well.

It is obvious that the author of this letter is trying to understand the essence of the problems which he has periodically encountered and is continuing to encounter in his daily life. Naturally, he is affected above all by the obvious manifestations of disrespect for human dignity, national traditions, way of life and so on. On the other hand, it seems to me, he includes in the concept of "national problem" a great deal of what was the result of command-administrative methods, which could not fail to have an adverse impact on all areas of our life but which, refracted in the lens of international relations, acquired an additional coloring as well.

The view is occasionally expressed that democratization, glasnost and perestroika seem to have aggravated the national problem. This is not so. The fact that many pressing and important problems of social development which, in the past, were frequently pushed aside and concealed have now found their place on the agenda as a result of the real possibility which has appeared to engage in their honest discussion and radical overall solution, is a different matter. Indeed, many aspects which are currently classified as national are essentially not. They have merely assumed a national aspect. On the other hand, the national problem, in its "pure" aspect also does not exist. It includes an entire range of political, economic, cultural and other relations. It is important to know what is cause and what is effect.

The point is, I believe, that in solving a number of economic and social problems in previous decades, the national factor was as a rule excluded. It was believed that the interests of the state (although frequently they concealed the interests of a union ministry or department) should automatically coincide with the interests of the republic and its population. It suddenly turned out, however, that the latest administrative initiative would trigger (sometimes unexpectedly even to its initiators) a negative reaction among the local population and "suddenly" a seemingly purely economic problem would be transformed into a national one.

For example, Moscow enterprises recruited outside manpower, as a result of which the new arrivals unwittingly became the rivals of the native population of the capital in terms of the allocation of housing and other social benefits. Imagine now that the overwhelming majority of migrants were members of a specific ethnic group. Immediately, such a socioeconomic problem would assume an ethnic coloring.

Such, precisely is the case with the Baltic area, an aspect which is noted by the author of the letter as well. By decision of the central planning authorities and union ministries, major industrial projects are under construction here regardless of available manpower. This stimulates mass migration of the population from other republics and the new arrivals are being given apartments, places in kindergartens and other actual social privileges, out of turn. Furthermore, many of them are people of a different culture, unfamiliar with the local language and unprepared for life in multinational collectives. This leads to the appearance of friction which could have been avoided entirely.

Let me be understood correctly: I do not oppose in the least migration as such. Furthermore, I believe that anyone should have the freedom to choose where he wants to live and work. Furthermore, today it would be unwise and unrealistic to speak of a national homogeneity in a republic. Russians have been settling in Estonia, particularly in the Pechorye, for a long time, and here, as elsewhere in the country, there has been a constant mixture of various nations and ethnic groups. This process should be natural and the principles governing the national deployment of production forces should be determined on a national scale.

In practice we frequently come across an entirely different approach on the part of ministries and departments. They try to build their enterprises wherever the infrastructure is the most developed, totally disregarding the interests of such areas and their populations. If such decisions add to the problem of any Russian territory, in the ethnic territories the national problem is added to them. In my view, each such plan should be drafted in accordance with everyone's opinion. The advice of the people should be sought and all possible consequences considered; diktat and arbitrary decisions should be avoided.

Let me cite a current example of such arbitrary decisions. Phosphorite deposits were discovered in Estonia and the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production is planning to undertake their development. Let me point out that our specialists have not even been asked to work on the project. In their view, the competence of which is unquestionable, such a development would cause irreparable damage to the environment, such as smoking dumps, drained soil and destruction of arable land... Yet this would cover almost one third of the republic's territory! One must also take into consideration the innate love which Estonians have for their environment, without which the culture of this people cannot be understood. To the Estonian, the landscape is like a huge book which is constantly being re-read and in which virtually every stone and ravine is related to legends and tales. To move them with a bulldozer means to insult profoundly national feelings, particularly if this is being done in accordance with a thoughtless departmental decision.

I am neither a geologist nor an economist and it is not up to me to determine how economically justified the plans of the ministry may be. Some of our specialists have greatly questioned the practical expediency of this step, not to mention the fact that careful thought should be given as to what is more effective in the final account, from the viewpoint of republic and national economic interests: to extract phosphorites in our country or else to protect the land which is feeding not only Estonia alone. Let me point out that the centrifugal forces in the national problem decisively prevail over centripetal forces if the population, if every resident of an ethnic area can clearly see the economic advantage of coexistence and if it contributes to improving his living conditions. To the bureaucrat, however, as a rule this is of no importance. In the final account, it is precisely he who bears responsibility for the aggravation of national conflicts.

For several months a stormy debate has been underway in various public halls and the press, radio and television. Everyone is discussing the "phosphorite problem." Meanwhile, the ministry personnel are only pouring oil into the fire by concealing from the public the results of the study, giving evasive answers, saying that the project has been postponed while, at the same time, they are continuing to work on it. Meanwhile, the atmosphere is heating up with every passing day.

In Russia such a problem would be considered economic, ecological or cultural but would not affect relations among nationalities. In this case, the clash between departmental ambitions and local interests is already assuming a different coloring. It is this type of mechanism which turns economic, social, ecological or many other conflicts into national. All the hurts, lack of understanding and misunderstandings pile up on top, at which point even arguments on not all that essential matters rise to the level of difficult problems.

What should be done? Listening to the viewpoints which are being voiced and attentively considering the views of opponents and soberly weighing all those who are "for" and "against," and jointly developing a **mutually acceptable** decision is necessary! In the final account, the point of view of the scientists and writers who opposed the project of transferring the stock of northern rivers was taken into consideration. Furthermore, the initiators of the movement virtually became national heroes. The same feelings are prevailing in our republic. The answer, however, consists of accusations of nationalism, parochialism and scorn for national interests. The harm which such accusations may cause becomes understandable.

It is one thing when we ourselves somehow create problems, frequently contributing to their transformation problems of our socioeconomic development into national problems. However, we must not fail to mention the other side.

We believe that our specialists in the social sciences should more clearly distinguish between concepts such as "national feelings," "national consciousness," and "nationalism." Naturally, it is difficult to draw demarcation lines in such matters, in both theory and practice. I would say the following: when national feelings develop into hostility or even hatred of another nation and when they cause it any given harm we are dealing with nationalism or chauvinism. The aspiration to do good for "one's own" (whether our family, nation or country) is justified only if it does not harm the neighbor. That, actually, is what the author of the letter is writing about.

Naturally, it is hardly possible to live without problems or arguments. It is time to become used to the idea that this is a natural condition for development. However, in order for problems of inter-nationality contacts not to become difficult to solve, patience must be displayed and particular attention shown in each "petty matter," and a skilled approach adopted in resolving arising differences. Unquestionably, tremendous tactfulness is needed above all. As V.I. Lenin pointed out, "in this matter one must be 1,000 times more cautious" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 53, p 190).

Naturally, it would be an unforgivable simplification to see in relations among nationalities only their negative, their conflicting side. However, nor should we ignore something else: whether we wish it or not, problems related to coexistence and interaction among numerous nations and ethnic groups within a single country have existed and did not appear only today or yesterday. They have accumulated over the years and have affected a great variety of areas of our life, including culture.

In my view, our multinational culture should be considered not only as a single entity but also as a complex interconnection of attractions and repulsions. Naturally, the role of Russian culture is tremendous for all ethnic groups in the country, above all thanks to its great potential. However, it would be naive to think that hegemony is possible in this area. Centers of intellectual life shift and cultural leaders change. A constant process of reciprocal enrichment takes place and who precisely has priority at any given moment is not all that important.

Culture cannot develop in a narrow national framework. Occasionally we speak of such a framework when we come across a self-defense reaction of a small ethnic group to which it seems that its culture, language and way of life itself are being threatened. Actually, this applies not only to small ethnic groups, for the way of life of many groups within the same ethnic nationality (such as Kazakhs or the Pomory of Arkhangelsk) is no less original and needs careful treatment. Incidentally, for as long as Russian culture has existed there has been a debate on its preservation and on ways of protecting and developing the Russian language. However, we cannot separate ourselves from outside influences, the more so in a contemporary world, with its exceptionally

increased complex interdependence. Furthermore, today we are on the threshold of the shaping a global culture which, in my view, will become one of the most important tasks of the next century. It would be difficult to imagine that we shall remain an isolated island in this ocean.

However, clumsiness or tactlessness could harm, despite the best possible intentions, even a splendid action such as the propaganda of a cultural legacy. We must not forget that whereas in matters of territory and population there are "large" and "small" nations, there are no "small" nations in culture. The territory and population of ancient Athens, which created one of the greatest world civilizations, at its peak could "fit" into an average oblast center today. Great cultures are created by great people, works and ideas. In this sense any true culture is a great culture. Those who promote the great (truly great!) Russian culture must remember the great Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Estonians and other cultures. It is only a highly cultured person who has the right to disseminate culture. Such a person would never allow any arrogance or bragging to take place.

The question of bilingualism is superimposed on this entire set of problems, also touched upon by V. Ogres in his letter. This has been a long on-going discussion not only in our country but in other multinational countries as well. I believe that any language is an opening leading to another culture and one of the most important tools for studying both it and our own. Many Europeans today are fluent in two or several languages. I believe that no two opinions are possible here: any person, whether a native or someone coming from another republic, knowing both his own and another language, has access to the cultural values, the treasury of thoughts and the spirit of the people to which fate has led him.

Naturally, we cannot do without knowledge of Russian in communicating, particularly in multinational collectives. However, the new arrivals as well, in my view, should learn the language spoken by the native population. For example, my children and grandchildren are already bilingual and I believe this to be entirely natural. As to the principles on the basis of which the study of both languages must be based in the school, a variety of viewpoints exist. I, for example, believe that the optional study of the Russian language in Estonian schools or of Estonian in Russian schools (as has been suggested by many) would be of little use: the people will end up by not learning that particular language. This, however, is my personal opinion. Whatever the training system may be, naturally, the main thing is to accomplish this not through coercion but for the people themselves to feel an interest in the language of the fraternal people and to realize the practical and spiritual usefulness of knowing that language.

Problems related to bilingualism affect not only the realm of education, for in my view we must look over the rule according to which a dissertation in the field of

Estonian or, let us say, Georgian philology, should be written in Russian. Obviously, we must seriously consider the suggestion of raising wages based on knowledge of a second language, naturally when a person needs this in his professional activities. Unquestionably, any high official who comes to the republic (naturally, not as a guest) should learn the language of its people and should be held to it.

On one occasion Carlyle noted that democracy comes surrounded by storms. A cleansing storm is sweeping off today anything that hinders progress and removes the alien encrustations of the past. This fully applies to the problem of relations among nationalities, where many remaining stereotypes and dogmas should be eliminated. Until recently, it seemed to many that such problems could wait and that they could be quite easily postponed for the future. Recent events have proved to all of us once again that we can no longer pretend that everything is in order. We must not push the disease back or "treat it" exclusively with the help of prohibitions. Daily, patient, tactful and intelligent work is needed. This must be done.

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05003

Touching the Source

180200120 Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 6, Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 109-115

[Letter to the editors by Ivan Vladimirovich Nastavshov, head of the Department of Scientific Communism, Kalingrad State University, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] Two circumstances led me to write this letter, on the basis of phenomena which I find worrisome.

The first which concerns me is the major weakening and, frequently, simply the loss of the tie which links many party members to the ideological foundations of the communist movement.

The second is related to the growing opposition to the process of perestroika for "ideological considerations," presented as efforts to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism from "distortions" and "revisions."

The "defenders" and "mourners" of socialism are nothing new to our history. They have frequently appeared on the historical scene and at any sharp turn in the socialist way of development. Let us recall the conversion to the new economic policy.

"I can imagine," V.I. Lenin wrote, "the noble indignation with which some people would react to these words... (the idea of the NEP—author). What? How can a conversion to state capitalism be considered a step

forward in a Soviet socialist republic?... Is this not a betrayal of socialism?" ("*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 206).

Our current "defenders" of the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and "mourners" for socialism are those same "vigilant guardians" who reject "with noble indignation" the innovative ideas of perestroyka. How is this "mourning" expressed? In the rejection of the very idea of perestroyka, in opposition to the reform and the application of economic management methods, in a negative reaction to initiative and in converting into a farce the election of managers.

It is also manifested in the fabrication of pamphlets opposing perestroyka. Noteworthy in this case is the extensive article by N. Andreyeva, "I Cannot Forgo Principles," which appeared in the 13 March 1988 issue of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The content of this article and its tonality motivated me to express my attitude toward some problems discussed in that article. In short, this is the answer of a teacher at a Kaliningrad VUZ to a teacher in a Leningrad VUZ.

Everyone realizes that today it is impossible to formulate any kind of serious political alternatives to perestroyka. It simply does not exist. Even the most inveterate moss-covered bureaucrat obviously feels that something must indeed be done. The result is that, purely on the surface, all of us are in favor of restructuring. It is a hopeless effort to oppose perestroyka openly. What then is left to the "mourners" and "defenders" of the foundations of socialism? One thing only: to fabricate articles which are essentially against perestroyka. The swords have crossed over Stalin's grave. This grave has become a real barricade at which the attitude of opponents and proponents of perestroyka become clear. This is by no means a question of Stalin personally, although he gets involved in it to a certain extent. It is mainly a question of the wish to palm off on us the ideology and practices of the cult of personality as a method of restructuring, with their anti-democratic nature and gross violations of the principles of scientific communism. It is an effort to go back to the worst part of the past, and to tighten up the screws with an iron hand or else to be guided by the Leninist idea that socialism is the live and creative creation of the toiling masses themselves. That is the crux of the matter!

In his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, M.S. Gorbachev most firmly said that "the culpability of Stalin and his closest associates to the party and the people for the mass repressions and illegalities which were committed is tremendous and unforgivable. It is a lesson for all generations." The question is, how to trigger the sympathy of the reading public and what are those who yearn for the powerful hand of the "boss" and for an "iron order" hoping for? All that is left is to romanticize the

past, relying on the poor memory of the people. Everything is put to work: Churchill's flattering reference, a gesture toward legalized millionaires and, naturally, "modesty reaching the level of asceticism," which "was not ashamed of itself."

I am profoundly convinced that it is much more important for us to recall, again and again, what was said by Marx, Engels and Lenin about the cult of personality and its tragic ruinous consequences, rather than collect all kinds of enthusiastic appraisals and characterizations which Stalin obtained from Churchill, General De Gaulle and other of his "frightening political opponents."

The founders of Marxism-Leninism scoured and rejected the possibility of the penetration of the cult of personality in the revolutionary movement, as a phenomenon which is profoundly alien to the labor movement, displaying exceptional sharpness, angry indignation and extreme dislike. Are the opinions of foreigners all that sacred! We ourselves composed odes unequal in their flattery.

I regret very much that in her walk along the snow-covered paths of the park in Petrovorets N. Andreyeva missed the opportunity of describing to her students the sharpness with which Marx and Engels opposed the cult of Lassalle and the indignation with which they spoke of his claim to the title of prophet, as well as the conditions under which Marx and Engels joined the secret society of communists. I would furthermore suggest to the students to imagine, even for 1 minute, the expressions which the classics of Marxism would have used in describing the cult of Stalin and his methods of leadership.

We are being told about a modesty which was not ashamed of itself. But where can we classify the monstrously false trials, the fabrication of numerous "cases," and the physical annihilation not only of one's opponents but also of rank and file party and nonparty members, not to mention oral singing of the praises and monuments erected while the person was still alive? Or should we remember exclusively the cigarette holder, the soft boots and the service jacket with its protective coloring? All of this depicts Stalin as "truthfully" as the film "Cossacks of the Kuban" depicts kolkhoz life at that time.

It is true that millionaires bit the dust. But what does this prove? Merely that the poisonous seed gave shoots. The elimination of the Central Control Commission, the creation of areas closed to criticism, the suppression of glasnost and democratization, the gross distortion of the basic principle of socialism and the organization of a system of benefits and artificial privileges were the sources of corruption, bribery and equalization.

It would be proper to ask: now, when these wasps' nests are being energetically eliminated and when the gold "stores" protected by cobras are being taken away, on

whose side are these millionaires? Was it not their treacherous hands that guided the actions of the excesses of hooligans in Sumgait? Is it not they who use such methods to test the strength of perestroika, democratization and glasnost, which are fatal to these nouveau riches? These "millionaires" found a common language with power-thirsty bureaucrats always, but never with glasnost! Should this be considered an "advantage" of perestroika?

One can feel, however, that the author of the article is not confident that she has been able to refurbish the dimmed image of the "leader" with the help of pompous benefactors. The waving of such a banner in an effort to lead the people is a rather unpromising occupation. In this case neither Churchill nor "modesty reaching asceticism" would help. The people have developed a firm immunity, an allergy to arbitrariness, illegality and repressions.

However, in order nonetheless to make us listen to evil prophecies, the author resorts to an unseemly but age-old and well tried method: fright.

Light-handedly, those who oppose the "mourners" of socialism have suddenly turned into the descendants of the basmaks, the NEPmen, the kulaks, and the heirs of Trotsky and Yagoda. They have acquired, so to say, a questionable ancestry. The ghosts of the "enemies of the people" have been revived. This is the right time for turning against them Beriya, with his infernal machine for indiscriminate killing of the guilty and the innocent, and only after that let us find out the truth and engage in posthumous rehabilitations. For the time being, it is a question of "who-whom." The struggle is becoming aggravated...

Let us look at the department where I work. There are ten people here of different age groups but amazingly similar in terms of social origin. All of them are children of simple workers and peasants, peasants mainly. Not one of us was harmed by socialism or is grumbling against the Soviet system.

All of us, however, are unanimous in one thing: in our ideological attachment to the ideals of perestroika and the principles of Marxism-Leninism. I am convinced that this stance is shared by the tremendous majority of Soviet people.

The result of all this is that, once again, we are classified as basmaks, and NEPmen and all that is left is to put on the "spiked gloves," to wait for the night and the knock at the door. Did this not happen? A retired colonel told N. Andreyeva that he did not come across cases of repression. He was either lucky, as we ordinarily refer to such cases, or else simply he sailed through. This lucky isolated case, however, is no grounds whatsoever for conclusions that no such things happened in general. Yes, it is also unquestionable that the people worked with dedication and even to excess. However, at the

same time, so was the infernal machine for destroying the "enemies of the people," including, extremely regrettably, its best representatives. Therefore, the heroic and the tragic went hand in hand and took place simultaneously and within the same historical space.

N. Andreyeva has set herself a difficult and, frankly, unattainable task. Opposed to it is life itself, the historical practices of the people. The unconvincing nature of her arguments and lack of proof are abundantly compensated by references to the harsh times, the status of being pioneers and historical roadlessness.

It is true that those were very harsh times. But who had made them such? Why was it that the period of the civil war and foreign intervention were any less harsh and that only then "very harsh" times came? Why is it that under such and even harsher conditions and desperately difficult objective historical circumstances, while the Communist Party and the state were headed by V.I. Lenin, there was no cult whatsoever? There was no one-man command and blind reverence to authority, not to mention the persecution of those who openly argued against Lenin.

What fundamental laws governing the development of socialist society were consistent with activities which entailed illegality and arbitrariness and a gross distortion of the principles of socialism? The lack of convincing answer is replaced by references to historical roadlessness and the position of pathfinder. But is there anyone who is marching ahead of us, to the places where we shall reach tomorrow? Each generation is a pioneer during the stretch of historical distance it covers.

I do not grant "pioneering" rights to illegality and terror, particularly in cases when a banner has been raised on which the sacred words of "everything for the sake of man and everything for the good of man" have been inscribed.

Everyone realizes that all this rhetoric about "historical roadlessness and harsh times" is used as a shield to conceal and to justify the crimes committed during those years. Today as well we are pioneers. This word is not an indulgence. It does not grant the right to arbitrary behavior but implies nothing but greater responsibility, caution and watchfulness, without any consideration of the fact that "if a tree is being felled chips will fly," and without any hope that violation of the principles of socialism would be written off as production costs and that "time will condense the results." What great cruelty lies in such terrible views expressed by the author. Can we forget the concept that not only the objective but also the means of achieving it must be pure and noble? You ask, how did such a passion for wasting the authority and the dignity of the leadership of the first socialist country in the world come about? This question is formulated incorrectly, as scientists usually say. The people cherish the memory of V.I. Lenin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.V. Frunze, S.M. Kirov, A.V. Lunacharskiy,

G.V. Chicherin, G.K. Ordzhonikidze and many other noted party and state leaders. Furthermore, the people are restoring the good memory, the honor and dignity of those who fell victim of Stalin's terror.

You write that today few people are bothered by Peter the Great's personal qualities. This is as may be, I shall not debate it. But what about the personal qualities of the "leader?" Today they bother a great number of people and one of the first among them who was quite concerned with such "personal qualities" was V.I. Lenin. Stalin's personal qualities "are not a petty matter or else they are the type of petty matter which may be of decisive significance." Lenin turned out to be tragically right.

Incidentally, as to Peter the Great. He neither violated nor distorted the principles of the cause he served but systematically strengthened them, which is what allowed him to raise the country to the level of a great power. That is why the fact that flowers are invariably laid on his sarcophagus is an entirely logical gesture.

On the other hand, what occurred under Stalin and what serious violations of the principles of socialism were committed by him and his closest retinue? Instead of true rule by the people there was the power of the bureaucracy; economic management methods were replaced by naked bureaucratic administration; initiatives, autonomy, creativity and enterprise were replaced by regulations.

Finally, what is the origin of this rudiment of suspicion with the help of which efforts are being made to find in any fresh thought or original view some foreign origins or even a "counterrevolutionary" national origin? Are we so poor intellectually that we cannot reach by ourselves simple truths such as the fact that elections must always be essentially democratic and not formal and that the law is the law and everyone is equal in its eyes.

You write that recently a student puzzled you with her view that the class struggle was an obsolete concept. But the precise reason for which there are students is so that they can be taught. Even a teaching assistant can explain to the student that the class struggle naturally remains as a means of solving the contradiction between labor and capital. The concept will become obsolete when this contradiction vanishes. Forgive me, but promoting this thesis in the practice of intergovernmental relations in our nuclear-space age, and failure to note the new realities, the multi-variant nature of global developments in particular, should be given a failing grade. It is very important for views not to fall behind life with its constant changes. Otherwise one could become confused and stuck with his "principles" and "eternal concepts."

Furthermore, since when has dogmatism become a criterion of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism? I read your article closely, several times. I fail to find proof of what specific principles you are unwilling to forgo.

Naturally, the general tonality of the article leads to some assumptions on this account. At that point, however, I become frightened. Let me say frankly that, to say the least, your claims not only to holding the monopoly on truth but also of loyalty to socialism and to its principles and ideals are immodest.

Let us now consider the way V.I. Lenin rated the "zealous minions" of the foundations. He wrote: "...Everything must be put to use in order to revive industry and agriculture at all cost. Those who can achieve the best results in this area, whether by adopting private capitalism or even without cooperatives, and without converting this capitalism into state capitalism, would be more useful to the cause of the all-Russian building of socialism than those who will 'think' of the purity of communism and issue regulations, rules and instructions... but would not move matters practically" (op cit., vol 43, p 233).

As we can see, spontaneously, without the help of Marx or Lenin, the ideas of petit-bourgeois vulgar socialism continued to reproduce themselves in the minds of many, based on envy and gross egalitarianism. These precisely are the origins of official zeal, of the irrepressible aspiration of equalizing one and all, of structuring everything according to a model. Therefore, if an official working for the rayispolkom or the financial office is dragging his feet and creating obstacles with the organization of cooperatives or with issuing a license for individual activity, he does this not because he is lazy or for lack of job discipline. He is doing something or, rather, doing nothing, he is sabotaging for reasons which are strictly "ideological," for he is "watching over" the "purity" of socialism. It is regrettable that these people do not realize that such home-grown "socialism" has nothing in common with scientific socialism. This kind of socialism appeared 100 years ago and reached its extreme manifestation in the views of Babeuf. If you were to tell such a "pure socialist" that he is nothing but a Babeufist, he would be so insulted that he would deem it his obligation to threaten you with the militia...

The profound mastery of the theoretical legacy of the classics of Marxism-Leninism is the only possible means of developing a firm immunity against recurrences of various prejudices and errors in the social consciousness. Only thus can we help the "defenders" of Marxism-Leninism and the "mourners" for socialism "not to fall into error" but become the true bearers of the ideas of scientific communism, the ideas and practices of restructuring.

Russia reached socialism through suffering. The Russian revolutionary intelligentsia was well familiar with the works of Marx and Engels. The first translation of "Das Kapital" into a foreign language was in Russian.

By the will of history our homeland became not only the country in which Marxism became most widespread but also the historical practice of millions of people, the

project and target of the entire nation. It is equally clear, however, that in itself the fact of being born in the Soviet Union does not make any one of us automatically a consistent materialist, not to mention a Marxist-Leninist. No certificate of having a scientific outlook is presented with the presentation of an internal passport to a citizen of the USSR. No one is born a Marxist-Leninist. One becomes such. The way to this goes through serious mental work and no less serious practical activity.

Each generation must, again and again, reproduce communist convictions and its support of the ideas and ideals of socialism. In this connection, I would like to make particular mention of the young people, for I have extensive experience in being in touch with graduates of this university, where I have worked since 1972. For many years I was chairman of the state examinations commission for scientific communism.

It may seem that after 5 years in a VUZ (not to mention secondary school although there as well social science is taught), hundreds of class hours and a number of intermediary forms of control (tests, examinations), nevertheless there are graduates unable to recall even the titles of works written by Marx, Engels and Lenin. And this occurs under situations in which not to recall, to forget becomes simply dangerous, for it may lead to a failing grade. I would like to believe that these cases are exceptional, for which reason they seem fantastic.

Nonetheless, I am concerned by the low standards of knowledge of the humanities, professional lack of competence and civic passiveness. Stupendous examples and convincing proof of this were cited at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Today the country's VUZs are experiencing difficulties with the new textbooks on Marxism-Leninism. To put it more simply, no such textbooks are as yet available. I am pleased by the fact that the lack of textbooks will encourage the young people to approach the virgin springs of communist thought. I noticed a long time ago that the young people consider difficult and, consequently, boring and uninteresting not only the Marxist-Leninist classics but also the classics of literature, such as Dostoyevskiy and Chekhov. In general, they consider as such anything which is considered classical, be it music or anything else.

In my time, I too failed to understand Dostoyevskiy and did not read Marx all that frequently. What hindered me was the tremendous gap between these giants of the mind and spirit and the modest possibilities of the reader. Consequently, we must not annoyingly ignore that which we cannot understand as yet but reduce this gap with stubborn efforts, persistently. It is then that the joy of knowledge, the condition of amazement and reverence for the power and greatness of these people will come. As the gap is narrowed, on each occasion one would discover for oneself a new Marx, a new Lenin. The reason

for this lies in their exceptional comprehensiveness and depth. A discovery is always a great joy, a joy for seeing the way the living thought which aspires to the truth is born and advances.

Perestroyka means, above all, the destruction of anything that is obsolete in social life. A process of democratization is underway, it is gathering strength. The people are learning democracy. Many of them for the first time are openly expressing their attitude toward life, political institutions and anything about which in the past they would rather keep silent. This is a tremendous accomplishment of restructuring, an accomplishment which has become part of life itself.

Awakening the activeness of people who had remained passive so far, and a conversion from historical hibernation to a new historical creativity cannot take place initially other than through meetings and debates. In the final account, the basic, the main events of perestroyka take place not on various rostrums where "left-wing liberals" or "traditionalists" develop hypothetical "models" of socialism but in the shops of plants and factories, at construction sites, in fields and livestock farms.

In order for such meetings and debates to have as few political "idiosyncrasies" and banalities as possible and in order for the process of civic maturing not to drag out—for this does not suit us, we must hurry, the time of revolutionary restructuring is urging us on—we must compress this time and this can be achieved best of all by remaining one to one with Marx and Lenin.

The classics of Marxism-Leninism are modern authors. To this day they are "more alive than the living." Turning to them will help the "mourners" get rid faster of the syndrome of being watchful guardians of the ideological purity of socialism. It will help them understand that neither the foundations are being destroyed nor the principles eroded but that it is all that is old, wearing the garb of defenders of ideological sterility, that is going away while desperately resisting. The time when authoritarian views and judgments were considered unappealable truths is in the past. What was honored was the "modesty of the researcher," rigidly determined by the bureaucrat's "fear of the conclusions" of science. It was a fear of the truth and of its "immodest" conclusions under the conditions of the triumph of social hypocrisy during the period of stagnation that contributed to erecting big obstacles on the way to a not always modest truth. We can only be amazed at how prophetically right was Marx. In his article "Debates on the Freedom of the Press" he wrote: "The more obstacles you erect on the way of the truth, the more substantive truth you will obtain! So, erect more obstacles!" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 1, p 61). We have been given this fundamental truth, the essence of which is that we simply have nowhere to retreat! Perestroyka is inevitable and necessary! There is no way back.

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Liberated Countries: Realities and Paradoxes of Development

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[Text] In the 1980s political personalities, journalists and orientalists came across a phenomenon which was hard to explain on the surface: the countries which had appeared in the place of the former colonial periphery, conventionally described as the "third world," had demonstrated in the international arena a sharp increase in political influence despite a relative decline of their role in the global economy.

The paradox, however, was only apparent.

Political influence is not always an indirect manifestation of the level of economic development or the size of the GNP. The activities of masses and leaders and their increased awareness of national interests and regional and global problems, and the changed correlation of forces in the world arena had turned the liberated countries, which today account for more than one half of all mankind, into active subjects of global politics. The economic difficulties of the third world themselves, the burden of huge indebtedness, and failure to establish a new international economic order are urging the developing countries to engage in decisive political actions. On the national and international levels, hundreds of millions of people, are becoming increasingly more involved in the whirlpool of political life.

The crisis-marked development of the third world, passing through social and political changes, local conflicts, and the efforts of billions of people to put an end to the vestiges of colonialism and racism and to change the system of international political and economic relations, and their opposition to the efforts of the West, the United States in particular, to gain in these areas a sociopolitical and, in frequent cases, a military revenge, have all brought about the intensified social activeness of the broad masses. The countries which rejected the colonial yoke were and remain an arena in the struggle for the choice of a way of socioeconomic development: socialist or capitalist. As was noted at the ceremonious meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, a "growth of political energy is taking place in the course of the shaping of nations and the true strengthening of national countries, among which countries with revolutionary systems hold an important place."

Politics in the liberated countries and their policies in the contemporary interrelated world are closely interwoven with universal problems, such as ensuring peace and security, determining the fate of human civilization,

preventing the militarization of outer space, environmental protection and, finally, the task of ensuring the survival of the human species itself. The contribution which the young countries are making to the solution of such problems or to the struggle for solving them cannot be overestimated. It is no accident that the nonaligned movement, which includes essentially countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, has become a substantial factor in world politics.

The "politicization" of socioeconomic life itself in the third world confirms the major and profound social changes which have taken place. The processes which are taking place here and their interconnection with those in the remaining global community are of a disparate and largely conflicting nature.

The collapse of the imperialist colonial system in the 1950s and 1960s triggered optimistic hopes expressed in political declarations and theoretical forecasts. It was assumed that the countries which had gained their independence (or else had taken the path of strengthening their independence) would be able to secure for themselves a faster "catching up" economic development, particularly in industry. Indeed, until the end of the 1970s, the increase in the GNP in Asia, Africa and Latin America was, as a whole, somewhat higher than in the Western countries; their economic structures changed quickly and, whereas at the beginning of the 1950s the share of the processing industry in the GNP was less than a third that of agriculture, today it exceeds the latter.

It was above all the increasing and higher-priced exports of mineral and agricultural raw materials to the West that were supposed to provide resources for this advancement. The substantial increase in the price of petroleum and some other commodities in the 1970s seemed to back a trend favoring the third world.

It was believed that the increased contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the former mother countries would lead to an increased conflict of their interests and to the political polarization separating the liberated countries from the West. Since historically capitalism is in a declining stage, according to many theoreticians in the third world and the socialist countries, it would be unable to "develop" a former colonial periphery, to ensure its socioeconomic development and to include it in the global capitalist system.

Several countries chose as a real alternative to the developing situation a path of socialist orientation which "bypassed" capitalist development. Progress in that direction was to be supported by the steadily growing

economic and other power of socialism, which was gradually approaching in terms of basic parameters the economic and scientific and technical standards of the leading capitalist countries.

Reality, however, turned out to be much more complex, contradictory and varied. The historical doom of the capitalist system does not mean in the least a cessation of economic, and scientific and technical development or the structural reorganization of its economy. Making use of the latest achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, capitalism reached a new level, distinguished by increased science-intensive sectors and services. The energy crisis of the 1970s accelerated the structural reorganization, as a result of which energy and material intensiveness per unit of gross national product drastically declined. Correspondingly, this reduced imports of all sorts of raw materials produced in the third world, with the exception of rare-earth metals. Successes in the agrarian sector reduced the needs of leading capitalist countries to import some types of agricultural raw materials and created a major export potential. Fearing for political and, partially, economic considerations, of becoming dependent on the former colonial periphery for a number of types of raw materials, the Western countries sharply expanded geological surveys on their own territories. This led to the discovery of substantial mineral deposits. As a result, between 1962 and 1983 the share of third world imports by Western countries declined from 71 to 67 percent for fuel, from 35 to 32 percent for mineral non-energy raw materials, and from 26 to 23 percent for agricultural raw materials.

The development of science and technology enabled the Western countries to retain, with the help of robotics and contemporary information industry facilities, even the lower and middle production stages (such as the clothing industry) which had been previously considered more advantageous to grant to the developing countries with their traditional abundance of inexpensive manpower. In a number of sectors the use of more expensive but skilled manpower, which can handle a modern technology, turns out to be more profitable than the utilization of inexpensive but less well-trained labor.

The share of the developing countries in world trade began to decline at the start of the 1980s. Commodity flows among Western countries increased faster than their trade with the third world. The deficits in the trade balance of the former colonial countries became chronic, which forced them to resort to foreign loans. Some countries erroneously relied on the excessive use of foreign loans for domestic needs. They were urged in this both by the imperialist countries as well as the international financial agencies under their control. The capital was provided from the credit markets partially from a surplus of "petrodollars," which had accumulated in some petroleum exporting countries but which remained under the control of multinational bank corporations.

On paper the loans appeared like siphoning off funds into the capitalist periphery (it is true that this did not take into consideration the reverse "clandestine" outflow of capital channeled into the latest imperialist banks by the local corrupt "elites"). By no means were all the funds thus acquired used productively. They were partially "eaten up" by the ruling classes. Finally, the aid in food, which increased the indebtedness of Asian, African and Latin American countries, was costing the West less than the storing of its own agricultural commodities.

By the second half of the 1980s the third world owed the West \$1 trillion. Loan repayments (the so-called "loan servicing") turned into a net outflow of funds toward the West starting with 1984, totaling \$20-40 billion annually.

In a number of developing countries the state sector, encumbered by corruption, incompetence, bureaucratism and excessive inflation of the administrative apparatus, proved unable adequately to react to the worsened circumstances of international trade, the increased foreign indebtedness and the aggravation of domestic socio-economic and ecological problems.

The economic growth of the liberated countries as a whole drastically slowed down in the 1980s. An absolute decline in production took place in a number of African countries, particularly in per capita terms. The gap between developed and developing countries began to widen rather than to shrink. In 34 of the poorest countries in the world the per capita GNP today is on an average 40 times lower than in the developed Western countries (in 1960 the ratio was 21:1). This gap is particularly dangerous also because it is increasingly assuming not merely of a quantitative but also a qualitative nature. The scientific and technical revolution provides in principle broad opportunities for the development of Asian, African and Latin American countries. However, it intensifies their dependency on the West in which most of the scientific research and science-intensive sectors are concentrated. The third world is experiencing increased need to import technical knowledge, licenses, consultation services and facilities for the information industry.

Higher wages and greater opportunities for scientific research and other work requiring higher skills are luring to the Western countries tens of thousands of scientists and specialists from countries which rejected the colonial yoke. Economists have estimated that this "brain drain," i.e., this intellectual bloodletting, is costing the third world between 4 and 6 billion annually. However, Western benefits are much greater than such amounts, for the participation of scientists coming from Asia, Africa and Latin America in ensuring a "breakthrough" in basic and applied sciences in essentially new directions can be difficult to assess in quantitative terms.

The contrast in this picture becomes even greater if we take into consideration that prior to the beginning of the 1980s a relatively fast economic upsurge was characteristic not of the entire third world but only of two groups of so-called "new industrial" and petroleum exporting countries and territories accounting for approximately one quarter of the population of this zone. More than two thirds of the growth of the GNP in the liberated countries was achieved precisely by the "new industrial" and petroleum exporting countries. Their share in the overall third world GNP rose from 44.6 percent in 1960 to 64.5 percent in 1982. This trend has been maintained also in the second half of the 1980s. Such an uneven development led to a drastic differentiation within the former colonial periphery between different countries as well as within large countries (such as India) among individual areas.

The nature of contradictions between the imperialist bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie and the ruling strata and groups in the developing world, oriented toward capitalism, changed. Having gained political power and taken their share of the "pie" of the national resources, increasingly such classes and social groups prefer cooperation rather than confrontation with the imperialist bourgeoisie. However, they can cooperate only as junior and unequal partners. Their dependence on the main centers of capitalism and the old mother countries and multinational corporations is becoming not only financial, economic and technological but also political (and in some cases military-political). For that reason such dependence is even increasing rather than diminishing.

At the same time, progress along the path of building socialism as an alternative to capitalist development proved to be longer and more difficult than was presumed in the 1960s and 1970s, despite the obvious successes reached in that direction. To begin with, countries with a socialist orientation, the overwhelming majority of which are within the world capitalist economy, are experiencing its direct and indirect impact. Second, in themselves revolutionary-democratic changes are of a conflicting nature. They dialectically combine bourgeois-democratic elements, which unfetter the development of capitalism (such as the agrarian reforms carried out in a number of countries) as well as anti-capitalist elements (nationalization of big and medium-sized capital). Third, a petty commodity production and partially traditional economic sectors spontaneously create capitalism "from below," so to say. Finally, wherever the revolutionary-democratic vanguard is unable to secure a priority of public over private interests, a capitalist development "from above" takes place through the growth of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This is accompanied by or based on a crisis in the state sector and its economic and, consequently, political functions. That is why the irreversible nature of the process of socialist orientation can be achieved not only by converting the revolutionary vanguard to the positions of scientific socialism and Marxism-Leninism, but also through profound socioeconomic changes within the society and

the close cooperation in the political and economic areas between such countries and the global socialist system. It is precisely at that point that the major concept formulated in the CPSU program can be implemented, to the effect that the noncapitalist way, the way of a socialist orientation chosen by several liberated countries, provides them with broad opportunities for social progress.

Another question which must be reformulated under the conditions of the 1980s is that of the possibility of capitalism as a system to draw into its orbit the young states. Today the West is intensifying the capitalist development of Asian, African and Latin American countries, acting as an external factor with the help of international economic and other relations and, as an internal factor, through the branches of multinational corporations, investments in modern economic sectors and other channels. The capitalist system has become economically dominant in the countries which chose the capitalist way. Obviously, for this reason it is still too early to say that capitalism has lost its ability to grow both "in depth," or, in other words, vertically, as well as "in width," or horizontally.

Having reached a new level of transformation, and based on the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, capitalism is increasingly internationalizing the world market and international production and developing new forms of enslavement of the former colonies and its own periphery through a system of collective neocolonialism. The visible features of this system are not only the decisions collectively adopted by the Western leadership in the course of the consultations among the seven leading capitalist countries. The activities of multinational monopolies and the international headquarters of financial capitalism—the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—also include imposing upon the third world policies and socioeconomic models suitable to imperialism which, as the CPSU program notes, "tries to emasculate the sovereignty gained by the young states and to preserve and even strengthen its control over them."

One of the most adverse effects of imperialism on the liberated countries is their involvement in the arms race. To the West, the United States above all, it has become a means of exerting military-political and psychological pressure on Asian, African and Latin American countries. Let us note that military expenditures in the developing countries are increasing faster than the global average and have significantly caught up with the growth of their GNP; by the mid-1980s they accounted for approximately \$120 billion. These countries account for two thirds of world arms imports. This means that the resources of the developing countries are being exhausted in the course of a senseless pursuit of armaments, waste of best cadres and the deformation of already fragile and backward socioeconomic structures. A direct connection may be traced between the huge debts incurred by the third world and its armament expenditures.

In evaluating the methods of neocolonialism, in our view it would be erroneous to believe that today capitalism as a system is interested in the stagnation of the third world and the preservation of precapitalist economic systems. Such preservation of traditional structures is not only fraught with sociopolitical explosions with unpredictable consequences but is also a hindrance to "streamlining" the exploitation of countries which have rejected the colonial yoke. The interests of the West are better served by development. Nonetheless, it must be a dependent development of the third world and involvement with capitalist production on the part of increasingly broader masses of its population, serving as targets of exploitation, expanding the markets for its commodities and, as a whole, promoting the neocolonialist "development" of the former colonial periphery.

The fact that this is paralleled by siphoning off some of the added product, which either limits or undermines expanded capitalist reproduction, is a different matter and so is the fact that some imperialist detachments, multinational corporations or even entire countries, guided exclusively by the interest of increasing their profits, could aspire to the predatory superplundering of the developing countries, depriving them of the possibility of further capitalist change. They may support the preservation of methods of precapitalist exploitation and capitalist exploiting strata. All of this is the price of the overall integration of the majority of former colonial countries with the global capitalist system, on a new basis.

Under the thus developing circumstances, the real possibilities of socialism in the international arena assume an essentially important role. Even if we take into consideration the historical doom of capitalism, to a certain extent it would be illusory to claim that the influence of socialism on the course of global developments is increasing in all areas—economic, political and ideological—not only in terms of the overall long-term future but also within each limited time segment, always and under all circumstances. In war, during a period of overall offensive, there are "strategic pauses" and temporary failures. The lagging of the Soviet economy and technology in a number of parameters behind the economy of the advanced capitalist countries was noted at the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. This fact indicates not only a temporary weakening of the "demonstration effect" of socialism in the liberated countries but also a lowering of its real economic and technological opportunities for influencing the course of events and the choice of ways by the former colonial countries. Let us emphasize that it is a question of a limited time interval which does not eliminate the overall progress of human society.

Another peculiarity marking the situation of the third world is that here processes pertaining to different historical ages clash and interweave in a complex interaction. As was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, "the contemporary world is complex and varied and

dynamic, imbued with clashing trends and crowded with contradictions. It is a world of most complex choices..." In Africa, for example, the ethnic differentiation and integration, which were characteristic of Europe at the beginning of the second millennium, or else Islamization, which was typical of the Middle and Near East at that time, becomes superimposed on uncoordinated formative processes. Most frequently capitalism exists as an economic system whereas the majority of the population has a precapitalist way of life. The army of hired labor is rapidly increasing in the entire third world (from 150-160 million people in 1960 to 290-300 million at the beginning of the 1980s). Quantitatively, however, the traditional or neotraditional social strata have maintained their size and have even increased. What we mean by neotraditional strata is a population which is part of precapitalist social structures (such as tribe, community, or religious brotherhood), which have changed under the new circumstances and adapted to capitalist development without, however, turning into strata or classes of contemporary society. Fast urbanization is taking place without a corresponding industrial and social base, which leads to the expansion of "marginal" strata, unemployment and semi-unemployment (450 million people at the beginning of the 1980s), and to mass pauperism. The high level of organic structure of capital in the contemporary sector and its respective labor productivity make the masses of working people unnecessary, after expelling them from their traditional industries. This dooms them not simply to temporary unemployment but also to forced parasitism.

All of this, within the framework of a dependent capitalist development, is accompanied by the aggravation of fierce social contradictions, polarization and the endless suffering of the working people. Crises, social cataclysms and political coups d'état in the third world are essentially preprogrammed. They also occur because the governmental structures in the liberated countries, copied from the Western models, change in terms of their nature and forms of functioning, adapting themselves to local traditions and features, i.e., becoming relatively unstable. However, the social and political coups in the former colonial world could take place both in the guise of national democratic and socialist revolutions as well as rebellions mounted by traditional or neotraditional social strata. This is exemplified by the "Islamic revolution" in Iran and the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism as the political banner of many social trends in the so-called "Moslem countries."

The social consciousness in countries in which a major or a significant portion of the population is related to precapitalist economic systems, is a reflection of social relations although, in frequent cases, in a distorted or transformed aspect. The patron-client relations (socio-economic relations of patronage and personal dependence), the castes, clans and tribalism, and membership in ethnic-confessional groups influence the shaping of political thinking, the activities of political trends and organizations and political behavior.

This reformulates the question of the role of "information imperialism" in the young countries. The domination of Western mass information media, from news agency reports to television programs and from the marketing of video cassettes to bribing the local press, is aimed at imposing upon the peoples of the liberated countries Western and bourgeois social, cultural, political and other values and orientations. The most receptive to such values are a segment of the local big bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-oriented minority. The opposition to "information imperialism" is provided, above all, by the local intelligentsia which is defending its national culture. However, even among the majority of the population, at the expense of which the capitalist transformation of society is taking place, "information imperialism" is creating an adverse reaction, the desire to lock oneself in the shell of traditional values and customary forms of spiritual life. For that reason the influence of the Western mass information media in the developing countries, while being one of the obstacles to a possible socialist choice by the masses, does not eliminate but intensifies their opposition to neocolonialism, which may be manifested in most unexpected forms.

In the matter of contradictions and differences between developing countries and imperialist states, matters are not limited to the masses but affect their political leaderships as well. For both objective and subjective reasons, in the international arena many leaders of Asian, African and Latin American countries assume positions which neither coincide with nor are the opposite of those held by the leadership of the main Western countries. This applies to the radical problems of the struggle for peace and international security, eliminating wars as instruments of politics in international relations and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Despite the difficulties experienced by the young states, the platform on which they have based their cooperation with the socialist world may have narrowed in some areas and broadened in others. Politically, the similarity or coincidence of the views held by the USSR and the nonaligned countries provide a rather convincing example of this fact.

Channeling the huge funds spent in armaments into meeting national economic needs is an idea shared by socialism and the third world. The concept of a comprehensive system of international security, actively supported by the USSR and the other socialist countries, organically includes the principle of development through disarmament. It is understandable that this problem can be solved by mankind only through the efforts of the entire international community.

The position held by the USSR, as expressed at the International Conference on the Connection Between Disarmament and Development, which took place last September in New York, is that problems of economic, scientific and cultural progress are interconnected with

problems of international security. In order to untangle them we must immediately undertake to convert resources to peaceful purposes. Clearly, it must be a question of funds which are truly released as a result of limiting and reducing nuclear and other armaments. This is the essence of the concept of the interconnection between disarmament and development.

At the New York conference the representatives of the USSR called for the creation of an international "Disarmament for Development" foundation, which would be the mechanism for transferring to the needy countries some of the funds saved as a result of disarmament, and for holding a special meeting on this problem by the leaders of the countries which are members of the UN Security Council. The Soviet Union, which spoke out in favor of creating a democratically stable trade system, which would ensure economic security for all countries, proclaimed its agreement to participate in a general fund for raw material goods, which was demanded by the nonaligned countries.

In order to solve the problem of foreign debts, the USSR suggested, in particular, that the amounts of the annual payments made by debtor countries be limited in such a way as not to harm the interests of their socioeconomic development. In the opinion of the Soviet leadership, it is also necessary to start a struggle against protectionism, to restructure the monetary system in accordance with the interests of all countries and to take efficient steps to expand equal multilateral trade. Great possibilities become available by lifting from the developing countries the burden of military expenditures. The Soviet Union favors bilateral and multilateral talks on limiting the sale and deliveries of conventional weapons.

The program which was formulated by the Soviet leadership on 15 January 1986 on freeing mankind from nuclear and other mass destruction weapons by the year 2000 stipulates the allocation of funds for socioeconomic development as the most important measure paralleling agreements on limiting armaments and disarmament. Had the suggestions presented in this declaration been adopted, funds running into the billions could have been released from the military area.

The common platform shared by socialist and developing countries is the struggle for solving the global problems of mankind: from environmental protection to eliminating diseases and illiteracy and from abolishing hunger to the peaceful development of oceans and outer space.

The most important areas of cooperation between socialism and the liberated countries are economic and scientific and technical. These areas cover the struggle for a new international economic order, equal and mutually profitable economic and scientific and technical relations and opposing the policy of exploitation pursued by the capitalist "centers."

Finally, neocolonialism itself, as the essence of relations between developed capitalist countries and their "periphery," preserves and strengthens the anti-imperialist potential in Asia, Africa and Latin America, converting the countries in those areas (and not only those following a socialist path) into objective allies of the socialist community in many problems. It is only with the cooperation of the USSR and the other socialist countries that they could hope to solve or alleviate their most pressing problems, strengthen their state sovereignty and even protect the interests of the national bourgeoisie in its struggle against multinational corporations.

However, there is also another, a most important link in the "socialism-developing countries" system: the situation in the USSR and in the entire socialist community. In this sense, the acceleration of the socioeconomic development in the USSR and the other socialist countries, reducing and eliminating the gap between the economic and scientific and technical standards between socialist and developed capitalist countries or, in short, success in the revolutionary restructuring initiated in Soviet society, will be of decisive significance to the future of socialism and the third world.

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Lenin and Contemporary Social Revolutions
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Apr 88 (signed to press 4 Apr 88) pp 125-127

[Review by G. Diligenskiy, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Lenin i Problemy Sotsialnoy Revoljutsii Sovremennosti" [Lenin and Problems of the Social Revolution in Our Time] by Yu.A. Krasin. Mysl, Moscow, 1987, 447 pp]

[Text] The author of this book is known for his works on problems of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the revolution. The work was initially planned as an updated edition of the book which came out 10 years ago ("Teoriya Sotsialisticheskoy Revoljutsii: Leninskoye Naslediye i Sovremennost" [Theory of the Socialist Revolution: The Leninist Legacy and Contemporaneity]. Mysl, Moscow, 1977). Naturally, however, the author could not remain within the limitations of this relatively modest concept and the new version is a practically new book. This is noteworthy in itself for the history of recent decades has introduced so many new features in the course of global social developments and in the conditions of the revolutionary struggle, that today it is no longer possible to publish simply a "patched up" and updated reproduction of concepts which were considered just about axiomatic only a few years back. Changes in the historical circumstances and unfettered theoretical thinking under the influence of the revolutionary renovation of our society and the course charted by the 27th

CPSU Congress motivate us, as the author notes, "to take a new look at the world revolutionary process," and to make a qualitative leap in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory (see page 3).

The main topic of the book is the further intensified mastery of V.I. Lenin's theoretical legacy. This is a necessary prerequisite for the study of contemporary social processes. Furthermore, loyalty to Leninist doctrine is inconceivable today without its creative development and without answers to the new questions "which did not face Lenin" (p 9).

Let us emphasize in this connection a feature of the book which, in our view, is of essential significance. In formulating the task of eliminating doctrinairism, which is still quite widespread in our science, the author justifiably considers as its main danger the fact that it separates theory from the contradictions created by practice and triggers the illusion that there is total clarity in all matters. In scattering such an illusion, the author nonetheless realizes that today it is still impossible to replace obsolete with fully developed new concepts on the theory of the social revolution in our time. Accordingly, he considers as his task in highlighting contradictions between the theoretical concepts of yesterday and today's practice, to formulate relevant questions and to encourage our social scientists to think about unsolved problems.

Thus, in the light of new historical experience, actually the author reconsiders the most difficult problem of the dialectics between the subjective and objective factors in the socialist revolution. The most valuable feature here is the systematic elimination of an almost fatalistic determinism in understanding the objective prerequisites for revolutions which until recently prevailed among Soviet and other social scientists. As Yu.A. Krasin accurately notes, the "objectivistic position expressed by the formula that objective laws are in our favor, meaning that the game has been won, is a dead concept which politically demobilizes the working class" (p 72). The concept of the great choice of possibilities which appear at each new turn of historical developments and the fact that the use of such opportunities takes place through the struggle of social forces, considered by the author, is very important theoretically as well as practically. The substantiation by the author of this multiple choice is closely related to the fruitful ideas he develops on the relative nature of the line separating objective from subjective factors and the dialectics of their interpenetration: ideas or political orientations which, today, are topics of the free choice of individuals, groups and parties, tomorrow become interwoven within the actual fabric of social relations and part of objective reality; therefore the limits of what is objectively possible could be either broadened or narrowed. In analyzing the features of the general crisis of capitalism, the author justifiably notes that its intensification is combined with a multidimensional modification of capitalist contradictions; it would have been quite useful for the author to

trace the way they interact currently with the dynamics of the subjective aspect of the revolutionary process and the way they influence the comprehensive nature of ways of social development.

One of the crucial points in the study is the attitude of the socialist revolution toward the state. In analyzing the foundations of the rule of monopoly capital in bourgeois society, the author convincingly proves that this rule is maintained not simply by force but also by a system of social alliances and socio-class compromises and concessions granted to some groups of the middle and the working class (see pp 168-171). Unquestionably, this approach (which, incidentally, is very similar to the concept of cultural hegemony expressed by A. Gramsci) opens extensive opportunities for the creative development of the strategy of revolutionary parties and the formulation by them of ways of transforming the class nature of governmental power. Nonetheless, such a study may have been more extensive had the author related today's sociopolitical realities not only to the policy of the bourgeoisie but also to the existing contradictions in the interests and awareness of mass social groups.

The book introduces many new features in understanding main concepts of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the revolution, such as the breakdown of the bourgeois state and the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In his consideration of such problems the author strictly follows the specific historical approach. He brings to light differences in objective conditions which determine the attitude of the revolutionary working class toward the state. Changes in condition also trigger the need for the creative development of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of a socialist type of rule. The author formulates the major concept that "with the intensification of the global revolutionary process possibilities of achieving a transition to socialism in more democratic forms than was the case in the past may appear" (p 183). He justifiably emphasizes the interest of the working class in ensuring the continuity of development of democratic forms, institutions and standards of political life in the course of revolutionary changes. Such changes, however, are inconceivable without changes in the class content of democracy and without the democratization of the "civic society," i.e., the sum total of social relations.

Our time has reformulated the problems related to the development of the revolution as a global process. As Yu.A. Krasin notes, "the replacement of the capitalist with a socialist system on a global scale appears, at the end of this century, as being a lengthier and more difficult process than it previously seemed" (p 425). This circumstance greatly changes existing concepts on the interaction among different global revolutionary forces and the conditions, forms and immediate tasks governing their activities. Another most important factor which urgently requires an updating of such concepts is that of the critical aggravation of the global problems of human civilization and, above all, the need for the prevention of

a global thermonuclear war. The real threat of the annihilation of mankind turns the universal interest of survival into a priority to which national and class interests are subordinated. As a rule, the author emphasizes, "the class struggle is inevitable today as well. However, it is developing within a system of coordinates of nuclear space realities. This means that it must be correlated with the broader interaction of forces for the sake of the preservation of the human species" (p 422).

The interconnection between the struggle for peace and social progress and the revolutionary role of global socialism under the conditions of peaceful coexistence among opposite social systems are the most topical theoretical problems which our time has posed to Marxist-Leninist thinking. This book is a contribution to their creative study. Based on Lenin's theoretical legacy, the documents of the 27th CPSU Congress and the principles governing the new style of political thinking formulated by our party, the author proves that the struggle for peace is following its own course which does not totally coincide with the transformation of society from capitalist to socialist. These processes, however, are interrelated: the basic social forces which form the potential for peace were established and strengthened in the course of the revolutionary process and their activities are aimed at restricting the aggressive trends of imperialism.

Quite recently our social thinking became enriched with a new and exceptionally fruitful study of the historical experience of socialism and its long term developments, made by the CPSU. One could say that in the course of perestroika socialism is seeking and acquiring its true features, asserting the great humanistic objectives in the name of which the socialist revolution was made.

These ideas are most directly related to the topic of this book, for they pertain to the most important problem of the objectives of the contemporary social revolution: for what type of socialism, strictly speaking, are we fighting and what should be its qualitatively new parameters? Unfortunately, in accordance with an old tradition, the author does not analyze this problem especially, as though assuming that the answer to it is more or less axiomatic and was provided long ago. Yet it is precisely this that today is a basic question in the development of the global revolutionary process and the lack of solution is the root of many difficulties accompanying this development. Simply deriving the "laws of the socialist revolution" from past revolutionary practices, without the study of the negative elements in such practices and their unsolved problems, can no longer be considered adequate. This applies to the economic aspects of revolutionary changes, such as the ways, means and forms of establishing and developing the public ownership of means of production and, to an equal extent, the problems related to the establishment of a socialist democracy and its scale. It is important to take into consideration the gravity and complexity of these problems in the study of the objectives and potential of socialism. In particular, it is hardly possible today to speak simply of

the laws governing the dictatorship of the proletariat without asking how to avoid its corruption into bureaucratic centralism and how to ensure the democratic nature of its implementation, for it was precisely this problem that particularly concerned V.I. Lenin in the final years of his life. The extremely important international significance of perestroyka lies precisely in the fact that it is making a substantial practical contribution to the solution of all such problems, thus providing new opportunities in the struggle for social progress and socialism.

Yu.A. Krasin's book unquestionably bears the mark of the atmosphere of creative intellectual quest which the course of perestroyka and democratization has established in our country. Nonetheless, we believe, its influence could have been deeper. We are living in a time of unparalleled high pace of reconstruction of social and spiritual life and the traditional literary book publishing activities and the writing of ~~fundamental~~ works cannot always keep up pace with it, for ~~we~~ substantial gaps remain. Despite such fully explained ~~problems~~, however, the reader has been presented with a valuable and meaningful book which greatly intensifies our ideas on the social revolution in our time.

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Short Book Reviews

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[Text] "Leniniana: Prodolzheniye Poiska" [Leniniana: The Search Continues]. Lenizdat, Leningrad, 1987, 302 pp. Reviewed by R. Vashchenko.

The Party History Institute of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom, which is a branch of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, has completed a useful and necessary work by compiling the second collection of "Leniniana." A first collection was published several years ago (see KOMMUNIST No 6, 1984). The articles included in the collection deal primarily with Lenin's activities related to Leningrad. They show the history of the search for, detection, gathering and publication of works and documents by V.I. Lenin. On the basis of new information this work supplements the biographic chronicle of V.I. Lenin, which was produced in 12 volumes by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and refines individual aspects of the chronicle.

The merit of this publication rests also in the fact that the articles were written, as a whole, in an extremely concise and brief style, without any repetition of familiar facts. A number of materials contain a study of the sources used in the study of Lenin's works, bringing to light less known facets and assessing the significance of

individual recollections as historical sources. Some articles trace the development of Lenin's concepts of "party-mindedness of the masses," the "leftist bloc," the slogan of worker control of production, and the theory of cooperation, which is important in terms of the creative study of the Leninist legacy under contemporary conditions. Some of the materials include letters which the working people sent to Lenin, and descriptions of places where he stayed and his activities, as well as the Lenin memorial museums in Leningrad.

The production of the latest collection of quotes *Leniniana* by the Party History Institute of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom has unquestionably added interesting knowledge to historical Leniniana and the study of Lenin, including new aspects, approaches, observations, facts and conclusions. Let us hope that the Leningrad scientists will continue this a fruitful and interesting work they have initiated in the same archeographic trends and studies of sources.

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International Meeting of Journalists

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[Text] A meeting among editors of theoretical and political journals of communist and worker parties of socialist countries and countries with a socialist orientation was held in Berlin on 22-23 March on the subject of "Socialism and the New Stage of the Scientific and Technical Revolution." This international forum was held with the participation of representatives of the journals NOVO VREME (Bulgarian Communist Party) TARSADALMI SZEMLE (MSZMP), TAP TI KONG SHAN (Vietnamese Communist Party), EINHEIT (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), KADAYA AL-ASR (Yemen Socialist Party) KYLLOCHZHA (Korean Labor Party), CUBA SOCIALISTA (Cuban Communist Party), ALUN MAY (Lao People's Revolutionary Party), NAMYN AMDRAL (Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party), NOWE DROGI (PZPR), ERA SOCIALISTE (Romanian Communist Party), KOMMUNIST (CPSU), NOVA MYSL (Czechoslovak Communist Party), MES-KEREM (Ethiopian Labor Party) and PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, the theoretical and information journal of communist and worker parties.

The importance of the acceleration of scientific and technical progress in terms of the fate of world socialism was emphasized at the meeting; an exchange of practical experience took place on covering such problems in the journals; problems of the further development and intensification of cooperation among party publications on a multilateral and bilateral basis were discussed.

The delegations visited the Erfurt district, where they studied the implementation of the SED course of production intensification and the extensive application of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution in the national economy of the GDR. The heads of the delegations were received by E. Krentz, Politburo member and SED Central Committee secretary.

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Chronicle

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[Text] The editors of KOMMUNIST were visited by a group of students from the Lao People's Democratic Republic, who are attending the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. The guests were informed about the basic areas of work of the editors and the participation of KOMMUNIST in preparations for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

The restructuring of the economic mechanism and its connection with social processes occurring in Soviet society, informal social associations, and problems of the struggle for peace were topics discussed between the editorial personnel and Italian journalists Daniela Arquibugi and Paola Ferretti who visited the journal.

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